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South Africa is a country steeped in sport, which is an important part of the culture of 
large parts of the population. The new political dispensation in South Africa that came 
into existence in 1994 recognized the inequalities that had negatively affected South 
Africans in sport and in other areas of their lives, over the span of many years. It 
prompted government to introduce affirmative action measures in sport as in other 
areas of the lives of South Africans. After 26 years these affirmative action measures 
that have been implemented in sport still remain a challenge for sports governing 
bodies, and are still controversial.  
This dissertation aims to delve deeper into these affirmative action measures and, 
specifically, to critically analyze the legality of racial quotas in professional sport in 
South Africa as a tool to accelerate transformation. The dissertation will focus on the 
fact that sport provides an atypical context for the application of affirmative action, but 
one that is still subject to laws. It will be shown that professional athletes in South 
Africa qualify as employees under labour legislation, and are consequently protected 
by the same rules as more traditional employees. 
This raises an interesting question for legal analysis. South African labour 
legislation expressly prohibits the use of racial quotas in the application of affirmative 
action. Despite this, South African sporting codes have for a number of years 
employed racial quotas for the composition of representative teams (examples of 
which will be mentioned and examined). Because of the applicable constitutional and 
legislative framework for the application of affirmative action, the dissertation analyses 
the use of racial quotas through evaluation of the jurisprudence on affirmative action 
outside the sporting context in South Africa, in order to draw conclusions regarding 
the lawfulness of the use of such quotas in sport. There is a relative dearth of case 
law specifically on the issue of racial quotas. As a result, a comparative analysis is 
undertaken in respect of the United States of America, a jurisdiction which has 
grappled with the legitimacy of racial quotas for much longer than South Africa, and 
which has developed legal precedent on the issue. 
The dissertation also deals with the concept of ‘representivity’ within the context of 




with transformation, both in sport and in society more generally. The dissertation 
focuses on the concept of ‘equitable representation’, which is the express objective of 
affirmative action under the Employment Equity Act. Equitable representation, 
ostensibly, means to pursue the achievement of a level of representation in 
workplaces which mirrors the national or regional racial demographic profile of the 
population. In the context of professional sports teams, when affirmative action 
measures are applied the aim is therefore to select a team which is representative of 
the racial demographic profile of the South African population. The dissertation 
investigates this concept and its role in transformation in South Africa, as well as its 
legitimacy in the context of professional sport. 
 Apart from the above-mentioned analysis of domestic law, the dissertation also 
examines the legitimacy of the application of racial quotas in the broader context of 
international sports governance. It considers the legitimacy of transformation 
measures as applied by South African sports governing bodies within the parameters 
of the relevant rules, principles and regulations of international sports governing 
bodies. This analysis highlights the anomalous nature of racial quotas in professional 
sport, both in the domestic and international contexts. South African sports governing 
bodies are contractually obliged to govern their respective sporting codes in a manner 
that complies with the rules of international bodies, and the dissertation also focuses 
on the potential danger of pushback from international sports governing bodies against 
domestic transformation measures which flout international rules.  
Finally, the dissertation investigates potential justification for racial quotas in 
professional sport in South Africa. It briefly evaluates the role that sport plays as a tool 
for nation- building and reconciliation, and then considers whether racial quotas could 
be justified as a means to remove inequalities and to create equal opportunities for all 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1 1  Problem identification  
Former South African Rugby Union (“SARU”) president, Oregan Hoskins, was 
quoted as follows on the implementation of racial transformation in rugby: 
 
“With the amount of pressure that we are under now by the Minister of Sport to change at 
the highest level, we’ve been told in no uncertain terms that there needs to be a radical, 
drastic and immediate change. The only way we can effect change is to use the quota 
system even more extensively than we currently do. This is not the optimum way to 
transform, it is a short-term measure and there is no other way to change representation in 
teams in the immediate short-terms.”1  
 
Considering the above quote, this dissertation will set out to examine a very specific 
issue, namely the application of race-based quotas in the selection of professional 
sports teams in South Africa. The objective of the study is to determine the legality 
and constitutionality of this practice in light of current South African (and selected 
aspects of international) law. 
Racial quotas are employed in professional sports teams in the name of 
transformation and in an attempt to address the history of segregated sport under 
apartheid as well as its continued effects on our current sporting landscape.2 
Addressing historical and social inequalities as stated in the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa of 1996 (the “Constitution”) applies to sport too, since sport 
represents a microcosm of our society.3 The Constitution empowers government to 
promote and fulfil the constitutional rights in the form of legislation and government 
policies. The sports transformation agenda is, therefore, one aimed at addressing the 
impact of historically unfair discrimination against athletes of colour, as well as for the 
 
1 B Nel “Quotas for currie cup, S15” (23-04-2014) Sports24 
<http://www.sport24.co.za/rugby/quotas-for-currie-cup-s15-20140423> (accessed 02-11-
2020). 
2 Mr. Mbeki stated the following regarding the inclusion of quotas of “players of colour” in sports 
teams, from a speech at the South African Sports Awards, March 2002: “For two to three years 
let’s not mind losing international competitions because we are bringing our people into these 
teams.” 





achievement of racially representative sports teams through affirmative action 
measures. As such, these quotas purport to be a form of affirmative action. 
A number of sporting codes in South Africa have furthermore implemented race-
based quotas to effect transformation. One such sport is rugby, where quotas have 
been implemented in various competitions, including in the erstwhile domestic 
Vodacom Cup.4 Provisions that include racial quotas in team selection take forms such 
as the following: 
  
“Teams will be forced to field seven players of colour in their 22-man squads, with at least 
five players in the starting team. At least two of the seven will also have to be among the 
forwards”.5  
 
Government officials have in the past shown a willingness to ensure that 
professional sports teams conform to race-based selection. Prior to Team South Africa 
participating in the Beijing Olympics in 2008, Mr Khaya Majeka told the parliamentary 
sport portfolio committee on 18 June 2007 that South African sports codes that do not 
have at least a 50-50 “Black-White ratio” of participants may not be allowed to send 
its teams to the Olympics.6 At the same committee meeting, the chairperson, Mr 
Butana Komphela of the African National Congress (“ANC”), was quoted as saying 
“[t]here would be measures to punish any federation moving in the wrong direction”.7 
Earlier, Komphela also threatened to consult the Ministry of Home Affairs in order to 
withdraw the passports of the Springboks rugby players before the Rugby World Cup 
in 2007 because of his displeasure with the racial composition of the team.8 
 
4 Anonymous “New race quotas for SA rugby” (14-08-2013) Sports24 
 <http://www.sport24.co.za/rugby/new-race-quotas-for-sa-rugby-20130814> (accessed 02-
11-2020). 
5 Anonymous “New race quotas for SA rugby” (14-08-2013) Sports24 [emphasis added].   
6 Mr Khaya Majeka was the South African Sports Confederation and Olympic Committee’s 
manager of team preparation for international competitions. PMG “Beijing Olympics Team 
Preparation: Input by SASCOC and SRSA; SABC Siyanqoba Campaign; SA Football 
Supporters Association” (18-06-2007) PMG <www.pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/9997/> 
(accessed 02-11-2020). 
7 PMG “Beijing Olympics Team Preparation” (18-06-2007) PMG.  
8 Komphela warned that: “this worst case scenario would be necessary if there were not at 
least six black players in the World Cup squad.” See M Thesbjerg “Chairman of South African 





More recently, former Minister of Sport, Fikile Mbalula, similarly threatened to 
punish federations for not adhering to the transformation targets set by the federations 
themselves. He stated that:  
 
“I may suspend or withdraw government’s funding to the said federation due to non-
compliance; I may withdraw government’s recognition of the particular federation as a 
National Federation”.9  
 
Specifically addressing transformation in rugby, Mbalula stated that he cannot 
interfere directly with team selection, as the “National Sport and Recreation Act 
contains no empowering provisions to enable the Minister to interfere”,10 but he 
indicated that there are ways to speed up transformation.11 It is clear that the types of 
repercussions for not implementing “aggressive targets” could have a crippling effect 
on professional sports teams.12 
Government has played a leading role in promoting racial quota systems throughout 
South African sport. However, the implementation of a quota system is often met with 
suspicion. The reason why uncertainty regarding the implementation of racial quotas 
in professional sport in South Africa persists is twofold. Firstly, the Employment Equity 
Act 55 of 1998 (as amended) (“EEA”) explicitly prohibits the use of quotas in the 
application of affirmative action. This is widely accepted in the traditional employment 
sphere but, when one considers the promotion of the application of racial quotas in the 
(professional) sporting context, it does not seem to apply to professional athletes – 
 
<http://www.playthegame.org/news/news-articles/2007/chairman-of-south-african-sports-
committee-puts-race-over-sporting-abilities/> (accessed 02-11-2020). 
9 F Mbalula “Sports codes will be punished for missing race targets” (25-04-2016) Politics Web 
<http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/fikile-mbalula-punishes-sports-codes-for-
missing-r> (accessed 02-11-2020).  
10Anonymous “Mbalula: Saru Transformation ‘On Track’” (29-08-2015) Rugby365 
<www.rugby365.com/countries/south-africa/68355> (accessed 02-11-2020). 
11 These punitive measures include among others to revoke SARU’s authority to host and bid 
for major and mega international rugby tournaments in the Republic as well as the withdrawal 
of SARU’s opportunity to awarded national colours via SASCOC to rugby players who 
participate in rugby under the auspices of SARU in order to represent the Republic 
internationally and nationally: Refer to n9. 
12 In the same breath, Mbalula threatened to “revoke the privilege of a federation to host and 
bid for major and mega International tournaments in the Republic and withdraw recognition of 





even though such persons are “employees” covered by the same labour legislation. 
This is extremely odd, and recently the trade union, Solidarity, attempted to officially 
challenge this status quo through litigation.  
Secondly, international sports law does not allow any form of discrimination in 
respect of participation, and it appears that South African sports federations may be 
in breach of these regulations through the application of race-based quotas.  
Therefore, to assess the legality of racial quotas, this dissertation will examine the 
applicable legal framework of affirmative action in South Africa. This will require a 
consideration of the relevant constitutional provisions that authorise the application of 
affirmative action, including the judicial interpretation of such provisions. It will further 
require a consideration of the relevant labour legislation on this subject. As mentioned 
above and as the research will indicate, labour legislation indeed covers professional 
athletes in South African team sports. Accordingly, the application of the affirmative 
action provisions of the EEA will need to be analysed. 
The dissertation will, however, not embark on a broad discourse of the various 
aspects of affirmative action and unfair discrimination law or of labour law, more 
generally. The focus will be on the specific purported affirmative action measures of 
racial quotas, in order to determine its legitimacy. 
During the study, a measure of comparative analysis will be undertaken. This will 
focus on: 
 
a) The use of (racial) quotas as a form of affirmative action measure, which is 
controversial both under the South African Constitution as well as the EEA. The 
EEA specifically allows the use of numerical goals or targets in the application 
of affirmative action, but expressly prohibits the use of quotas. Accordingly, it 
will be necessary to examine the differences between targets and quotas. In 
light of the fact that South Africa has seen limited jurisprudence on this topic, 
the treatment of quotas in affirmative action in the United States of America 
(“USA”), a jurisdiction that has grappled with this issue for much longer, will be 
examined. 
b)  The fact that the South African professional sports industry is subject to the 
rules of international sports governing bodies and the fundamental principles of 
international sports law. The study will also engage with the legitimacy of racial 





the rules and principles of the applicable sporting code as set down by 
international sports governing bodies. These bodies include World Rugby 
(formerly the International Rugby Board), the International Cricket Council 
(“ICC”), World Athletics (formerly the International Amateur Athletics 
Federation) and the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”). 
 
1 2 Background: The aim of South African sports transformation 
To the outside world, racially segregated sport was a divisive embodiment of the 
ugly face of apartheid which resulted in one of the major driving forces for sanctions 
and sport boycotts against South Africa from the international community.13 Prowess 
at sport represented a right to rule and sport was inevitably rationed according to race, 
and recreational facilities were dominated by the white race.14 While the law stated 
nothing about recreation, the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 (“Group Areas Act”) defined 
areas of residence and business, and this also affected sport and recreation.15 The 
ruling party during apartheid, the National Party, recognised that “performance in sport 
was a quick way to the sort of publicity and acclaim that would make nonsense of 
racial division and even, ultimately, facilitate contested ideas of race.”16 However, once 
the ANC gained political power, then-President Nelson Mandela recognised the impact 
that sport can have on a nation, and coined the following iconic statement: 
 
“Sport has the power to change the world … It has the power to inspire. It has the power to 
unite people in a way that little else does. It speaks to youth in a language they understand. 
Sport can create hope where once there was only despair. It is more powerful than 
government in breaking down racial barriers.”17 
 
 
13 M Corrigall “International Boycott of Apartheid Sport” South African History Online 
<http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/international-boycott-apartheid-sport-mary-corrigall> 
(accessed 02-11-2020). 
14 C Merrett, C Tatz & D Adair “History and its racial legacies: Quotas in South African rugby 
and cricket” (2011) 14 Sport in Society Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics 753. 
15 757. 
16 767. 
17 J Busbee “Nelson Mandela: ‘Sport has the power to change the world’” (05-12-2013) Sports 
Yahoo <https://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/the-turnstile/nelson-mandela-sport-power-change-





Mandela recognised sport as more than contesting ideas of race but instead used 
sport as a method to dismantle the system of institutionalised racism.18 The South 
African transformation mission aims to transform a deeply divided society 
(economically, socially, and racially), to one comprised of equals. Transformation 
specific to sport can be described as managing “change in a way that will eliminate 
crude references to race in sport yet promote the ideals of harmonious co-existence, 
working together and playing together”.19  
In this regard, the equality clause is considered to embody one of the most 
fundamental rights in our Constitution and one of the primary aims of the Constitution 
is to serve as a vehicle with which to minimise or eradicate the inequalities of the 
past.20 The equality clause has to be interpreted in light of the history of discrimination. 
Therefore, the courts have accepted that section 9, the equality clause in the Bill of 
Rights, is to be interpreted substantively.21 Section 9(2) states that legislative and 
other measures may be taken to promote the achievement of equality. This provides 
the constitutional basis for the implementation of affirmative action measures.22 
Through affirmative action measures, there is an attempt to truly transform the sports 
sector in harmony with the equality principle of the Constitution. Sachs J described the 
aim of affirmative action as follows: 
 
“We long for the day when colour is completely irrelevant in our society, when we are all 
just human beings, South Africans, with a common love for this country, and possessing 
an equal chance of enjoying its riches, the moment when skin colour is not even noticed, 
let alone referred to.”23 
 
In South Africa, affirmative action measures can be described as steps that are 
taken to attain substantive equality.24 The EEA regulates the implementation of 
 
18 Busbee “Nelson Mandela: ‘Sport has the power to change the world’” (05-12-2013) Sports 
Yahoo. 
19 Cloete Introduction to Sports Law 153. 
20 304. 
21 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC); see also See 
Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) paras 26-27. 
22 South Africa recognises the substantive notion of equality. See Minister of Finance v Van 
Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) para 26. 
23 J Rabe Equality, Affirmative Action, and Justice (2001) 340.  





affirmative action measures in the workplace.25 Section 2 states that one of the 
purposes of the Act is to implement affirmative action measures to redress past 
disadvantages in the workplace, in order to achieve equitable representation of 
persons from designated groups. Therefore, under the EEA, affirmative action is 
defined differently, as section 15(1) of the EEA states:  
 
“Affirmative action measures are measures designed to ensure that suitably qualified 
people from designated groups have equal employment opportunities and are equitably 
represented in all occupational levels in the workforce of a designated employer.”  
 
Affirmative action in the employment context aims to provide preferential 
employment opportunities for the previously disadvantaged (even though it is notable 
that the EEA, unlike section 9(2) of the Bill of Rights, does not expressly utilise the 
concept of disadvantage in designating the potential beneficiaries of affirmative action, 
opting instead for the categorisation of beneficiaries on the grounds of race, sex or 
disability). It is arguable, therefore, that the use of racial quotas in professional sports 
teams that aim to achieve equality, in fact amounts to an (purported) affirmative action 
measure. 
Despite the introduction of affirmative action, South African sports teams are 
seemingly still not transforming swiftly enough (as will be illustrated by the statements 
of various government spokespersons). As a result, and since the dawn of democracy, 
racial quotas have been introduced, albeit on an on-and-off basis, even though they 
are explicitly prohibited under the EEA. In addition, government spokespersons 
introduced the term “representivity” when discussing transformation. Representivity 
has become a focal point in the transformation mission. The aim of transformation has 
now shifted to ensuring that national teams are representative of South Africa’s racial 
demographics. Penrose stated that there are strong pragmatic reasons to develop the 
potential non-white talent participation, as they make up more than 90% of the 
 
25 Section 15(1): 
“Affirmative action measures are measures designed to ensure that suitably qualified 
people from designated groups have equal employment opportunities and are equitably 






nation.26 Logic dictates that this pool of untapped talent can improve our sports teams, 
but questions linger whether reserving places for non-whites using racial quotas is the 
way to do it. If demographic representivity is now the yardstick in these policies, it is 
at odds with the equality clause in the Constitution, as the Constitution does not refer 
to demographic representivity as a yardstick or indicator for the achievement of 
equality.  
Despite the above-mentioned problematic nature of the use of racial quotas, one 
cannot overlook the importance of sport in South Africa as a possible justification for 
the use of such measures. Sport is not only important for entertainment, leisure and 
national integration but also, in light of our (sporting) past, especially relevant in the 
context of redressing past discrimination as experienced in the racial segregation of 
sport. Transformation in sport is therefore specifically relevant and may be one of the 
driving forces in upholding democracy. The continuing echo of apartheid emphasises 
the need for transformation in sport and may be able to provide a lens through which 
to evaluate the success or failure of transformation in society, more generally. 
However, at this stage what is clear is that according to labour legislation, quotas 
are prohibited. Many observers also deem quotas to be inherently unfair, as quotas 
do away with merit-based selection, and as a result, players are purely selected based 
on their race and the benchmark of demographic representation. This situation may 
not be unique in the world, but it does create challenges for professional sport in South 
Africa and as a result, it makes for an important study as to the legality of these racial 
quota systems.  
 
1 3  Research aim 
The proposed aim of this research is to critically evaluate the legality of the use of 
a race-based quota system in professional team sports in South Africa. In doing so, 
the following will be evaluated and analysed: 
• The various legal mechanisms used to apply affirmative action more generally, 
which includes section 9(2) of the Bill of Rights and Chapter III (the affirmative 
action chapter) of the EEA. In the process, consideration will also be given to the 
 
26 B Penrose “‘The right thing to do?’ Transformation in South African sport” (2017) 36 SAJP 





judicial test for evaluating the constitutionality of affirmative action under the 
Constitution and the legality of affirmative action applied in terms of the EEA. 
• That professional players in team sports are considered “employees” for purposes 
of labour legislation, and in this context, it calls for special consideration of the 
legality of the use of racial quotas. This will involve a consideration of the EEA’s 
prohibition on quotas (in section 15(3) of the Act) and on absolute barriers to the 
employment and advancements of persons from non-designated groups (in 
section 15(4) of the Act), as well as of the objective of affirmative action under the 
same Act.  
• Whether the role and importance of sport in South African society, more generally, 
justify the use of racial quotas in professional team sports. In essence, and 
considering the legislative prohibition of quotas, the question will be asked whether 
sport may be a seen as a “special case” where the use of an otherwise legislatively 
prohibited (and probably unconstitutional) measure such as a racial quota might 
be justifiable in light of historical, contextual, or other reasons. 
• The legality of racial quotas in sport in the context of international sports law, in 
particular the applicable rules of the relevant international sports governing bodies, 
and also whether South Africa’s sports transformation experience complies with 
such rules (including consideration of the implications if it is found to not comply).  
 
1 4 Structure of the chapters 
Chapter 2 will set out the legal framework of affirmative action which will establish 
that quotas purport to be a form of affirmative action measure. This will be followed by 
a discussion of affirmative action in terms of South African jurisprudence. This will 
include a discussion of section 9(2) of the Bill of Rights, the Van Heerden test for the 
constitutionality of an affirmative action measure, as well as the fact that we have 
special regulation of affirmative action in the employment context, in the form of the 
EEA. It will be shown that the purpose of affirmative action under the EEA differs from 
that of the purpose of affirmative action under the Constitution. Furthermore, there will 
be an examination of whether there exist different standards of review for the 
implementation of affirmative action measures under the EEA and the Constitution.  
Chapter 3 will show that the EEA applies in this context as professional athletes in 





qualify as “designated employers” for purposes of the affirmative action chapter. Once 
it has been established that the EEA applies, and also that it prohibits quotas but 
allows numerical goals, the analysis will shift to determining the legitimacy of the use 
of quotas, specifically as opposed to numerical goals. The difference between quotas 
and goals will, therefore, be examined. Moreover, there will be an analysis of the 
adjudication of quotas by the Constitutional Court and other courts. The aim here will 
be to determine whether quotas, currently, are viewed as legitimate and constitutional 
affirmative action measures in the pursuit of substantive equality. Furthermore, the 
terms “equitable representation” and “representivity” will be examined. Representivity 
is of particular concern as it is not a term mentioned anywhere in the Constitution (nor 
in any dictionary) yet it plays a pivotal role in the application of affirmative action in 
South African sport. 
In chapter 4, a comparative analysis of the legitimacy of quotas in affirmative action 
will be undertaken. Because there has been little in-depth engagement with the issue 
of quotas in South Africa (also in case law), there is a need to undertake an 
examination of the jurisprudence on quotas as an affirmative action measure in the 
USA, a jurisdiction that has grappled with this specific issue for quite some time.  
Chapter 5 will examine the legality of racial quotas in sport in the context of 
international sports law (especially the rules of international sports governing bodies). 
It will consider how South Africa’s race-based sports transformation agenda compares 
with the standards and rules of sports governing bodies in respect of the condemnation 
of unfair discrimination in sport.  
 Chapter 6 will confirm that this type of affirmative action measure, and in this 
particular context, is highly anomalous, pointing out three specific elements: That the 
measure is outlawed in all other industries and contexts for transformation; that these 
are affirmative action measures that have been imposed by (designated) employers 
under direct pressure from government (what critics often refer to as “government 
interference”); and that they are also unique in the world of sport. In light of these 
anomalies as well as the fact that there has, to date, been very little reasoned legal 
criticism of or legal challenge to the use of sports quotas, it will be considered whether 
there might exist some special justification for the use of these highly contentious 
measures in this specific context: Is sport special in some way, in order to justify the 





The final chapter will conclude with a reasoned conclusion on the constitutionality 






























CHAPTER 2: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
2 1 Introduction 
The principle of equality is a core foundational value of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“Constitution”).27 In fact, the supreme law of South 
Africa says more about equality than any other comparable Constitution, and as such, 
the importance of equality cannot be over-emphasised.28 However, this also entails 
that our quest to achieve equality must occur within the discipline of our Constitution.29 
It is now trite that our interpretation of equality is one of substantive and not formal 
equality.30 As Moseneke J stated:  
 
“[W]hat is clear is that our Constitution and in particular section 9 thereof, read as a whole, 
embraces for good reason a substantive conception of equality inclusive of measures to 
redress existing inequality.”31 
 
Formal equality does not take into account actual social and economic disparities 
between groups and individuals,32 and it does not allow for legislation to be 
implemented that would discriminate between categories of persons. Treating 
everyone the same would, therefore, not remedy the past injustices as the previous 
systematic discrimination would persist. Substantive equality, on the other hand, is an 
understanding of the historical context of persons, and the systemic discrimination 
which has affected the human and social development of groups or categories of 
persons. Therefore, substantive equality requires the law to ensure equality of 
outcome and is prepared to tolerate disparity of treatment to achieve this goal.33 
 
 
27 Section 1(a).  
28 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) para 24. 
29 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) para 30. 
30 Para 28: “But, unlike other constitutions, ours was designed to do more than record or confer 
formal equality.” 
31 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) para 31. 
32 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 213. 





2 2  The fundamental right to equality  
Section 9 of the Constitution is the first right listed in the Bill of Rights and protects 
the right to equality. Section 9(1) guarantees everyone equality before the law. 
However, as mentioned above, the meaning of equality is not to be understood in the 
literal sense, as denoting equal treatment for all. Section 9(3) prohibits the state from 
unfairly discriminating against anyone in any form (on the basis of certain listed 
grounds of discrimination) and section 9(4), in turn, ensures that the legislature enacts 
national legislation that will prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. The equality 
clause has a dual character which suggests that it must not simply eliminate existing 
inequalities in society but it must equally retain its character of protecting individuals 
in society.34 This is the challenging part of the notion of substantive equality, as some 
individuals’ rights may need to be advanced to the detriment of others. The measures 
of eliminating existing inequalities are referred to as restitutionary measures or 
affirmative action measures. These measures are regulated by section 9(2) which 
encapsulates a transformative dimension and states that:  
 
“Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the 
achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance 
persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.”  
 
Dupper described the constitutional right to equality and the existing labour 
legislation as having envisioned a two-pronged strategy to achieve substantive 
equality, by “(i) eliminating existing discrimination, and (ii) implementing a number of 
positive measures designed to protect and advance those people disadvantaged by 
past discrimination”.35 It is clear that section 9(2) provides the constitutional basis for 
affirmative action measures. However, affirmative action measures are not an 
exception to equality but serve as a means to achieve equality understood in its 
restitutionary sense.36 President John F. Kennedy coined the term “affirmative action” 
in 1961.37 He meant an affirmative effort to assure equality of opportunity to all 
 
34 Rabe Equality, Affirmative Action, and Justice 289. 
35 O Dupper “In defence of affirmative action in South Africa” (2004) 121 SALJ 187 189. 
36 Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 241. See also Minister of Finance v Van 
Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) para 95. 





Americans and to end discrimination against members of groups that had historically 
been exposed to much discrimination.38 Various authors have since attempted to 
define affirmative action: Carol Lee Bacchi defines affirmative action as “a range of 
programs directed towards targeted groups to redress their inequality”.39 Duncan 
Innes describes affirmative action as “a set of procedures aimed at proactively 
addressing the disadvantages experienced by sections of the community in the 
past”.40 Affirmative action may also be loosely defined as actions or programmes 
which provide opportunities or other benefits to persons based on their membership 
of a specific group or groups.41 
It is no secret that apartheid left a legacy of inequality by favouring certain groups 
and unfairly discriminating against others. The Constitution, therefore, seeks to 
dismantle the disparities of the past and through the equality clause (section 9(2)), the 
legislature is actively placing a positive obligation on the state to develop and protect 
previously disadvantaged persons through affirmative action measures. This notion is 
echoed throughout various cases. For example, Ackerman J refers to equality as 
“remedial or restitutionary equality”,42 while in Minister of Finance v Van Heerden (“Van 
Heerden”),43 Moseneke J stated that: 
 
“Remedial measures are not a derogation from, but a substantive and composite part of, 
the equality protection envisaged by the provisions of section 9 and of the Constitution as 
a whole. Their primary object is to promote the achievement of equality.”44 
 
This analysis derives from the premise of the Constitution having a transformative 
mission and allows the state to take steps to eradicate past injustices.45 Affirmative 
 
38 T Weisskopf Affirmative Action in the United States and India: A comparative perspective 
(2004) 3. 
39 C Bacchi The Politics of Affirmative action: ‘Women’, Equality and Category politics (1996) 
15. 
40 D Innes; M Kentridge & H Perold Reversing discrimination: Affirmative action in the 
workplace (1993) 4. 
41 Rabe Equality, Affirmative Action, and Justice 73. 
42 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC).  
43 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC). 
44 Para 32; see also Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs [2004] 
ZACC 15; 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC); 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) para 76. 





action may, therefore, be justified by its consequences. In other words, a measure that 
favours a relatively disadvantaged group at the expense of those who have been 
previously advantaged would not be deemed discriminatory, provided the 
consequences of the measure are, in the long run, intended to provide for a more 
equal society.46  
The courts, however, still have the power to interrogate whether the measure 
constitutes a legitimate restitutionary measure within the scope of section 9(2).47 
These guidelines were formulated in Van Heerden where the court set out a three-
pronged analysis, more commonly referred to as “the Van Heerden test”. The purpose 
of the test is to determine whether a measure falls within the ambit of section 9(2). The 
Van Heerden test includes asking whether the measure: 
  
(a) targets persons or categories of persons who have been disadvantaged by past 
unfair discrimination;  
(b) is designed to protect or advance such persons or categories of persons; and  
(c) promotes the achievement of equality.48 
 
If these remedial measures pass muster under section 9(2), it is not construed as 
unfair discrimination.49 If the remedial measure does not pass the test, and it 
constitutes discrimination on a prohibited ground, it will be necessary to resort to the 
Harksen test50 to determine whether the measure falls within the anti-discrimination 
prohibition in section 9(3).51 The court further stated that if “measures are arbitrary, 
 
46 Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 242. 
47 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) para 37. 
48 Para 37. 
49Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) para 36:  
“If a measure properly falls within the ambit of section 9(2) it does not constitute unfair 
discrimination.  However, if the measure does not fall within section 9(2), and it constitutes 
discrimination on a prohibited ground, it will be necessary to resort to the Harksen test in 
order to ascertain whether the measures offend the anti-discrimination prohibition in section 
9(3).” 
50 Harksen v Lane NO 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) para 53. 
51 Section 9(3) of the EEA:  
“The state may not discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more 





capricious or display naked preference they could hardly be said to be designed to 
achieve the constitutionally authorised end”.52  
 
2 3  National legislation: The Employment Equity Act  
The EEA is a form of national legislation which gives effect to section 9(2) by 
promoting the implementation of affirmative action in the workplace. The EEA was 
passed by Parliament to “address disparities in access to jobs, skills and education”.53 
Similarly to section 9, which provides that affirmative action measures are not unfairly 
discriminatory, section 6(2)(a) of the EEA explicitly states that adopting affirmative 
action measures “which are consistent with the purpose of the Act”54 do not amount to 
unfair discrimination. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Employment Equity Bill,55 
states that the legislation is aimed at advancing those groups who have been 
disadvantaged as a result of discriminatory laws and social practices.56 Nevertheless, 
the purpose of the EEA differs somewhat from the equality clause in the Constitution. 
The Constitution sets out to promote the achievement of equality and authorises 
measures which may be taken to assist in achieving equality, while the EEA aims to 
not only eliminate unfair discrimination and promote equality, but also to ensure 
“equitable representation” of beneficiaries in the workplace through the 
 
colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture language and 
birth.”  
52 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) para 41. 
53 U Archibong & O Adejumo “Affirmative Action in South Africa, Are We Creating New 
Casualties?” (2013) 3 Journal of Psychological Issues in Organizational Culture 14 16. 
54 Section 6(2)(a) of the EEA:  
“[I]t is not unfair discrimination to – take affirmative action measures consistent with the 
purpose of the Act.”  
55 Explanatory Memorandum to the Employment Equity Bill GN 1840 in GG 18481 of 1 
December 1997. 
56 Introduction on page 5:  
‘‘Apartheid has left behind a legacy of inequality. In the labour market the disparity in the 
distribution of jobs, occupations and incomes reveals the effects of discrimination against 
black people, women and people with disabilities. These disparities are reinforced by social 
practices which perpetuate discrimination in employment against these disadvantaged 
groups, as well as by factors outside the labour market, such as the lack of education, 
housing, medical care and transport. These disparities cannot be remedied simply by 
eliminating discrimination. Policies, programmes and positive action designed to redress 





implementation of affirmative action measures.57 Moseneke J similarly stated that the 
purpose of the Act consists of redressing “the effects of past discrimination to achieve 
a diverse workforce representative of our people.”58 The EEA recognises that, due to 
apartheid, there are disparities which exist in the employment sector in South Africa 
that need to be overcome.59 The Act is therefore understandably more specific in its 
approach, as set out in section 15(1): 
 
“Affirmative action measures are measures designed to ensure that suitably qualified 
people from designated groups have equal employment opportunities and are equitably 
represented in all occupational levels in the workforce of a designated employer.”  
 
However, it is important to note that the Act must still be interpreted in accordance 
with the Constitution,60 as the Act not only takes its cue from the Constitution but also 
gives effect to the protection of the fundamental rights to dignity and equality enshrined 
in the Constitution.61 
An affirmative action programme would, therefore, typically require a member of a 
disadvantaged group to be preferred for the distribution of some benefit over someone 
who is not a member of that group.62 Affirmative action measures apply to all 
designated employers63 as stated in section 4(2)64 of the EEA, while beneficiaries of 
 
57 Section 2(b): 
”implementing affirmative action measures to redress disadvantages in employment 
experienced by designated groups, in order to ensure their equitable representation in all 
occupational categories and levels in the workplace.” 
58 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) para 40. 
59 M McGregor “Judicial notice: Discrimination and disadvantage in the context of affirmative 
action in South African workplace” (2011) 8 De Jure 111 117. 
60 Section 3(a) of the EEA:  
“The Act must be interpreted – in compliance with the constitution.”  
61 M McGregor “Affirmative action on trial – determining the legitimacy and fair application of 
remedial measures” (2013) SALJ 650 659. 
62 Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 241. 
63 Section 1 of the EEA:  
“‘designated employer’ – means a) an employer who employs 50 or more employees; b) 
an employer who employs 50 or fewer employees, but has a total annual turnover that is 
equal to or above the applicable annual turnover of a small business in terms of schedule 
4 to this Act.”  





affirmative action are referred to as “suitably qualified”65 persons from a “designated 
group”.66 The Act further allows affirmative action measures to make provision for 
preferential treatment and allows a designated employer to use numerical goals in 
order to pursue the achievement of equitable representation of persons from 
designated groups, but it prohibits quotas.67 The Act, however, is not very clear on the 
distinction between quotas and numerical goals, but the rigid enforcement of a 
numerical goal may in fact amount to a quota.68 This view is supported by various 
judges, including Zondo J, who stated that in order for a claimant to show that a 
numerical goal amounts to a quota, “they need to first show that they were rigid.”69 
Katz J concludes that “what is impermissible is rigidity – however it is named”.70 
Furthermore, Moseneke J stated the following: 
 
“Let it suffice to observe that the primary distinction between numerical targets and quotas 
lies in the flexibility of the standard. Quotas amount to job reservation and are properly 
prohibited by section 15(3) of the Act.”71 
 
Therefore, the implementation of numerical targets and the methods used to 
enforce them must be examined to determine whether a measure is a target or a 
quota.72 The courts’ views on the use of quotas will be examined later in this 
dissertation. 
 
“Except where Chapter III provides otherwise, Chapter III of this Act applies only to 
designated employers and people from designated groups.” 
65 Section 20(3):  
“[A] person may be suitably qualified for a job as a result of any one of or any combination 
of that person’s – a) formal qualifications; b) prior learnings; c) relevant experience; or d) a 
capacity to acquire, within a reasonable time, the ability to do the job.” 
66 Section 1:  
“‘designated groups’ means black people, women and people with disabilities; ‘Black 
people’ is a generic term which means Africans, Coloureds and Indians.” 
67 Section 15(3). 
68 Rabe Equality, Affirmative Action, and Justice 376. 
69 Solidarity v Department of Correctional Services 2016 5 SA 594 (CC) para 51. 
70 South African Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners Association v Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development; In Re: Concerned Insolvency Practitioners Association v 
Minister of Justice And Constitutional Development 2015 2 SA 430 (WCC) para 214.  
71 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) para 54. 





The EEA prohibits unfair discrimination in section 6. Specifically, section 6(1) 
provides that no person may unfairly discriminate against an employee on one or more 
of the listed grounds, which include inter alia race, gender, sex and disability. 
Affirmative action may seem like a form of discrimination, but it is a necessary and 
allowable form of discrimination, and the courts have consistently confirmed that 
genuine affirmative action is not unfair discrimination. Furthermore, neither the 
Constitution nor the EEA prohibit discrimination per se, but both prohibit unfair 
discrimination.73 Section 6(2) of the EEA permits affirmative action measures that are 
consistent with the purpose of the Act. As such, Basson et al state that the purpose of 
affirmative action “overrides the actual means to achieve it – provided … the employer 
acted rationally in pursuing it”.74 
This raises the question, what is the purpose of the EEA when it comes to 
affirmative action? Upon a reading of section 2(b), the purpose of the Act, in the 
context of the application of affirmative action, is ultimately to achieve equitable 
representation of persons from designated groups.75 This raises further questions, 
especially since “equitable representation” is not used in the section 9 equality clause 
but in reality amounts to one of the central objectives of the EEA, which refers to it as 
one of its “purposes”. It should be borne in mind that the EEA was passed specifically 
in terms of the constitutional instruction to actively promote “equality”, and not 
necessarily to promote “equitable representation”.76 Therefore, rather strangely, 
equitable representation is not defined, but section 42 (the assessment of compliance 
section) does provide some guidance to determine whether designated employers 
have complied with their affirmative action mandate. The original wording of section 
42 of the Act provided the Director-General with a number of factors that “must” be 
taken into account when determining whether a designated employer has complied 
with Chapter III of the Act in order to achieve the equitable representation of persons 
from designated groups. However, section 42 has since been amended and the 
 
73 A Basson, M Christianson, A Dekker, C Garbers, P le Roux, C Mischke & E Strydom 
Essential Labour Law 5 ed (2009) 218. 
74 222. 
75 See ss 2 and 15 of the EEA. 
76 AM Louw “"I am not a number! I am a free man!" The Employment Equity Act, 1998 (And 
Other Myths about The Pursuit of "Equality", "Equity" and "Dignity" In Post-Apartheid South 





wording has changed significantly. It now reads that these factors “may” be taken into 
account as opposed to “must”, which implies that it is optional. Furthermore, a number 
of factors under section 42(1)(a), which relates to the representation of suitably 
qualified people from amongst the designated groups, have been removed. These 
factors included taking into account the pool of suitability qualified people from 
designated groups from which the employer is expected to appoint or promote; the 
present and anticipated financial circumstances of the employer; the number of 
present and planned vacancies which exist, and the relevant economic situation of the 
employer.77 Section 42(1)(a) now merely reads as follows: 
 
“In determining whether a designated employer is implementing employment equity in 
compliance with this Act, the Director-General or any person or body applying this Act may, 
in addition to the factors stated in section 15, take the following into account:  
 
a) The extent to which suitable qualified people from and amongst the different designated 
groups are equitably represented within each occupational level in the employer’s 
workforce in relation to the demographic profile of the national and regional 
economically active population.”78 
 
No reason was provided for this amendment, but what is certain is that the EEA 
strives for “equitable representation”, and apparently at any cost. Although 
demographics are important, Cameron J, Froneman J and Majiedt J believe that the 
EEA also requires a consideration of the operational needs and realities of 
employers.79 Employers, therefore, cannot simply rely on a broad and unsophisticated 
notion of demographic representivity across the whole workforce.80 The EEA is aware 
 
77 Section 42 of the EEA. 
78 Section 42(1) (a) of the EEAA. 
79 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) para 107. See 
also Basson et al Essential Labour Law 237; Solidarity v Department of Correctional Services 
2016 5 SA 594 (CC) para 54. 
80 Basson et al Essential Labour Law 237; See also McGregor (2013) SALJ  n 147: 
“Solidarity, however, argued that affirmative action was not a bludgeon aimed at halting all 
promotions of members of over-represented groups until ideal targets were reached: if that 
were the case, the employment equity plan would constitute a quota system and a 
perpetual and absolute barrier to the advancement of certain groups inconsistent with the 
Employment Equity Act. Moreover, affirmative action was not intended to elevate 





of the need for competency and efficiency in the workplace, and therefore any 
beneficiary of affirmative action must be suitably qualified.  
There remain many unanswered questions about what can only be described as 
the EEA’s apparent obsession with “equitable representation”, and the fact that this 
does not appear to derive from any constitutional provision or objective, which will be 
addressed in more detail later in this dissertation.  
 
2 3 1 The uncertainty surrounding the standard of review  
One of the major uncertainties regarding the application of affirmative action 
measures under the EEA is the applicable standard of review to determine compliance 
with the legislative and constitutional framework(s). This may be due to the dearth of 
case law on the validity and implementation of affirmative action under the EEA, 
particularly deriving from the Constitutional Court (which has, to date, heard only two 
cases where the EEA applied to the relevant affirmative action policy). While it is by 
no means the purpose of this thesis to recommend a standard of review, the 
uncertainty which is created due to the lack of consensus on the most appropriate 
standard does require some discussion if one is to critically analyse the application of 
affirmative action measures. The judicial system has a duty to provide certainty to 
anyone who is questioning the validity of affirmative action measures, and currently, 
this uncertainty surrounding the applicable standard of review does not provide that. 
Therefore, this remains a debate which has not been sufficiently concluded.  
The leading case in this regard remains South African Police Service v Solidarity 
obo Barnard (“Barnard”).81 As mentioned above, the test for the validity of a measure 
under the Constitution is found in Van Heerden, which is the three-pronged “rationality 
test”. In Barnard, Moseneke J interpreted the standard to not only test the rationality 
of the design of a measure but also to test the implementation of a measure.82 
 
demographic targets: this could suffice only if it were accepted that the proper 
implementation of affirmative action entailed disregarding “entirely” the rights of members 
of certain groups to apply and compete for vacant posts until demographic targets were 
reached and if the national commissioner possessed an “unfettered” authority to decide 
whether and when exceptions should be allowed.” 
81 2014 6 SA 123 (CC). 





Moseneke J in the majority judgment found that the rationality standard as recognised 
in Van Heerden, is indeed the accepted standard.83 However, due to differing opinions 
in the minority judgments in Barnard, the most appropriate standard of review 
continues to be uncertain. Cameron J, Froneman J and Majiedt J consider the relevant 
standard to be one of fairness,84 while Van der Westhuizen J deems a proportionality 
analysis as the appropriate standard of review.85 The suggestion of a new standard 
(different from that set out in Van Heerden) may be due to the fact that these judges 
and several legal commentators do not view rationality as an adequate standard of 
review. Likewise, the majority of the court in Barnard considered the standard of 
rationality to be the “bare minimum” and stated that these “minimum requirements do 
not define the standard finally”.86 This opens the door to the possibility of a stricter 
standard being applied in future. As a result, Rautenbach poses the question whether 
the judges in Barnard clarified or changed the affirmative action requirements as set 
out under Van Heerden.87 Moseneke J provided some guidance on the constitutional 
requirements for affirmative action in the Barnard case, including formulating 
measures with “due care not to invade unduly the dignity of all concerned”88 and being 
“careful that the steps taken to promote substantive equality do not unwittingly infringe 
the dignity of other individuals”.89 The closest the EEA comes to mirroring these points 
is in section 15(2)(b), which states that measures must be “based on equal dignity and 
respect for all people”, and in section 15(4), which prohibits affirmative action 
measures which establish absolute barriers to the continued employment or 
advancement of persons from non-designated groups. However, there remains a 
 
“The first two prongs test whether the measure itself, in its design, is rationally connected 
to the end it aims to achieve…The focus of the third prong is somewhat different. It is on 
the measure, but also on its implementation.” 
83 Para 39:  
“the principle of legality would require that the implementation of a legitimate restitution 
measure must be rationally related to the terms and objects of the measure…Therefore, 
implementation of corrective measures must be rational”. 
84 Para 76. 
85 Para 165. 
86 Para 39. 
87 IM Rautenbach “Requirements for affirmative action and requirements for the limitation of 
rights” (2015) SALJ 431 432 
88 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) para 30. 





possibility that the EEA sets an additional standard of review to that of section 9(2) of 
the Constitution,90 as their purposes appear to be different (whether this is 
constitutionally permissible, of course, is another question).  
The recognition of an adequate and appropriate standard of review is essential 
because of the tensions which are invariably created by affirmative action measures. 
On the one hand, the Constitution commits us to recognise and redress the realities 
of the past, while on the other hand, it is committed to establishing a non-racial, non-
sexist and socially inclusive society. Tension also exists between the equality 
entitlement of an individual and the equality of society as a whole.91 As a result of 
these tensions, a more exacting level of scrutiny may be required.92 The concurring 
judgments in the Barnard case allow for a discussion on the balancing of these rights 
as it is the foremost judgment in respect of the different standards of review. Two of 
the minority judgments recognise that because of the nature of the rights involved and 
the fact that the seriousness of the effects must be taken into account, there will be 
circumstances where the effects of the measure would not be justified by merely 
relying on the importance of the purpose.93 As has been observed, the choice of 
standard of review determines the degree of justification for governmental action and 
signifies the judicial sensitivity and commitment to the fundamental constitutional 
principles of accountability and fairness.94  
 
2 3 1 1 The criticised rationality standard of review 
McGregor, in a discussion on the legitimacy and application of remedial 
measures,95 states that “rationality implies that actions should be endowed with 
reason, to be sensible, sane, commonsensical and moderate, and not foolish, absurd 
 
90 The minority judgment in Barnard of Cameron J, Froneman J and Majiedt AJ, by implication 
suggested that the EEA might call for a specific standard of review – see para 75 – and also 
expressly – see para 95 in Barnard.  
91 Para 77. 
92 Para 95 see also para 96. 
93 Rautenbach (2015) SALJ 438. 
94 JL Pretorius “Accountability, contextualisation and the standard of judicial review of 
affirmative action: Solidarity obo Barnard v South African Police Services” (2013) 130 SALJ 
31 37. 





or extreme”.96 Moseneke J in Van Heerden stated that if a measure complies with the 
internal requirements of section 9(2), even if it is based on any of the grounds of 
discrimination enumerated in section 9(3), it would not constitute discrimination and 
would not be presumptively unfair.97 As a result, it would not need to comply with the 
fairness standard (section 9(3)) or the proportionality standard of section 36.98 
Moseneke J considered it contradictory that our Constitution would authorise 
measures aimed at redressing past inequalities while simultaneously labelling them 
presumptively unfair. This would reduce the provisions of section 9(2) to a “mere 
interpretive aid or surplusage”.99 
The Van Heerden “rationality test” is criticised for being restrictive and too 
deferential in nature.100 It allows the courts to avoid having to provide reasons for their 
decisions and so evade the development of a judicial standard which corresponds with 
the “demands of the principles of openness and accountability, implicit in the section 
36 norms of an open and democratic society”.101 Rautenbach argues that the 
development of an applicable standard needs to take cognisance of the limitation by 
affirmative action on the rights of those other than the beneficiaries of the measure.102 
McGregor enforces the idea that compared to the alternative potential tests of fairness 
and proportionality, rationality calls for a lesser degree of accountability and it does 
not require that the state show a reasoned assessment of competing rights.103 When 
considering the majority judgment in Van Heerden, the court does mention that some 
form of balancing needs to be done.104 Therefore, it may be deemed quite 
disappointing that the court settles on a low standard such as rationality. Pretorius, in 
discussing the accountability and understanding of an adequate standard of review,105 
similarly states that: 
 
96 660.  
97 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) para 33. 
98 Pretorius (2013) SALJ 36. 
99 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) para 33. 
100 Pretorius (2013) SALJ 31, see also JL Pretorius “Fairness in transformation: a critique of 
the constitutional court’s affirmative action jurisprudence” (2010) 26 SAJHR 536. 
101 Pretorius (2013) SALJ 39. 
102 Rautenbach (2015) SALJ 439. 
103 McGregor (2013) SALJ 656. 
104 Para 44. 






“[T]his reduction of equality to rationality restricts the normative reach of the notion of 
substantive equality, since it is effectively deprived of the comparative contextual setting 
necessary to be able to function as an inclusive fairness-based standard for the 
assessment, evaluation and integration of competing equality claims.”106  
 
The test is not equipped to deal with situations where there should be a recognition 
of the validity of competing rights of both the advantaged and the disadvantaged. 
Respect for the democratic process requires greater, not less, attention to the duty to 
account and explain.107 These commentators view rationality as very restrictive in 
terms of the rational relationship between a given end and the means chosen to 
achieve it.  
 
2 3 1 2 Fairness as a standard of review  
The second standard that has been suggested is that of fairness. Fairness entails 
actions being “just, equitable, impartial, unbiased, unprejudiced, nonpartisan and 
even-handed.”108 This standard was raised in the minority judgment by Cameron J, 
Froneman J and Majiedt AJ in Barnard. Cameron J et al state that the EEA “imposes 
a standard different from, and additional to, rationality.”109 Cameron J et al state that 
the Barnard case was the first case dealing “with the standard to be applied in 
assessing the lawfulness of the individual implementation of constitutionally compliant 
restitutionary measures”.110 According to Cameron J et al, this seems to indicate that 
the affirmative action programme had already passed constitutional muster, and now 
one would need to test the implementation of the programme against the more specific 
provisions of the EEA. Therefore, Cameron J et al appeared not only to believe that 
the standard of review should be that of fairness but also indicated that a standard of 
review under the EEA is additional to the standard under section 9(2) of the 




108  M McGregor “Affirmative action and the constitutional requirement of ‘efficiency’ for the 
public service” (2003) 15 SA Merc LJ 82 93. 
109 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) para 95. 






“It is a cause of action that arises directly from the Act, which prohibits unfair discrimination 
by an employer against an employee or applicant for employment. This Court’s task is 
therefore to mediate the tension between that prohibition and the Act’s recognition that 
affirmative action measures are justified, and to formulate a suitably robust, constitutionally 
compliant standard by which to adjudicate Ms Barnard’s claim.”111 
 
The basis for the suggestion of fairness as the appropriate standard is said to be 
found in the Act, and Cameron J et al set out several factors to support this claim.112 
Considering the purpose of the Act in section 2(b) it is to achieve “equitable 
representation” (my emphasis). Louw defined both “equitable” and “equity” using their 
ordinary meaning as found in Dictionary.com.113 “Equitable” is defined as being 
“characterised by equity or fairness; just and right; fair”, while “equity” is defined as the 
“quality of being fair or impartial; fairness”114 – fairness being the keyword in both 
definitions. If the Act centres around equity (since it also forms part of the title of the 
Act), the Act may impose a standard in addition to the section 9(2) standard. Therefore, 
the EEA attempts to achieve equitable representation in the workforce and it will then 
make sense to have a standard of fairness. Cameron et al further sum up the 
possibility of an additional standard by stating that: 
 
“Assessing the fairness of the individual implementation of affirmative action measures is 
different to deciding whether those measures amount to unfair discrimination. The latter 
enquiry is at the general level of determining whether the formulation and content of a 
restitutionary measure are constitutionally compliant. The former enquiry examines 
whether a specific implementation of a measure that is constitutionally compliant in its 
general form is nevertheless in conflict with the provisions of the Act. We must insist that 
the specific implementation as well as the general formulation of remedial measures be 
fair.”115 
 
This not only suggests that an additional standard may exist separate from that of 
the rationality standard under Van Heerden, but it also implies that the legislature has 
 
111 Para 82. 
112 Para 87-98. 
113 Louw (2015) PELJ 638. 
114 638. 





potentially opted to set a different standard under the Act, which may be the standard 
of fairness. 
Furthermore, the judges acknowledged that the EEA does not determine when a 
restitutionary measure is permitted, but it does provide clues.116 One of the important 
clues identified is that the Act insists on affirmative action which is “based on equal 
dignity and respect of all people”.117 Dignity is recognised as a fundamentally important 
right and an underlying value which needs to be taken into consideration when the Act 
is being interpreted. Affirmative action measures advancing previously disadvantaged 
persons may mark the promotion of equal dignity for all, while those negatively 
affected by such measures may find their dignity undermined. It is clear that according 
to Cameron J et al, dignity must be taken into account and thus balancing of the 
different rights is fundamental to the fairness test. As stated in S v Makwanyane,118 
the balancing process entails an assessment of: 
 
“The nature of the right that is limited, and its importance to an open and democratic society 
based on freedom and equality; the purpose for which the right is limited and the importance 
of that purpose to such a society.”119 
 
 Cameron J et al state that the test should be applied when “making a decision that 
relies predominantly on one of the criteria, such as race, that are normally barred from 
consideration by section 9(3) of the Constitution”.120 Cameron J et al further assert 
that, unlike rationality, the fairness standard would allow the court to “interrogate 
properly a decision-maker’s balancing of the multiple designated groups, or of their 
interests against those adversely affected by the restitutionary measures”.121 
 
116 Para 87; see also s 15 of the EEA.  
117 Section 15(2)(b). See also South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 
SA 123 (CC) para 87-88:  
“First, it makes plain that the Act does not sanction affirmative action measures that are 
overly rigid … the Act does not countenance employment decisions “that would establish 
an absolute barrier” to the employment or advancement of those not from designated 
groups … In addition, the Act aims to advance several different “designated groups””.   
118 1995 3 SA 391 (CC). 
119 Para 104. 
120 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) para 96. 





McGregor believes that it is in this manner that the fairness test provides for a wider 
scope of inclusive adjudicative reasoning and coming to a balance.122  
However, the standard of fairness does not go without its share of detractors. The 
judges themselves raise a couple of objections to the fairness standard. Firstly, they 
state that it may be too vague, but they believe it will become more certain as 
precedent builds up.123 Secondly, it may be internally inconsistent where the 
resitutionary measure has already passed constitutional muster and thus does not 
constitute unfair discrimination.124 Van der Westhuizen J agreed with both these 
objections. He states that fairness is too vague and may not be applicable in this 
context when dealing with measures under section 9(2).125 However, fairness as a 
standard under section 9(2) likewise receives criticism, as Mokgoro J in Van Heerden 
stated that the main focus of section 9(2) is “on the group advanced and the 
mechanism used to advance it.”126 Measures should, therefore, be assessed from the 
perspective of the goal intended to be advanced.127 Pretorius opines that fairness 
would, therefore, be out of place, as undue attention would be paid to those persons 
disadvantaged by the measure.128 However, Mokgoro J’s interpretation could be 
contested as we cannot apply these measures blindly and completely ignore third 
parties.129 If Cameron J et al are believed to be correct, namely that there exists a 
separate standard under the EEA, then the comments by Mokgoro J would not be 
applicable under these circumstances, as these concerns are specific to the standard 
of review under section 9(2) and not the EEA (which Act did not apply to the case 
before the court in Van Heerden).  
 
 
122 McGregor (2013) SALJ 657. 
123 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) para 99. 
124 Para 99. 
125 Para 159. 
126 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) para 78. It must be noted that 
Mokgoro J did recognise that even though the focus is on the group advanced, the interests 
of those not advanced should not be disregarded. 
127 Para 78. 
128 Pretorius (2013) SALJ 42. 





2 3 1 3 Proportionality analysis 
The third standard of review that has been suggested is that of a proportionality 
analysis. Van der Westhuizen J in Barnard suggested that the section 36 limitation 
analysis should be used, and therefore a proportionality standard. But Van der 
Westhuizen J was of the view that while the implementation of affirmative action 
measures by an employer is not a limitation of rights by the means of law of general 
application, “this formula helps with the task of measuring the impact of the 
enforcement of one right on another”.130 However, Rautenbach disagrees and feels 
that section 36 also includes conduct in furtherance of or in terms of legislation like the 
EEA.131 Furthermore, the limitation analysis is an important part of constitutional 
democracy and it involves the weighing up and balancing of competing values in the 
context of the Constitution as a whole.132 As a result, proportionality analysis focuses 
on whether state action can be justified in a liberal democracy.133 Therefore, Van der 
Westhuizen J states that:  
 
“[I]nterpreting the ambit and nature of a right restrictively so as to mask the reality that 
courts are compelled to make difficult choices, the appropriate route is often to interpret 
rights holistically and robustly and then consider whether intrusions into those rights are 
reasonable and justifiable in a democracy.”134 
 
This requires courts to engage in a balancing exercise and not merely to adhere to 
a checklist as affirmative action measures may influence a number of interests and 
 
130 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) para 164. 
131 Rautenbach (2015) SALJ 436:  
“Van der Westhuizen J said that to the extent that other rights could be affected in this case, 
the general limitation clause in section 36 would not be directly applicable “because it 
[section 36] deals with the limitation of rights by ‘law of general application’” (para 162; 
emphasis added). This statement is incorrect. The general limitation clause in the interim 
constitution referred to limitation “by” law of general application (s 33 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993), but this was deliberately changed in the final 
constitution to “in terms of” law of general application. The effect of this change is that every 
limitation must be authorised by law of general application and not that the general limitation 
clause cannot be applied to other forms of limiting action.” 
See also, Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 152 and 155-160. 
132 McGregor (2013) SALJ 653. 
133 Pretorius (2013) SALJ 38. 





rights of the parties involved, as well as of greater society. Pretorius states that 
proportionality analysis is “essentially about the assessment of reasons.”135 The 
requirement of a legitimate aim for state action ensures that the proportionality test 
facilitates a discussion and contestation of the kind of grounds that can be legitimately 
invoked in justification of the restriction of fundamental rights.136 
Rautenbach, in a discussion on the requirements for affirmative action,137 
commends Van der Westhuizen J for identifying a standard which includes principles 
of the section 36 limitation analysis.138 However, he states that it cannot merely be 
done through an exercise of indirect application. Rautenbach states that the 
appropriate requirements for affirmative action cannot avoid dealing with limitation by 
affirmative action of the rights of those people who are not the beneficiaries of the 
measure.139 The majority judgment in Van Heerden similarly recognised that there 
must not be “substantial and undue harm on those excluded from its benefits”.140 This 
may indicate that there may be scope to use the requirements which are applied under 
the general limitations analysis. Van der Westhuizen J, when applying “proportionality 
analysis”, applied provisions of the section 36 limitation clause after initially claiming 
that it would not be applicable.141 The Constitution commits itself to a standard which 
requires all rights-limiting action to be “reasonable and justifiable in an open 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom”.142 Therefore, we 
have a right-limiting standard in our Constitution. It would seem to be unintuitive to not 
use this standard of review when rights are limited, as may very well be the case for 
non-beneficiaries in the application of affirmative action.  
Furthermore, proportionality analysis filters out the burden on those detrimentally 
affected by governmental action by ensuring that such measures must also be the 
result of “a judicious discernment of the facts as they relate to the government 
 
135 Pretorius (2013) SALJ 31. 
136 39. 
137 Rautenbach (2015) SALJ 431-443. 
138 438. 
139 439. 
140 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) para 44. 
141 See South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) paras 181-
182 and paras 184-189. 





measures and weighing the competing concerns in a contextually sensitive way.”143 
Apart from acting like a filter, proportionality also “counters a lack of serious 
engagement with the realities to which the law applies”.144 Therefore, proportionality 
requires more than a good reason for state measures in the abstract. More practically, 
Rautenbach believes that some provisions of the EEA, such as section 15(4), give 
effect to constitutional proportionality principles. Section 15(4) states that an absolute 
barrier to the prospective or continued employment of non-designated groups is not 
permissible. This would mean that the “nature and effect of limitations by affirmative 
action of the right to trade, occupation and profession of non-designated groups that 
amount to ‘barring’ them from employ[ment] outweigh the importance of the purpose 
of the limitation”.145  
 
2 4 Conclusion  
Due to the systematic unfair discrimination of the past, the South African 
Constitution is transformative in nature. The right to equality is, therefore, one of the 
foundational principles and it aims to achieve substantive equality. It is well known that 
restitutionary measures are not an exception to equality and that it is necessary to 
achieve substantive equality. The Van Heerden test is currently still the accepted 
standard of review for restitutionary measures to pass constitutional muster. However, 
the Barnard case has created uncertainty regarding the appropriate constitutional 
standard of review for affirmative action measures, generally, and for such measures 
implemented under the EEA, more specifically. This may be due to the fact that the 
EEA has a different aim and objective for the application of affirmative action to that of 
the Constitution, even though the EEA is a form of national legislation which was 
enacted to give effect to section 9(2) of the Constitution, in terms of section 9(4) (and 
the fact that the Act must be interpreted in compliance with the Constitution). The EEA 
itself must not only comply with the Constitution but the quest to achieve equality must 
occur within the discipline of the Constitution.  
There is a great debate about the most suitable standard of review for affirmative 









providing a framework that would permit our constitutional goals to be read 
harmoniously. The discussion surrounding the standard of review is important 
because the standard will ensure that affirmative action measures which are 
implemented do not unduly infringe the dignity of others. Further, an adequate 
standard will assist the courts in identifying the use of quotas (which are prohibited 
under the EEA) when they are disguised as targets. However, the standard of review 
cannot be inappropriately high (like that of the strict scrutiny approach in the United 
States), as an inappropriately high standard would impede our constitutional 
objectives, something that the majority in Van Heerden pertinently warned against. 
What is clear is that the standard should be rigorous enough to ensure that the 
implementation of an affirmative action measure under the EEA is consistent with not 
only the purposes of the Act but also the constitutional requirements.146 As was 
illustrated, the EEA takes its cue from section 9(2) of the Constitution. This would, 
therefore, entail balancing the interests of the various designated groups as well as 
avoiding undue harm on those excluded from its benefits that would result in our long-
term constitutional goal being threatened.147 The general consensus (at least amongst 
academic commentators) is that rationality does not provide this, as rationality is too 
deferential. Compared to a fairness or proportionality inquiry, rationality does not 
require a high degree of democratic accountability concerning rights-limiting measures 
and it does not demand an explanation for the disproportional or unfair invasion of 
rights.148 As a result of the competing fundamental rights claims and public interests 
that are invariably involved in affirmative action disputes, rationality would be deemed 
to be too low a hurdle to be used to adequately test the legality of affirmative action 
measures.149  
It is believed that rationality gives far too much attention to the aim or objective of 
affirmative action measures, as this is deemed to be the primary component of the 
standard.150 This low standard would mean that by merely calling something an 
 
146 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) para 97; refer 
also to s 15(4) of the EEA. 
147 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) para 44. See also South African 
Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) para 148. 
148 Pretorius (2013) SALJ 40. 
149 44: McGregor (2013) SALJ 656. 





affirmative action measure, you would be able to show it is rational if it is only aimed 
at advancing the designated group. The stricter standards of fairness and 
proportionality are said to be required to give effect to the constitutional principles of 
accountability, openness and inclusivity. Under the proportionality analysis, the aim of 
a measure is but one of the factors that must be taken into account.  
The idea posed by Cameron J et al that there may exist a separate and additional 
standard under the EEA must also be given due consideration. It is a valid proposition 
when one considers the fact that the EEA and section 9(2) have two seemingly 
different purposes (although, as mentioned earlier, it remains questionable whether it 
is constitutionally permissible for the EEA to depart from the purpose of affirmative 
action as stipulated in section 9(2) of the Bill of Rights).  
The current understanding is that the Van Heerden test still determines the 
constitutionality of an affirmative action programme or measure. That does not imply 
that the standard to test the individual “implementation” of that programme should also 
be that of rationality. However, despite the differing opinions regarding the most 
appropriate test, what is certain is that affirmative action under the EEA aims to 
achieve an equitable level of representation of beneficiaries and equality of opportunity 
in the workplace. The judiciary requires that both the measure and the implementation 
of such measure must be lawful and proper, but it seems that the confusion mainly 
exists under which standard of review the implementation must be tested. As a result 
of this uncertainty, one has to question how this would impact future affirmative action 
cases, especially those that may present in the context of sports (transformation), as 
we will see that affirmative action is becoming more and more synonymous with the 
pursuit of the achievement of demographic representivity. Nevertheless, the current 
internal requirements of section 9(2) remain the only constitutional hurdle which 








CHAPTER 3: THE ROLE OF THE EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT IN RACE-BASED 
SPORTS TRANSFORMATION  
3 1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 above set out the legal framework of the EEA in the context of affirmative 
action under the Constitution, and the next step is to not only determine whether 
Chapter III of the EEA applies to professional athletes in sports teams, but also what 
constitutes a quota in the context of affirmative action. Furthermore, the discussion will 
delve deeper into the true purpose of the EEA and how that creates grey areas in the 
law of affirmative action. 
 
3 2 The Applicability of the Employment Equity Act in the professional 
sports context 
For the EEA to be applicable in this context, it needs to be demonstrated that 
professional athletes in team sports in South Africa are “employees” as defined by the 
Act. The EEA, Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (“LRA”) and Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act 75 of 1997 (“BCEA”) all define an employee in similar terms:  
 
“[E]mployee means any person other than an independent contractor who –  
(a) works for another person or for the state and who receives, or is entitled to receive, 
any remuneration; and  
(b) in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the business of an employer.”151 
 
The courts have likewise formulated a number of tests to distinguish between an 
employee and an independent contractor. The first of these tests is the control test. 
The control test was formulated in Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v 
Macdonald,152 and it is argued that the right to control is more extensive in the 
 
151 Section 1 of the EEA; see also s 1 of the BCEA and s 213 of the LRA. 
152 1931 AD 412 (at 434-435):  
“one thing appears to me beyond dispute and that is that the relation of master and servant 
cannot exist where there is a total absence if the right of supervising and controlling the 
workman under the contract; in other words, unless the master not only has the right to 
prescribe to the workplace what work has to be done, but also the manner in which such 





employment contract than in an agency contract.153 The second test is the 
organisation test. The organisation test was summarised in the case of SABC v 
McKenzie,154 in which the Labour Appeal Court stated:  
 
“The second [test] is the organisation test: a person is an employee if he is “part and parcel 
of the organisation”…, whereas the work of an independent contractor “although done for 
the business, is not integrated into it but is only accessory to it”.”155 
 
Basson et al summarise the position by stating that “if a person is incorporated or 
related sufficiently to the organisation of the employer that person will be regarded as 
an employee or worker even though the employer might exercise little actual 
control”.156 The final test is the dominant impression test. This test is often the standard 
test employed by our courts and it uses several factors to ascertain whether or not the 
contract in question is a contract of service.157 
However more recently the case of State Information Technology Agency (Pty) Ltd 
v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration158 stated that three primary 
criteria exist to determine the existence of an employment relationship. These criteria 
are the “employer’s right to supervision and control, whether the employee forms an 
integral part of the organisation with the employer and the extent to which the 
employee was economically dependent on the employer”.159  
Furthermore, a more recent test has emerged, which is referred to as the reality 
test. In Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber160 the court stated that ”whether or not a person is or 
was an employee of another is a question that must be decided on the basis of realities 
– on the basis of substance and not form or labels”.161 The case of Uber SA 
 
153 Basson et al Essential Labour Law (2009) 26. 
154 1999 1 BLLR 1 (LAC). 
155 Para 5. 
156 Basson et al Essential Labour Law (2009) 27. 
157 27: These factors would include the following: The right to supervision, the extent to which 
the worker depends on the employer in the performance of his duties, whether the employer 
is allowed to work for another, whether the worker is paid according to a fixed rate or by 
commission.  
158 2008 29 ILJ 2234 (LAC). 
159 Para 12. 
160 2005 26 ILJ 1256 (LAC). 





Technology Services (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Public Service & Allied Workers162 
stated that: 
 
“[T]he ‘reality test’ is no more than the assertion that where parties have concluded an 
agreement to structure the relationship between [them] in a particular form, that does not 
preclude the court from enquiring into the substance of the arrangement and to determine 
that despite the terms of the contract, an employment relationship exists when one in fact 
exists … It is no more than a measure to be applied to combat disguised employment 
relationships where contractual arrangements between the parties serve to conceal what 
is in truth an employment relationship, and thus deprive an employee of the statutory 
protection that is his or her due.”163 
 
The court, however, found that the dominant impression test remains intact and that 
the reality test “was used to combat bogus arrangements designed to conceal true 
employment relationships”.164 
Section 200A of the LRA also provides for a presumption which provides guidelines 
when someone is an employee (applicable to workers earning under the earnings 
threshold set in the Act). The effect of this presumption is that if one or more of the 
listed factors is present, the person is rebuttably presumed to be an employee. Section 
200A (1) states: 
 
“Until the contrary is proved, a person, who works for or renders services to any other 
person, is presumed, regardless of the form of the contract, to be an employee, if any one 
or more of the following factors are present:  
(a) the manner in which the person works is subject to the control or direction of another 
person;  
(b) the person’s hours of work are subject to the control or direction of another person  
(c) in the case of a person who works for an organisation, the person forms part of that 
organisation;  
(d) the person has worked for that other person for an average of at least 40 hours per 
month over the last three months;  
(e) the person is economically dependent on the other person for whom he or she works or 
renders services; 
(f) the person is provided with tools of trade or work equipment by the other person; or  
 
162 2018 39 ILJ 903 (LC). 
163 Para 75. 






(g) the person only works for or renders services to one person.”165 
 
This provision virtually summarises the principles laid down by the courts.  
Mould states that it is clear that when considering the above factors, “professional 
sportsmen and sportswomen can be classified as ‘employees’ governed by ‘contracts 
of employment’".166 When you take into consideration the relationship between a 
professional sportsperson and their employer and apply it against the aforementioned 
legislative definition of an employee, the tests under the common law and the factors 
included in the legislative presumption, professional sportspersons would be classified 
as employees. Therefore, the question of whether professional athletes in team 
sporting codes are employees as opposed to independent contractors is no longer 
contested.167 This position is further endorsed by the fact that disputes involving 
professional sportspersons and their employers are being adjudicated by the 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (“CCMA”) and Labour Courts, 
which focus on legal rules and principles which govern employer-employee 
relationships. In the case of SA Rugby Players Association on behalf of Bands v SA 
Rugby (Pty) Ltd (Bands),168 which centred around an unfair dismissal dispute of three 
rugby players, it was confirmed that professional rugby players are covered by the 
labour legislation of South Africa: 
  
“Our labour courts have established the principle that equity and fairness are paramount to 
the employment relationship. Irrespective of whether employees are factory workers or 
professional rugby players they have a right to be treated fairly. This principle is also 
enshrined in our Constitution.”169 
 
The South African Rugby Players Association (SARPA) CEO, Piet Heymans, 
commented on the judgment saying: 
 
 
165 Section 200A (1) of the LRA. 
166 K Mould “The Suitability of the Remedy of Specific Performance to Breach of a “Player’s 
Contract” With Specific Reference To The Mapoe And Santos Cases” (2011) 4 PER 189 192.   
167 S Smailes “Sports Law and Labour Law in the Age of (Rugby) Professionalism: Collective 
Power, Collective Strength” (2007) 28 ILJ 57 59. 
168 2005 26 ILJ 176 (CCMA). 





“It also confirms that professional rugby players are covered by the labour laws of South 
Africa and that despite the sometimes unique employment environment, all labour-law 
principles are applicable when dealing with professional rugby players.”170  
 
In Cronje v United Cricket Board of SA,171 it was further stated that:  
 
“The respondent [the then United Cricket Board of South Africa] contracts players to play 
international cricket. The relationship with the contracted players is a direct employer-
employee relationship and is governed by the terms of their contracts of employment.”172  
 
Sport is a specialist endeavour and the employment contracts for professional 
sportspersons differ somewhat, and sometimes significantly, from other contracts of 
employment. These unique features include the fact that the contract is for a fixed 
period, or it may include clauses pertaining to the physical condition and fitness of the 
athlete.173 The courts have recognised these differences and in McCarthy v Sundowns 
Football Club the court stated the following:  
 
“[T]he employment contract of professional footballers differs substantially from the 
contracts of other employees. In particular, a professional footballer cannot resign during 
the period of his contract of employment and take up employment with another club without 
the agreement of his old club. If a professional footballer leaves a club after the period of 
his contract of employment, he cannot begin playing for another club unless and until he is 
provided with a clearance certificate.” 
 
Despite the sui generis employment relationship which sport creates, labour law 
and the labour legislation apply to these relationships.  
Having determined that professional athletes in team sports are “employees” and 
thus covered by the labour legislation, the next question is whether national sports 
governing bodies such as SARU, Cricket South Africa (“CSA”) or provincial unions and 
franchises are “designated employers” for purposes of affirmative action measures 
 
170 J Van Der Westhuyzen “Landmark victory for Straeuli’s Boks” (10-12-2004) IOL 
<https://www.iol.co.za/capeargus/sport/landmark-victory-for-straeulis-boks-540466> 
(accessed 02-11-2020). 
171 2001 4 SA 1361 (T). 
172 1367J: see also McCarthy v Sundowns Football Club 2003 2 BLLR 193 (LC) and Santos 
Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2002 23 ILJ 405. 





under the EEA. It is these designated employers who are tasked with implementing 
affirmative action measures in terms of the Act. A designated employer is defined as:  
 
“a) an employer who employs 50 or more employees; 
 b) an employer who employs fewer than 50 employees, but has a total annual turnover 
that is equal to or above the applicable annual turnover of a small business in terms of the 
Schedule 4 to this Act”.174 
 
It is clear from the annual reports of both SARU and CSA that not only do their 
annual turnovers exceed the annual turnovers of a small business in terms of 
Schedule 4 of the EEA,175 but they also employ 50 or more employees.176 These sports 
bodies and their members are responsible for not only the employment of the various 
players in the national teams but also their administrative structures, team selections 
and management sectors.177 Furthermore, the Solidarity trade union has submitted an 
affidavit to the Labour Court in which the trade union argued convincingly that the 
various sports bodies such as SARU and CSA, to name just two, are in fact 
“designated employers” in terms of section 1 of the EEA.178  
 
3 3 The mystery of targets and quotas  
It is now clear that the EEA applies to professional athletes in team sports and that 
their employers generally qualify as “designated employers” for the purposes of the 
affirmative action chapter. As a result, the applicability of the use of racial quota 
 
174 Section 1 of the EEA; Note that the Employment Equity Amendment Bill in GG 43535 of 20 
July 2020 which was tabled in Parliament aims to repeal schedule 4 in the principal Act. 
175 Schedule 4 of the EEA states that the annual turnover threshold for community, special 
and personal services amounts to R15million. 
176 South African Rugby Union SA Rugby Annual Report 2017 49 and Cricket South Africa 
Integrated Report 2017/2018 23-25.  
177 AM Louw “‘Should the Playing Fields be Levelled?’ Revisiting Affirmative Action in 
Professional Sport – Part 1: The Background and the Context” (2004) 15 Stell LR 135, stated 
that these sports bodies must undoubtedly be designated employers. Furthermore, that each 
of these bodies not only employ more than 50 persons, they also have substantial annual 
turnovers well in excess of the statutory limit for small businesses set in Schedule 4 of the Act 
as mentioned above.  







systems in the implementation of affirmative action measures should come under 
scrutiny. As identified, racial quotas may amount to job reservation, and it appears to 
be implemented in professional sports teams to speed up transformation. This view 
corresponds with what the former Minister of Sport and Recreation stated: 
 
“If it was not for a barbaric nonsensical apartheid system that privileged them, we could not 
have implemented quota system to normalise an otherwise abnormal system.”179  
 
The use of racial quotas results in previously disadvantaged members of society 
having reserved positions in the workplace or, in this instance, in professional sports 
teams. This contrasts with the affirmative action provisions in the EEA, which provide 
for preferential treatment for persons from designated groups in the workplace as 
opposed to the use of quotas. This results in complete and apparently blatant, 
systemic disregard for section 15(3) of the EEA, which explicitly prohibits the use of 
quotas (which prohibition was approved of by Moseneke SCJ in Barnard (CC) on the 
grounds that “quotas amount to job reservation”) in the professional sports industry.180 
The use of racial quotas in the composition of professional sports teams would, 
therefore, appear to amount to an atypical form of affirmative action, and one which, 
at least at first glance, appears to offend directly against the provisions of the Act as 
well as the judicial conception of what constitutes constitutionally permissible 
affirmative action. 
Having sketched the applicable law, it is clear that in terms of the EEA numerical 
targets or goals are allowed but quotas are explicitly prohibited. The term “quota” has 
not specifically been defined by various judges in recent cases, but it is rather 
frequently compared and contrasted to that of a numerical target, as will be illustrated 
later. Dictionary.com defines a quota as “a proportional part or share of a fixed total 
amount or quantity”.181 It essentially translates into an allotment or an allocation of a 
specific amount. The difference between numerical targets and quotas would need to 
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be established as it is clear that quotas are prohibited while numerical targets and 
goals are permitted, and their use indeed encouraged under the EEA.  
 
3 3 1 The difference between numerical targets and quotas  
It may seem easy to define quotas or numerical targets in the context of affirmative 
action, yet neither the EEA nor several judges who adjudicated matters in this regard 
have expressly defined these terms.182 However, in some cases, judges have 
attempted to set out what would make a measure qualify as a numerical target as 
opposed to a quota. Moseneke J states that “the primary distinction between numerical 
targets and quotas lies in the flexibility of the standard”.183 Nugent J similarly stated 
that the only way to avoid unduly infringing another person’s dignity is by allowing for 
flexibility in the application of an affirmative action measure.184 In the case of Solidarity 
v Department of Correctional Services (Correctional Services),185 the majority of the 
court stated that numerical targets that envisage designated groups filling specified 
percentages of the workforce, but which allow for deviations, are legally permissible.186 
In South African Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners Association v Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development; In Re: Concerned Insolvency Practitioners 
Association NPC v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development (“SARIPA”),187 
Katz J stated the following: 
 
“[S]ome flexibility of approach is required. This is expressly articulated by Cameron J, 
Froneman J and Majiedt AJ in stating that ‘over-rigidity … risks disadvantaging not only 
those who are not selected for a job, but also those who are’. This is because it can create 
the impression that appointments are due only to race and exclusive of merit. Further, when 
considering implementation of a measure ‘a decision-maker cannot simply apply the 
numerical targets by rote’.”188 
 
 
182 See South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) para 42. 
183 Para 54. 
184 Solidarity v Department of Correctional Services 2016 5 SA 594 (CC) para 117. 
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Thlothlalemaje J provided the most comprehensive evaluation of the use of quotas 
by including various judges and legal commentators’ remarks on the difference 
between a quota and a numerical goal or target, which will be quoted extensively here:  
 
“The terms ‘quota’ and ‘numerical goals’ found elucidation in Munsamy v The Minister of 
Safety and Security. Katz AJ in South African Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners 
Association v Minister of Justice and constitutional Development and Others; In Re: 
Concerned Insolvency Practitioners Association NPC and Others v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development and Others (“SARIPA”) explored further meaning to the terms 
and held that: 
 
“Some guidance as to the distinction between targets and quotas can be obtained from 
American jurisprudence. In Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association v 
EEOC, quotas and targets were distinguished as follows: 
 
‘A quota would impose a fixed number or percentage which must be attained, or which 
cannot be exceeded, and would do so regardless of the number of potential applicants who 
meet necessary qualifications. ... By contrast, a goal is a numerical objective, fixed 
realistically in terms of the number of vacancies expected, and the number of qualified 
applicants available in the relevant job.’ 
 
In the South African context, Klinck & Ngwena state: 
 
‘“Quotas” refer to all preferential techniques that have the effect of reserving all or a fixed 
percentage of job opportunities for designated groups. This may be achieved through the 
setting aside of a specific number of positions for designated groups or by making 
designated group status the only or dominant criterion for eligibility for employment 
opportunities.’ 
 
According to Andre M Louw, quotas in the employment equity context are ‘mandatory and 
represent a fixed number to be achieved, apparently at any cost’, whilst targets are non-
mandatory guidelines to achieve representation from designated groups in the workforce. 
Further, he argues that application of quotas is ‘generally divorced from reality and the 
circumstances of the specific situation in which they are applied’. Louw argues that a target 
or numerical goal established in an Employment Equity Plan will only be legitimate if regard 
is had to the factors listed in s 42 of the Employment Equity Act. An element of such goal-
setting is that it must be realistic in context. 
 







The drafters of the EEA were careful to use the word “numerical goals” rather than “quotas”. 
The difference in the use of these terms is not semantic, and flowing from the distinction 
made in Barnard and other authorities referred to above, it is useful to add that “numerical 
goals” or “targets” within the context of employment equity plans are often voluntarily 
agreed between parties to set objectives and guidelines. Parties by agreement can adjust 
these numerical goals, and the EEA does not make provision for parties to be sanctioned 
when they do not meet those numerical goals. To the extent that it might be argued that 
Schedule 1 of section 65 of the EEA imposes fines in the event of its contravention, these 
fines are in respect of specific contraventions identified in the Schedule, being sections 16, 
19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the EEA. None of these provisions, however, speak of “quotas”.  
 
“‘Quotas’ on the other hand are externally imposed, (e.g by way of legislation, policy, 
regulations or even practice) and the failure to meet them is usually met with a sanction. 
They denote a limitation; a fixed amount; or a maximum of something related to a number, 
quantity, share, allocation or value, which an individual, individual group or entity is 
permitted or entitled to. ‘Quotas’ are an end in themselves, as they do not permit flexibility 
unless there is a change to the tool that enforces them.  
 
Racial or gender quotas as applied within the workplace as indicated in Barnard equate to 
job reservation, and furthermore attract negative connotations and for good reasons. Not 
only are they inherently and irrationally discriminatory, they are also demeaning in 
implementation in that they fail to acknowledge an individual’s worth. In most instances, 
and unwittingly so, they promote mediocrity and incompetence, and instil a false sense of 
entitlement. Invariably and whether rightly or wrongly, beneficiaries of the quota system will 
always be viewed as inferior and incompetent, as the assumption will always be that they 
got recognition or appointment simply to make up the numbers rather than based on their 
suitability or competencies. In a society such as ours and in our workplaces, where we are 
still battling the demons of racial polarisation and tensions, the use of quotas adds fuel to 
those tensions and creates further suspicions and resentment. Any affirmative action 
measure based on quotas is inherently ‘arbitrary, capricious and displays naked 
preference’, and would accordingly not pass constitutional test as stated in Van Heerden 
and Barnard.”(Citations and references omitted)189 
 
Therefore, quotas can be described as rigid, a fixed number or percentage which 
must be attained, and a reservation of places, and quotas do not permit flexibility. The 
most common characteristic seems to be that quotas do not allow deviation or some 
sort of flexibility in their (by definition, rigid) application. However, Nugent AJ states 
that the fact that a plan makes provision for a deviation is not enough to determine 
whether it is a quota system or not. Nugent AJ stated, on the facts of the Correctional 
 





Services case, that one should not enquire “whether there are special cases that are 
excepted from the Plan, but instead whether there is scope for flexibility when the Plan 
is applied to non-excepted posts”.190 Nugent AJ concurs with Moseneke J, that 
numerical targets should be understood as guidelines and therefore it allows for a 
scope of deviation in their application.191 The discretion is important to avoid unduly 
infringing the dignity of the applicants of all posts,192 and without such a discretion, an 
absolute barrier to employment would exist and the targets would, therefore, be 
construed as a quota.193 According to Pretorius the “distinction between acceptable 
numerical targets and unacceptable quotas or absolute barriers must not be reduced 
to the definitional element of whether or not an authorisation exists to deviate from the 
prescribed targets as such”.194 Pretorius explains it as follows: 
 
“Therefore, the ultimate marker to distinguish acceptable numerical targets from unlawful 
quotas or barriers is not whether an employment equity plan contains a deviation clause as 
such, but whether the flexibility that such a clause makes provision for can accommodate 
all the implicit considerations of an inclusive notion of substantive equality, along with all 
the constitutionally protected interests, rights and values inherent in such disputes. Thus, 
the narrow deviation clause in [the Correctional Services case] arbitrarily diminished the 
contextual factors that should have steered the design and implementation of the numerical 
employment equity targets in line with an inclusive notion of substantive equality and a 
holistic reading of the Constitution (or, in Sachs J’s words, ‘the fundamental constitutional 
values called into play by the situation.’). One struggles to comprehend how a plan that 
omits considerations that could very well be intimately related to the substantive equality 
ideal of realising the equal worth and dignity of all can be called ‘flexible’ in any 
constitutionally normative sense, and claim to promote the purpose of the substantive 
equality right.”195 
 
Louw agrees that the definitional approach lacks constitutional legitimacy as it loses 
sight of the “wording of the first sentence in section 9(2) of the Bill of Rights, which 
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calls for recognition of substantive equality embracing the ‘full and equal enjoyment of 
all rights and freedoms’”.196  
However, the exercise of determining the existence of quotas is not limited to 
whether flexibility exists, as it is also suggested that if sanctions are imposed for not 
meeting a target, it amounts to a quota. On more than one occasion the former Minister 
of Sport, Fikile Mbalula, had threatened to punish federations for not meeting their 
transformation “targets”. In April 2016 he revoked the privileges of CSA, Athletics 
South Africa (“ASA”), the SARU and Netball South Africa (“NSA”) from bidding to stage 
and host major international events as a result of their perceived failure to meet their 
“own” transformation targets.197 The Minister does not have the power to intervene in 
team selections, as stated in section 13(5)(b)(ii) of the National Sports and Recreation 
Act 110 of 1996 (“NSRA”).198 The targets by the unions were not met, and the Minister 
proceeded to penalise the unions. Innes too described a quota as something which is 
externally imposed,199 and the case above would appear to be a perfect example of 
the Minister imposing a sanction on the different sports bodies. This would appear to 
make a nonsense of the nature of these “targets” of the federations; at least, the 
imposition by government of a sanction for failing to meet such targets would appear 
to show that they may be nothing other than quotas.  
 
3 3 2 The courts’ views on quotas  
The EEA states that quotas are prohibited, therefore it is only logical that the courts 
should stand by this prohibition. This has been the case in various judgments. Judges 
have openly stated their stance against the use of quotas in affirmative action 
measures. The Constitutional Court in Barnard accepted that the EEA does not allow 
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for the enforcement of quotas, but did allow for numerical targets in the implementation 
of employment equity plans, and as such the implementation of quotas would be 
impermissible.200 In Van Heerden, it is stated that measures should not be “arbitrary, 
capricious or display naked preference”.201 If measures do display these 
characteristics, it would not achieve its constitutionally authorised end. In Minister of 
Justice v The South African Restructuring & Insolvency Practitioners Association 
(“SARIPA II”),202 Mathopo JA, Mpati P, Wallis, Swain and Van der Merwe JJA agreed 
with this view and stated that implementing a measure in that manner would amount 
to a quota system.203  
In SARIPA, the court recognised that a rigid approach cannot be sensitive to the 
achievement of substantive equality, whether that is in the context of employment or 
in a broader setting,204 and as such would not pass muster under section 9(2) of the 
Constitution.205 Quotas create an absolute barrier to the future or continued 
employment of persons from non-designated groups,206 which infringes on their 
 
200 South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC) para 42; see 
also para 87:  
“the Act does not sanction affirmative action measures that are overly rigid … this is 
because affirmative action measures “include preferential treatment and numerical goals, 
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section 22 constitutional right to pursue their choice of career, trade and profession.207 
But that is not the only potential infringement that may be at stake when a quota is 
applied. In SARIPA II the court stated that such remedial measures must not trump 
the rights of previously advantaged persons. Katz J stated that when using quotas, it 
harms the core values and right to dignity as a result of “a measure which elevates 
race and gender as absolute categories without any regard to individual characteristics 
or the context in which appointments must take place.”208 Tlhotlhalemaje J further 
stated that quotas are not only “inherently and irrationally discriminatory, they are also 
demeaning in implementation in that they fail to acknowledge an individual’s worth”.209  
Despite all of this, quotas remain a common theme in the application of affirmative 
action measures in sport. Even though we have Ministers past and present saying that 
it is necessary, it is prohibited in the EEA for good reasons, and reasons endorsed by 
various judges. Quotas would infringe on the core rights of those individuals who do 
not form part of the previously disadvantaged groups in society, the non-beneficiaries 
of team selection or the contest for franchise contracts in the relevant sporting code.  
In chapter 2 above it was identified that equitable representation is one of the key 
objectives of the EEA, and it would, therefore, be interesting to understand the 
relationship between equitable representation and the use of quotas. It is important to 
note that the EEA endorses (in fact, prescribes) equitable representation, and surely 
this would result in limited “flexibility” when implementing a measure despite the 
factors listed in section 42 which may justify the failure of the employer to meet 
targets? It is therefore valuable to look at the role equitable representation plays in 
government’s transformative scheme in the South African workforce. 
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3 4 The EEA’s obsession with “equitable representation”/representivity  
“South Africans want to see more “representivity” among executives running businesses in 
the country … People are tired of businesses being run by minorities.”210  
 
This is merely just one of the occasions that the government and President Cyril 
Ramaphosa used the term “representivity” when referring to transformation. Louw 
notes that the word “representivity” is not part of the English language and that 
wordnik.com gives ten examples of its use, all by the ANC in official documents and 
media statements, which seems to suggest that the ANC in fact coined the term.211 
The term’s exact date of “creation” is not stated but it has certainly become part of the 
South African vocabulary. So much so that it is a word which may now be used 
interchangeably with “equitable representation” as found in the EEA. As Malan 
observes, “representivity is the principal instrument for achieving transformation”.212  
Malan describes representivity as “the norm in terms of which institutions and 
organised spheres of people are required to be composed in such a manner that they 
reflect the national population profile, particularly the racial profile of the national 
population.”213 Therefore, it is implied that the workforce of each employer must be 
organised according to the racial composition of the entire South African population.214 
To measure representivity, at least in terms of the EEA, one must look at the national 
and regional demographics of the economically active population, which according to 
recent figures currently stands at 78.5% Africans, 9.6% Coloureds, 9.1% Whites and 
2.8% Indian/Asian.215 Nugent AJ described this as an exercise of “cold and impersonal 
arithmetic.”216 Malan pointed out that the “[EEA] is therefore substantively aimed 
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towards the achievement and maintenance of quotas (euphemistically phrased as 
equitable representation) in the workforce.”217 Louw has on numerous occasions 
stated that applying rigid race-based demographic targets turns constitutionally 
legitimate targets into illegitimate quotas.218 More specifically, Louw explains: 
 
“The EEA requires affirmative action measures to be taken in order to achieve “equitable 
representation” of groups in the workplace. A designated employer must take such 
measures once it is found that a group or groups are “under-represented”. Such employer 
may then set targets for the achievement of equitable representation. When demographic 
statistics are used – especially if they are used as rigidly as they were by the DCS in 
Solidarity v Department of Correctional Services … with reference to the actual 
demographic representation of each racial group in the national population – any level of 
representation of a specific group which falls below the demographic representation of the 
relevant group would mean that such group is under-represented, and that such 
demographic target must be pursued until such time as the relevant percentage 
representation for the group has been reached. This percentage is then, clearly, no longer 
a ‘target’, and the requisite percentage representation of the group has inevitably come to 
function as a rigid quota.” 
 
As mentioned earlier, Tlhotlhalemaje J observed that a characteristic of a quota is 
a reference to fixed numbers according to race or gender to populate the ranks.219 The 
idea of populating ranks sounds similar to the description of representivity when one 
considers it in the context of using racial demographics as the benchmark for target-
setting in the employment sphere. It is therefore interesting to consider how these 
terms relate to achieving equality, which is the ultimate constitutional objective of any 
affirmative action policy or measure (as confirmed also in the third leg of the Van 
Heerden test). 
 
3 4 1 The strange concepts of “equitable representation” and “representivity” 
As previously mentioned, “equitable representation” is a foreign term introduced into 
the legal objectives of affirmative action by the EEA. In Van Heerden, it was stated 
that the objective of affirmative action measures under section 9(2) of the Bill of Rights 
is to promote the achievement of equality by redressing disadvantage caused by past 
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unfair discrimination. It was expressly stated in the majority judgment that the purpose 
of affirmative action under the Constitution is “remedial and restitutionary”. 
Interestingly, the expressly stated purpose of the EEA is to redress past disadvantage 
– which is in line with the constitutional purpose as set out in Van Heerden – but the 
Act says this must be done “in order to ensure equitable representation” of persons 
from designated groups in all levels of the workforce.220 According to Louw, section 2 
of the EEA clearly indicates that redressing past disadvantage is merely just a “means 
to another end”, as the true aim is to ensure equitable representation of members of 
designated groups in the workplace.221 The EEA is an example of legislation passed 
specifically to actively promote equality of outcome.222 Nevertheless, it appears that 
most of the focus of the Act’s affirmative action chapter is on equitable representation, 
which would imply that there is a link between substantive equality and equitable 
representation; or that there must somehow be. McGregor disputes this and states 
that: 
 
“Further, whether the notion of ‘equality’ may be equated to ‘equitable representation’ is 
debatable. One can argue that ‘equitable representivity’ may be equated with substantive 
equality, since both notions are outcomes-based. I contend, however, that ‘absolute’ 
demographic representivity cannot be a mandatory rule required from the Constitution.”223 
  
Louw furthermore sets out reasons why imposing equitable representation is odd: 
firstly, equitable representation is not named/mentioned anywhere in the constitutional 
equality guarantee. McGregor concurs and states that: 
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“The Constitution does not use the notions ‘equitably represented’, ‘equitable 
representation’, or ‘designated groups’; these are used only in the EEA and defined not by 
disadvantage, but by race, sex and disability in the EEA.”224 
 
 If the EEA is an example of legislation promoting equality, it should be strange that 
the important part of the Act which deals with affirmative action is so fundamentally 
centred on the concept of equitable representation, if this concept does not feature in 
the Constitution itself. The concepts of diversity and equitable representation appear 
very frequently in the Act, especially in Chapter III, which deals with affirmative action. 
These concepts are pivotal parts of the Act and act as justificatory grounds for 
affirmative action measures. An example of this is set out in section 6(2) of the Act. As 
Louw points out, “an employer may defend a claim of unfair discrimination under the 
prohibition of unfair discrimination contained in section 6(1) by showing that differential 
treatment occurred in terms of affirmative action “consistent with the purpose of this 
Act”.225 As mentioned, the purpose of implementing affirmative action is evidently to 
ensure equitable representation – this is expressly provided in section 2(b) of the Act 
– not necessarily (or, at least, nominally) the redressing of past disadvantage.  
Furthermore, the Constitution is not completely silent on the need for diversity and 
representation of the different groups. It contains provisions dealing with the 
composition of the judiciary,226 the composition of any commission established under 
chapter 9,227 and the public administration.228 However, these provisions use the term 
“broadly representative” as opposed to demographic representivity of different groups 
in line with the national (or, for that matter, regional) demographic statistics along the 
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lines of race and gender. Broadly means generally, and without minor detail.229 This 
is a far cry from specific targets as set out in affirmative action measures in certain 
workplaces – the examples from cases involving the public service that have come 
before the courts to date are illustrative of this. In Correctional Services, Zondo J 
similarly stated that the workforce or workplace should be broadly representative of 
the people of South Africa and that it “cannot be achieved with an exclusively 
segmented workforce”.230 Zondo J further continued to explain his understanding of 
representivity in the workplace: 
 
“If, therefore, it is accepted that the workforce that is required to be achieved is one that is 
inclusive of all these racial groups and both genders, the next question is whether there is 
a level of representation that each group must achieve or whether it is sufficient if each 
group has a presence in all levels no matter how insignificant their presence may be. In my 
view, the level of representation of each group must broadly accord (emphasis added) with 
its level of representation among the people of South Africa.”231 
 
 Again, Zondo J recognised that representation of each group must “broadly accord” 
with their level of representation among the South African population. According to 
Zondo J, the reason the workforce should be broadly representative is that upon a 
proper construction of the EEA read with the Constitution among other relevant acts, 
that is what is required.232 Not only does Zondo J recognise that the preamble of the 
EEA states that it “aims to achieve a diverse workforce, broadly representative of our 
people”,233 but he also rightly recognises that the EEA like all legislation must be 
construed consistently with the Constitution.234 This would be a good time to yet again 
point out that there is no mention of representivity or national/regional demographic 
representivity in our Constitution. What turns out to be quite strange is how Zondo J 
overlooks his previous statements when determining the validity of the relevant 
employment equity plan. While continuously quoting sections of relevant acts 
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emphasising “broadly representative”, he not once questioned the words “equitable 
representation” in the affirmative action section in the EEA. He then stated that 
equitable representation must be equitable representation “in relation to the 
demographic profile of the national and regional economically active population”,235 
thus completely ignoring his own previous comments that the purpose of the EEA is 
to achieve broad representation and not one based specifically on the demographic 
profile of South Africa. Zondo J went from general representation to very specific 
demographics-based targets.  
The above ambiguity provides a good example of our (case) law concerning the 
understanding of these somewhat constitutionally suspect concepts, and has become 
the norm when referring to affirmative action measures in the workplace. It is unclear 
whether these terms have ever been clearly defined in the Constitutional Court, but as 
soon as the term equitable representation is mentioned, “racial balancing” appears to 
become acceptable. And the constitutionality of this is undoubtedly questionable. 
Secondly, Louw points out that according to section 3(a) of the EEA, the Act must 
be interpreted “in compliance with the Constitution”. We have established that the term 
“equitable representation” is not found in the Constitution. Therefore, upon 
establishing that the purpose of the Act is to achieve equitable representation, section 
3(a) makes for a mystifying reading if it must be interpreted in compliance with the 
Constitution. It is unclear how the concept of equitable representation found its footing 
in the Act with no constitutional connection. Therefore, applying equitable 
representation, rigidly or not, would amount to a deviation from the Constitution as it 
is a new concept that is introduced, foreign to our constitutional equality guarantee. 
Furthermore, section 3(a) may imply that the equitable representation standard as 
employed in the Act would have to be tested in respect of compliance with the 
objectives of section 9(2) of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court, for one, has 
not done this to date. Therefore, as discussed in the previous chapter, even if the 
relatively low standard of rationality would prevail, there would at the very least have 
to be some demonstrable rational link between “equitable representation” and 
demographics and the achievement of substantive equality.  
Finally, the third reason according to Louw, is that it is unclear how “redressing past 
disadvantages would/can lead to ensuring equitable representation of groups, or vice 
 





versa, in any context”.236 As “there is no apparent link between the representation 
(demographic representation) of any particular group (be it based on race, or gender) 
and the redressing of past disadvantage suffered by such group”.237 Louw further 
states that he cannot see a link between representivity and equality.238 That could be 
because they not only mean two very different things but produce two very different 
outcomes. This could also be the reason why the ANC has introduced the term 
representivity when discussing transformation. (Substantive) equality would and 
should never amount to so-called job reservation. However, according to Malan, from 
a transformative point of view, “representivity and equality are regarded as two sides 
of the same coin”.239 It is clear that representivity is viewed as a pre-requisite for 
achieving equality.240 This has become the norm as illustrated by Madlanga AJ, who 
stated that “I see no irrationality in distributing work in a way that uses the demographic 
make-up of South Africa as a point of departure in order to promote equality”.241 This 
is in stark contrast to what Louw believes. However, this view may carry some weight 
when one considers that not only does the EEA use representivity as a pivotal 
instrument for achieving transformation, but it is also evident in statements by a 
number of government spokespersons in the specific context at hand. Former 
President Mbeki stated that “[r]epresentivity of South Africa’s national sports teams 
remained first prize, but racial quotas was not the way to do it”.242 Butana Komphela 
had previously stated that “the ruling party will seek to pass legislation forcing teams 
to achieve demographic “representivity” right down to the schools level”.243 
Furthermore, and in another context, former Minister of Justice and Correctional 
Services, Michael Masutha stated that: 
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“The National Forum on Legal Practice is working on the full implementation of the Legal 
Practice Act, 2014. As part of this process and in making regulations for the Legal Practice 
Council, which will be the governing structure for the legal profession, there must be a 50/50 
(equal) representation of men and women on the Council, with a 70/30 Black to White 
representation. This will see the Council achieving both gender and racial representivity in 
line with what is envisaged in the Legal Practice Act.”244 
 
The Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014 states that not only must transformation embrace 
the values underpinning the Constitution, but also that the Council must pursue a legal 
profession that “broadly reflects the demographic of the Republic”.245 This may be a 
further example of government not only projecting representivity into legislation but 
also an example of how representivity can translate into quotas. Representivity has 
become a goal which appears to be equated with the achievement of equality. Louw 
and Malan are not the only commentators to recognise this assessment. Others have 
recognised the abnormality of using representivity in the achievement of equality. 
Brassey, commenting shortly after the enactment of the EEA, said the following: 
 
“[The Employment Equity Act’s] concern is not with disadvantage, but with racial 
representativeness, which it uses as its organising concept. Since demographic testing of 
this sort can find no justification in the Constitution, the Act can be rescued only if 
representativeness is considered to be a legitimate proxy for past disadvantage.”246  
 
Also shortly after the enactment of the EEA, Rycroft predicted that the Act would be 
revisited because of its relationship with the right to equality:  
 
“It is to be noted that whilst s 9(2) of the Constitution sanctions legislative and other 
measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, the target in the Employment Equity Act is not 
explicitly the concept of disadvantage but “designated groups”, defined not by disadvantage 
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but by race, gender and disability. There is thus a moot constitutional point as to whether 
the Employment Equity Act is tailored narrowly enough to meet the declared constitutional 
purpose that affirmative action measures must be "designed" to protect or advance 
persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. Whilst an 
affirmative action policy will ordinarily constitute discrimination, it is saved from being unfair 
discrimination because of the constitutional and legislative mandate. But precisely because 
these provisions are seen by many as an exception to the right to equality and the 
prohibition against unfair discrimination, they will be revisited many times in the coming 
years.”247 
 
Both Louw and Malan are of the view that courts are now being influenced by this 
foreign concept when adjudicating on affirmative action measures and that the terms 
representivity and equality are at times used interchangeably.248 Too often judges are 
referring to a transformative society which is non-racial and non-sexist, but yet they 
allow the pursuit of representivity, which could condone the use of quotas and may be 
promoting a form of systematic inequality. Yet the judges are painting a picture of a 
transformative mission which requires necessary vigilance. Moseneke ACJ stated: 
 
“Our quest to achieve equality must occur within the discipline of our Constitution.249 
Measures that are directed at remedying past discrimination must be formulated with due 
care not to invade unduly the dignity of all concerned. We must remain vigilant that remedial 
measures under the Constitution are not an end in themselves … We must be careful that 
the steps taken to promote substantive equality do not unwittingly infringe the dignity of 
other individuals – especially those who were themselves previously disadvantaged.”250 
 
Furthermore, Van der Westhuizen J similarly speaks out against merely pursuing 
representivity by stating: 
 
“It must be pointed out that equality can certainly mean more than representivity. Affirmative 
measures seek to address the fact that some candidates were not afforded the same 
opportunities as their peers, because of past unfair discrimination on various grounds. By 
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focusing on representivity only, a measure’s implementation may thwart other equality 
concerns.”251 
 
It is clear that judges appear to be saying all the right things by affirming the need 
for a balancing of the rights of the various citizens in our country, but yet these words 
are hollow without any action. It remains to be seen whether judges are taking a strict 
stance on the issue of racial quotas and the ever-increasing usage of the concept 
“representivity” (and the apparent elevation of this concept to a non-enumerated 
constitutional objective or even value). The case law on the topic remains relatively 
sparse, but clarity is required.  
 
3 4 2 The practical effects  
Nugent AJ states that the purpose of the EEA is representivity and employment 
opportunity, but he feels that all the characteristics of the population that are relevant 
must be taken into account,252 and not just race. Nugent AJ indicates the flaws in 
attempting to achieve representivity blindly, especially with the amendment of section 
42 of the EEA; these include the fact that races are not distributed uniformly throughout 
the country and applying equitable representation in this manner “induces racial 
migration to accommodate stats”253 and we would only achieve the objective of equal 
opportunity if we take into account where applicants for the posts are located.254 The 
example set out by Nugent AJ, by looking at the regional demographics of two 
provinces and applying the national demographics, shows the huge flaw in trying to 
achieve equal opportunity: 
 
“The great majority of Coloured people live in the Western and Northern Cape. The 2011 
census revealed that Coloured people comprised 48.8% of the population of the Western 
Cape, and 40.3% of the population of the Northern Cape. In all other provinces except the 
Eastern Cape, where they comprised 8.3% of the population, their presence was negligible. 
In Limpopo they made up a mere 0.3%, while 96.7% of the population of that province were 
what the census calls “Black Africans”.  
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Translating those proportions to numbers, at the time of the 2011 census there were some 
16 000 Coloured people in Limpopo and some 5.2 million Black African people. 
Approximately 2.8 million Coloured people and 1.9 million Black African people lived in the 
Western Cape.  
 
I see no rationality in restricting almost half the population of the Western Cape to 8.8% of 
employment opportunities in that province, and simultaneously extending 8.8% of 
employment opportunities in Limpopo to 0.3% of the population. Of every 100 work 
opportunities in the Western Cape nine are made accessible to some 2.8 million Coloured 
people, while in Limpopo nine opportunities are made accessible as well to roughly 16 000 
Coloured people. And while in Limpopo nine of every 100 posts are made accessible to 
roughly 16 000 Coloured people, only 73 are made available to 2.8 million Black African 
people, denying some 20% of employment opportunities to almost the whole population. 
Conversely, in the Western Cape nine of each 100 opportunities are made accessible to 
some 2.8 million Coloured people while 1.9 million Black African people have access to 
73.5.”255 
 
This example sets out the clear job reservation of one racial group over another that 
may occur through the rigid pursuit of demographic representivity, and it also indicates 
what happens when only using one characteristic of the population, which is race. The 
purpose of the EEA is not to reserve jobs for those previously disadvantaged, nor is it 
the purpose of section 9 of the Constitution to achieve “representivity”. These sorts of 
anomalies will arise when statistics bear no relation to the purpose for which they are 
used.256 It does appear that representivity is now being elevated to the same status 
as equality, and this may be extremely troubling. The following section will attempt to 
illustrate this in the specific context of the sports transformation exercise.  
 
3 5 Representivity in sport  
We have now seen that there are judges who are questioning the use of demographic 
representivity in the application of affirmative action, but this is yet to happen in respect 
of racial representation in professional team sports in South Africa. Louw stated that 
rigid racial demographic targets turn legitimate targets into illegitimate quotas. We 
have seen that quotas are freely implemented by sports bodies and the term is 
casually used by government spokespersons. Therefore, we have to question the 
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difference between quotas, which are being criticised more and more often in more 
mainstream employment equity cases, and the use of quotas in professional sports 
teams. Louw points out how the implementation of representivity in the name of 
equality affects South African sport and sport in general: 
 
“One of the most troubling aspects of the pursuit of sports transformation is that government 
has chosen to pursue an agenda whereby equality is measured by means of 
‘representivity.’ The achievement of equality is measured against race demographics. Only 
if a sports team (or workplace) is demographically representative of all groups in the 
population and in the proportion of such representation within the population (for example, 
80% black African) is such representation deemed to be equitable. In this way a statistical 
yardstick, which has no link to the achievement of equality (and is nowhere mentioned in 
the constitutional equality right), has managed to usurp other, more germane factors (such 
as sporting merit, or the available pool of suitably qualified or talented players) in the 
determination of equitable treatment of all. Such measures do not, in the meaning of the 
words of the Constitutional Court, pursue the achievement of redress for the previously 
disadvantaged, but rather the tokenistic achievement of ‘representative sports teams’”.257 
  
The trade union Solidarity had taken the former Minister of Sport and a number of 
sporting bodies to court, to challenge the agreed implementation of transformation 
targets which are viewed as quotas and therefore unlawful and to request an order to 
invalidate demographic profiling as it appears in the Transformation Charter.258 We 
have seen that in the mainstream employment sphere, courts view quotas as being 
unlawful, and the outcome of this case had the potential to bring significant change in 
the sports employment sphere. Unfortunately, the case was dismissed due to a legal 
technicality, which entailed Solidarity not having any athletes as members, which 
meant that they could not argue on their behalf.259 Solidarity had submitted the 
application on the basis that employees (athletes) may or have suffered prejudice as 
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a result of the selection policies which are pursued by SARU, ASA, CSA and NSA.260 
Solidarity claimed that the blind pursuit of demographic representivity can never be 
lawful because under the Constitution it is impermissible to discriminate on grounds 
such as gender and race and the EEA outlaws unfair discrimination.261 In 2015, the 
above-mentioned federations, as well as the South African Sports Confederation and 
Olympic Committee (“SASCOC”), signed a “Transformation Agreement” with the 
Department of Sport and Recreation to transform sport along racial and gender 
lines.262 The agreement not only set out each sports target that needs to be met but 
further set out compliance requirements and punitive measures for failure to meet the 
targets. The punitive measures include: 
 
• “Suspending or withdrawal of Government’s funding to a defaulting federation 
in terms of section 10(3) (a) of the National Sport and Recreation Act; 
• Withdrawal of Government’s recognition to the National Federation in terms 
of section 10(3)(b) the Act. Such a decision will mean that the National 
Federation will be de-registered and that such a decision be published in the 
Government Gazette; 
• Revocation of the National Federation’s authority to host and bid for major and 
mega international tournaments in the Republic in writing in pursuance of the 
prescripts of the Bidding and Hosting of Major Events Regulations gazetted 
and published in line with the NSRA and also as a result of not recognising 
the federation: 
• Withdrawal of the federation’s opportunity to be awarded national colours via 
SASCOC to players who participate under the auspices of the federation in 
order to represent the Republic internationally and nationally, in writing; 
 
260 These are the same policies as discussed in chapter 2 when the Minister set out punitive 
punishment for not meeting targets. 
261 Solidarity v South African Rugby Union LC Founding Affidavit 52. 
<https://cdn.24.co.za/files/Cms/General/d/5205/9b29b0cb5acb4bcf9c00a885d30b67e5.pdf> 
(accessed 16-11-2020). 
262 A Muller “Fikile Mbalula has just banned South Africa from bidding for major sporting 







• Terminate the existing five year agreement in writing due to non-compliance; 
or 
• Request the Minister in writing to consider issuing a directive in terms of 
section 13(5)(a) of the Act as SRSA deems fit and appropriate, which may 
include but is not limited to the withdrawal of political support and 
endorsements for sponsorships.”263 
 
In 2016, the former Minister stated that upon review of the transformation 
barometer, he had no choice but to implement what he referred to as agreed-upon 
punitive measures: 
 
“I have resolved to revoke the privilege of Athletics South Africa (ASA), Cricket South Africa 
(CSA), Netball South Africa (NSA) and South African Rugby (SARU) to host and bid for 
major and mega international tournaments in the Republic of South Africa as a 
consequence of the aforementioned federations not meeting their own set transformation 
targets with immediate effect.”264 
 
The grounds upon which Solidarity based their claim of unlawfulness have been 
mentioned in previous chapters. These include the fact that in terms of section 15(3)(b) 
of the EEA, quotas are prohibited; section 2(b) of the EEA envisages representivity 
which is broad and equitable; there is no basis laid in the EEA for the employment or 
selection of a national demographic profile to determine an appropriate composition 
of the workforce of sports teams; and s 13(5)(b) of the NSRA encourages sport in its 
purest form.265 Solidarity alleges that since the conclusion of the transformation 
agreement between the above-mentioned sports bodies and the Department of Sport 
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and Recreation, there has been a “weighted emphasis on the enforcement of 
demographic representation in all aspects of sport – from team selection to 
administrative support.”266 The multi-dimensional transformation strategy has been 
implemented by the sports bodies subject to guidance by the Eminent Persons Group 
(“EPG”).267 Solidarity claims that it is in fact a quota system which is being 
implemented by the Minister and the sports bodies and this conclusion is derived from 
the Transformation Charter268 read with the mandate of the EPG and the obvious 
terminology used in identifying the transformation targets. The agreement states that 
the sports bodies must ensure 60% of black representatives in all spheres, and not 
meeting the numerical targets will ensure that punitive measures would be imposed. 
As was discussed previously, this does bear a strong resemblance to the definition of 
a quota system, and it is hard to ignore this fact.  
This case would have certainly challenged the status quo and would have 
contributed to the ongoing debate about the implementation of quotas and 
representivity. The best idea would always be to revert back to the EEA and the 
Constitution and what is trying to be achieved, and how. This is exactly what McGregor 
states in “Affirmative action on trial – determining the legitimacy and fair application of 
remedial measures”: 
 
“The Employment Equity Act takes its cue from the constitution and gives effect to the 
protection of the rights to dignity and equality. It seeks to eliminate unfair discrimination and 
obliges designated employers to implement affirmative action measures consistent with the 
purpose of the act. Such measures must be designed to further diversity and have to ensure 
that suitably qualified people from designated groups (blacks, women and the disabled) get 
equal employment opportunities and are equitably represented in all occupational 
categories and levels in the workforce by way of numerical goals (but not quotas). In 
essence, then, affirmative action measures or employment equity plans strive to achieve 
“equitable representation” in the workplace. This is differently worded from the constitution, 
which sets out to promote the achievement of equality and authorising measures which 
may be taken to assist with achieving equality.”269 
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Even here we see that the EEA veers off from the Constitution, but the most 
alarming thing is the fact that the Act is now being used in a way that results in it being 
inconsistent with itself. The term representivity attempts to disguise the use of quota 
systems, but as mentioned by Louw it is possible that instead of disguising quotas, 
“representivity turns numerical goals into quotas”.270 Again, we have to ask the 
question, why have these clear quotas, which by definition offend against section 15(3) 
of the EEA, not been challenged until now? 
 
3 6 Conclusion 
It should now be firmly established that quotas in the application of affirmative action 
are prohibited. In sport, a quota may translate to a set number of places, which are 
reserved for previously disadvantaged individuals, in the team or match-day squad. It 
is widely accepted that the distinction between numerical targets and quotas lies in the 
flexibility of the standard. However, Nugent AJ suggested a different interpretation and 
stated that allowing flexibility does not necessarily turn an unlawful quota into an 
acceptable numerical target, as flexibility is not an end in itself. This may be an 
important part of the analysis in the context of the distinction between quotas and 
numerical targets, as it challenges the status quo of what determines a quota system. 
Quotas not only offend against the EEA, but courts also agree with the fact that quotas 
are prohibited in the Act. 
Moreover, if demographic representivity is the aim, it would amount to job 
reservation and invariably turn numerical targets into quotas. Despite the above, 
representivity is the principal instrument for achieving transformation in South African 
sport despite the potential infringement of the rights of non-beneficiaries. The link 
between striving for a racially representative workforce or sports team and the 
achievement of equality is yet to be established. Why are African blacks being 
advanced more than Generic Blacks (to use the terminology of the relevant 
transformation charters and documents)? Were both groups not disadvantaged by the 
apartheid system? But here we have a case where instead of “achieving” substantive 
equality and redressing past injustices, we have one designated group elevated above 
 





another based on race (race has clearly become not only a stand-alone factor but a 
determinative factor). It appears that this whole sports transformation agenda 
proceeds from the assumption that, because of the gross injustices of the past, our 
sports teams would have looked a certain way and implementing demographic 
representivity allows government to achieve that goal. However, Moseneke ACJ 
stated that “the steps taken to promote substantive equality do not unwittingly infringe 
the dignity of other individuals – especially those who were themselves previously 
disadvantaged”.271 
Implementing a quota system by definition raises the concern of the proper role of 
merit-based selection – and this is something that any right-thinking person would 
consider especially relevant in the context of (professional) sport. This is exactly what 
section 20(3) of the EEA attempts to avoid, by warning not to promote racial 
representivity at the expense of merit. That is the reason why section 20(3) requires 
beneficiaries of affirmative action to be “suitably qualified”. Moseneke ACJ 
emphasised this in Barnard, as abiding by this is crucial in order not to compromise 
competency and efficiency in attempting to achieve transformation.272 Moseneke ACJ 
then goes on to say that the Act protects itself against the “hurtful insinuation that 
affirmative action measures are a refuge for the mediocre or incompetent”.273 
According to the NSRA – is this really promoting sport in its purest form?  
The immediate observation is that there remains an apparent lack of consideration 
of the possibly significant differences between the implementation of affirmative action 
measures in the traditional workplace and the implementation of affirmative action in 
the world of sport. The very nature of sport is its inherent grounding in the principle of 
competition, which brings to the fore the accepted notion that “uncertainty of 
outcomes” (another inherent characteristic of genuine sporting competition – compare 
the international sports community’s fight against the scourge of match-fixing as a 
corrupt practice that threatens the very legitimacy of sporting competition) is a crucial 
component of sport. And this, of course, in turn, brings to the fore the marked 
importance of merit (and merit selection) in the sporting context. It is suggested that 
the legal debate on the application of affirmative action in sport – and, more 
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specifically, the practice of the application of race-based quotas in team selection – 
has to date neglected to give due regard for merit in this very specific and special 
context. 
Further, more emphasis needs to be placed on the fact that sportspersons in South 
Africa are employees just like every other person that pursues an occupation. As such, 
the EEA should be applied in a manner that resembles that, and not treat a 
sportsperson differently. However, it is no secret that South Africa has had little in-
depth engagement with the issue of quotas. There is, therefore, a need to undertake 
an examination of the jurisprudence on quotas as an affirmative action measure in the 
United States, a jurisdiction that has had longer to grapple with the issue. This will be 























CHAPTER 4: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND RACIAL QUOTAS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
4 1 Introduction  
“You do not take a man who, for years, has been hobbled by chains, liberate him, bring him 
to the starting line of a race saying, “You are free to compete with all the others,” and still 
believe you have been fair. This is the next and more profound stage of the battle for civil 
rights. We seek not just freedom of opportunity, not just legal equity, but human ability; not 
just equality as a right and theory, but equality as a right and result.”274 
 
These are the words of former American President, Lyndon Johnson, on the need 
for affirmative action in the United States of America (“USA”) in 1965. Although the 
development of affirmative action in the USA can mainly be ascribed to civil unrest 
and the race riots at the time, what makes examining affirmative action in the USA 
compelling is the fact that that jurisdiction has been grappling with racial quotas in 
affirmative action programmes for a lot longer than South Africa. As we have seen, 
South African law is still somewhat ambivalent with regard to quotas. Courts were 
initially shying away from quotas by not declaring whether they are unconstitutional or 
not, but recent case law seems to confirm that they might in fact be unconstitutional.  
The USA has dealt with racial quotas in employment for close to 60 years, and it 
would be helpful to observe how they have approached it. There are remarkable 
differences between the Constitution of the United States of America (“US 
Constitution”) and the South African Constitution. This ultimately shapes the 
implementation of affirmative action in the different jurisdictions, and setting out a brief 
overview of the development of affirmative action in the USA will contribute to the 
analysis of the two jurisdictions. This chapter will not only unpack quotas in the USA 
but further examine racial balancing as a tool used to achieve racial diversity. 
 
4 2 Development of affirmative action  
The fact that the original US Constitution275 did not contain an equality provision is 
significant, as the basis of the Constitution was to protect the freedom of the 
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individual.276 It is believed that the main reason for this was the existence of slavery at 
the time, as it was viewed as being incompatible with a guarantee of equality. 
However, the position changed after the American Civil War in the 1860s, and the US 
Constitution was amended to abolish slavery. This saw the introduction of the 
Thirteenth Amendment which abolished slavery, the Fourteenth Amendment which 
contains the equal protection clause and the Fifteenth Amendment which prohibited 
the denial to vote on account of race. The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment 
are directed at the state and to a certain degree restrict state authority.277 Section 1 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment states that: 
 
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”278 
 
But despite this, racial segregation was still held to be constitutional by the Supreme 
Court.279 However, the case of Brown v Board of Education280 marked a turning point 
in the interpretation of equality and it is regarded by Rabe as “the beginning of the 
modern equality jurisprudence in America”.281 The case consisted of black plaintiffs, 
who sought admission to schools based on a non-segregated basis, as they were 
“denied access to white schools under laws permitting or requiring segregation 
according to race”.282 The court stated that “segregation is a denial of the equal 
protection of the laws [guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment]”.283  
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The constitutional guarantee of equal protection is therefore provided in the 
Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Fifth Amendment.284 The American debate 
recognised that the equal protection provision guarantees equality before the law and 
must be applied equally to all persons.285 The provision does not only require that the 
content of the law itself must be equal but it stems from the belief that all people are 
morally equal as individuals.286 In contrast to South African equality jurisprudence, the 
American interpretation of equality suggests a very formal notion of equality as 
opposed to a substantive notion of equality.287 
 
4 2 1 The introduction of affirmative action  
Despite the American Civil War ending in the 1860s, affirmative action only became 
synonymous with the civil rights movement in the 1960s. It began with the issue of 
Executive Order 10925, by President John F Kennedy in 1961, which not only created 
the Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity but also ordered federal contractors 
to take “affirmative action” to ensure that hiring and employment practises were free 
from racial bias.288 However, this did not appear to be sufficient and under the 
presidency of Lyndon Johnson, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“CRA”) was signed into 
law and Executive Order 11246 was issued. Title VI and Title VII of the CRA are the 
significant sections in terms of the connection between civil rights enforcement and 
affirmative action. Title VII did not provide for preferential treatment and it was 
originally interpreted to prohibit employers from discriminating based on race, sex, 
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colour, national origin and religion.289 However, it was the combination of Title VII and 
the Executive Order 11246 which set the stage for a stronger implementation of 
affirmative action. The Executive Order required companies who enter into business 
with the federal government to take “affirmative action” to provide equal employment 
regardless of race, religion or national origin.  
Like many jurisdictions, the USA did not have the greatest relationship with 
affirmative action and there was, of course, opposition to the Civil Rights Bill.290 Jones 
states that it is when these “theoretical rights” began translating into tangible results 
that criticism from these opponents reached “fever pitch”.291 Jones states that “once 
affirmative action came out of the Executive Order closet and Title VII litigation shifted 
to scope of remedy and started adopting affirmative action plans as remedial devices, 
vindication of civil rights threatened entrenched interests”.292 The fact that Congress 
failed to provide such programmes with a constitutional foundation,293 as well as 
enacting the CRA which seemed to prohibit their coming into existence,294 would have 
definitely aided the opponents’ case. Therefore, even though the Bill was enacted to 
end discrimination suffered by blacks, whites were also protected from race-based 
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discrimination in employment.295 Section 703(j) of the CRA further stated that “nothing 
contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer … to grant 
preferential treatment to any individual … because of race … on account of an 
imbalance which may exist”. In the early stages of the application of affirmative action 
in the USA, there were fears of employment quotas and, as a result, the Civil Rights 
Bill was amended to prohibit quotas.296 However, despite these fears being articulated, 
it will be illustrated that racial quotas did make their way into affirmative action 
programmes. 
Despite the potential tension between affirmative action goals and civil rights laws 
which prohibit the consideration of race in employment decisions, there remained a 
need for affirmative action in the USA as non-discrimination alone would be insufficient 
to overcome the “lingering effects of historical discrimination”.297 Rabe states that “it is 
morally imperative that some form of remedial action is taken to achieve more social 
justice and equality for [racial minorities]”.298 Congress was aware of this and upon 
revision of Title VII, Congress enacted section 718 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1972, “which gave increased legislative validity to affirmative action plans as required 
under the Executive Order.”299 Furthermore, former Presidents Nixon and Clinton 
garnered support for affirmative action. President Nixon initiated the Philadelphia Plan 
of 1969300 and stated that “[w]e would not impose quotas, but would require federal 
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contractors to show ‘affirmative action’ to meet the goals of increasing minority 
employment".301 While presenting a speech on the guidelines of affirmative action, 
President Clinton asserted that the case of Adarand Constructors, Inc v Pena,302 
(“Adarand”) “reaffirmed the need for affirmative action and reaffirmed the continuing 
existence of systematic discrimination in the United States”.303 However, it is important 
to note that President Clinton called for the removal of any programme that: 
 
“(a) creates a quota;  
 (b) creates preferences for unqualified individuals;  
 (c) creates reverse discrimination, or  
 (d) continues even after its equal opportunity purposes have been achieved”.304  
 
The Supreme Court may have failed to address all the issues involved in the 
affirmative action debate, but there was enough evidence to indicate that 
“classification by race or ethnic minority for granting remedies for past discrimination 
or bestowing benefits are not per se unconstitutional.”305 Given the latter, it is, 
therefore, crucial to delve into the relationship of the US Supreme Court with 
affirmative action. 
 
4 2 2 The Supreme Court and affirmative action 
The Supreme Court applies the strict scrutiny test when “so-called ‘suspect 
classifications’ are used by any governmental organ; and in cases where fundamental 
constitutional rights are burdened, or limited.”306 Therefore, when policies are 
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promoting the action of providing some form of benefit based on racial classification, 
it must be analysed using the most searching judicial enquiry. For the Supreme Court, 
the equal protection jurisprudence is that the Constitution “protect[s] persons, not 
groups”307 and to maintain this personal right to equal protection, strict scrutiny is 
applied.308 The Supreme Court has described the strict scrutiny test as entailing that 
such a suspect classification must serve a compelling government interest, and must 
be narrowly tailored to further that interest.309 Therefore, government would need to 
show that there is a sufficiently close “fit” between the compelling goal and the means 
chosen to implement it.310 In terms of implementing the above-mentioned two-prong 
analysis, the court would first have to establish whether the legitimate government 
interest or purpose is a compelling interest that justifies the use of a suspect 
classification.311 Once this has been established, the court examines whether the 
means used to attain this goal are narrowly tailored to achieve the goal.312 Decisions 
of the Supreme Court regarding affirmative action have varied considerably over the 
years. Through the evolution of case law, general principles regarding when 
affirmative action is allowed have developed,313 however, the relationship between the 
Supreme Court and affirmative action has for the most part been tenuous as will be 
illustrated through varying case law decisions. 
 
4 2 2 1 The role of the court 
The landmark Supreme Court case of Regents of the University of California v 
Bakke (“Bakke”),314 was the first affirmative action case decided on merit.315 Rabe 
described this as a “victory and a defeat” for affirmative action because “a majority of 
the justices held that in principle racial preferences were permitted by the Constitution, 
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but the actual program was held to be invalid”.316 Allan Bakke, a white male, applied 
to the Davis Medical School. Upon the rejection of his application, he alleged that the 
Davis special admissions programme operated as a racial quota and was in violation 
of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well 
as Title VI of the CRA.317 The faculty devised a special admissions programme to 
increase the representation of “disadvantaged” students. Sixteen places in the class 
of 100 were reserved for “disadvantaged” students and they were only rated against 
themselves.318 The court ruled that it is legitimate to deem race as a “plus” factor, but 
the use of a quota system is not. The Supreme Court was split 5-4 in its decision and 
this case provided an insight into the differing perceptions concerning affirmative 
action that divided the court and continue to divide the court.319  
As a result of the differing views, Justices switched sides depending on the facts of 
the case and this resulted in a lack of consistency regarding the jurisprudence of the 
court.320 This is evident in the cases concerning minority contracting set-asides. Set-
asides involves government reserving a fixed proportion of public contracting dollars 
that by law must be spent on the purchase of goods and services provided by minority-
owned businesses.321 In Bakke strict quotas were struck down, however, in Fullilove 
v Klutznick (“Fullilove”),322 the Supreme Court found that “modest” quotas were 
constitutional. The court upheld a provision of a federal law which required 10% of 
public funds for public works be set-aside for qualified minority workers.323 The court 
found that the affirmative action programme did not violate the equal protection rights 
of non-minority contractors and the provision was a legitimate remedy for present 
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competitive disadvantages resulting from prior discrimination.324 In a later case 
regarding set-asides, City of Richmond v J.A Croson Co (“Richmond”),325 the court 
ruled that racial classifications in state and local set-aside programmes were inherently 
suspect and were subject to the most searching standard of constitutional review 
which is strict scrutiny.326 The court stated that “an amorphous claim that there has 
been past discrimination in a particular industry cannot justify the use of an unyielding 
racial quota.”327 The court invalidated the Richmond set-aside in a six-to-three 
decision, which yet again highlighted the unpredictability of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions.  
Like Richmond, which required that race-based action by state or local government 
required strict scrutiny, Adarand established that any federal affirmative action 
programme using racial classification needs to be justified by the strictest judicial 
scrutiny.328 Adarand, therefore, set the precedent that strict scrutiny has to be applied 
in cases involving racial classification.329 The court further tried to dispel the notion 
that strict scrutiny is “strict in theory, but fatal in fact”,330 by asserting that "the unhappy 
persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination 
against minority groups in this country" justified the use of race-based remedial 
measures in certain circumstances.331  
In another landmark decision, the Supreme Court decided the case of Grutter v 
Bollinger (“Grutter”),332 which was decided more or less at the same time as Gratz v 
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Bollinger (“Gratz”).333 Both these cases concerned university admission programmes 
which were challenged as being unconstitutional on the basis that the admission 
programmes violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as 
well as Title VI of the CRA. In Gratz, the court, when applying strict scrutiny to the 
admission programme, found that providing “educational benefits that result from 
having a diverse student body” results in a compelling governmental interest.334 
However, the problem with the admission programme was that it was not narrowly 
tailored to achieve the interest.335 In contrast, the university admission programme in 
Grutter passed the strict scrutiny test. The court relied heavily on the opinion of Powell 
J in Bakke and concurred that the attainment of a diverse student body was a 
compelling interest. However, the “means chosen to accomplish the [government’s] 
asserted purpose must be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that 
purpose,”336 and it is at this stage of the test where Gratz failed, and Grutter 
succeeded. When determining whether the admissions programme was narrowly 
tailored to further the compelling interest, the court again relied on the opinion of 
Powell J. According to him: 
 
“To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota 
system—it cannot ‘insulat[e] each category of applicants with certain desired qualifications 
from competition with all other applicants’...Instead, a university may consider race or 
ethnicity only as a ’”plus” in a particular applicant’s file,’ without ‘insulat[ing] the individual 
from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats’… In other words, an 
admissions program must be ‘flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity 
in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the same 
footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them the same weight’.”337  
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The court found that the admission programme did contain attributes of a narrowly 
tailored plan.338 The court stated that race can be used as a plus factor in university 
admission programmes, however, the programme “must remain flexible enough to 
ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes 
an applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application”.339 This 
was the difference between Gratz and Grutter, as Grutter engaged in a highly 
individualised, holistic review of each applicant’s file and awarded no “mechanical, 
predetermined diversity ‘bonuses” based on race or ethnicity’,340 as was the case in 
Gratz. 
The US Supreme Court has decided on the most searching judicial test for all racial 
classifications regarding affirmative action programmes. This may stem from the fact 
that affirmative action programmes have the potential to violate the equal protection 
clause as the interpretation of the equality provision is seen as a “rigid prohibition 
against discrimination”.341 Much like South Africa, racial quotas are prohibited as was 
stated by Presidents Nixon and President Clinton. This will also be illustrated with 
reference to various court judgments in the USA. While South Africa may have 
explicitly prohibited quotas in the EEA, the United States uses strict scrutiny to “smoke 
out” the use of quotas in affirmative action programmes. As stated in Grutter, “to be 
narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admission program cannot use a quota system”.342 
 
4 3 Quotas and the Supreme Court 
The focal point of the study remains an analysis of racial quotas in affirmative action. 
Upon laying out a brief development of affirmative action in the USA, it becomes critical 
to look at how the US Supreme Court has defined a quota and how the court has dealt 
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with quotas. Quotas were in limited instances found to be constitutional,343 but with the 
adoption of strict scrutiny, quotas will be very difficult to justify and defend as they deny 
benefits based on race alone.344 Keeping this in mind, it is important to analyse the 
rulings by the Supreme Court on racial quotas. 
 
4 3 1  Defining a quota 
In the case of Bakke, the trial court, as well as the Supreme Court of California, 
found that the admission programme which reserved sixteen places out of a hundred 
for minority applicants acted as a quota system because the minority applicants were 
only rated against one another for the sixteen places.345 Unfortunately, the Supreme 
Court did not furnish a definition of a quota itself but Powell J did not deny the 
evaluation by the trial court. Powell J, however, did state that an admission programme 
may not “insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the 
available seats”.346 In Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ v Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (Sheet Metal Workers),347 the court defined a quota in two 
different contexts. O Connor J stated: 
 
“To hold an employer or union to achievement of a particular percentage of minority 
employment or membership, and to do so regardless of circumstances such as economic 
conditions or the number of available qualified minority applicants, is to impose an 
impermissible quota.”348 
 
O Connor J further stated that:  
 
“In the view of these federal agencies, which are charged with responsibility for enforcing 
equal employment opportunity laws, a quota ‘would impose a fixed number or percentage 
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which must be attained, or which cannot be exceeded,’ and would do so ‘regardless of the 
number of potential applicants who meet necessary qualifications’.”349  
 
In Grutter, the court used previous cases to describe what constitutes a quota and 
stated that:  
 
“Properly understood, a ‘quota’ is a program in which a certain fixed number or proportion 
of opportunities are ‘reserved exclusively for certain minority groups.’ ... Quotas ‘‘impose a 
fixed number or percentage which must be attained, or which cannot be exceeded,’”… and 
‘insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats’.”350 
 
There are a few instances where cases define quotas, but it is similarly important 
to identify the stance the court has had in dealing with these racial quotas. As 
mentioned above, quotas will be difficult to defend under the strict scrutiny analysis 
and therefore the courts’ reasoning behind their decisions regarding quotas will be 
invaluable for the comparative analysis between the USA jurisprudence and South 
African jurisprudence on quotas.  
 
4 3 2  Racial quotas struck down by the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court in Bakke found that quotas do not pass constitutional muster 
because it violates the Fourteenth Amendment.351 The court stated that: 
 
“The guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to all persons. Its language is 
explicit: ‘No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.’ It is settled beyond question that the ‘rights created by the first section of the 
Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights 
established are personal rights,’ …The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one 
thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of 
another colo[u]r. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal.”352 
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Another characteristic of the quota in Bakke, which rendered it unconstitutional, was 
its rigidity. The admission programme’s numerical goal was mandatory and therefore 
lacked flexibility and precluded the decision maker from treating each applicant as an 
individual.353 Therefore, the court stated that when applying racial classification, 
preferring a member of one group “for no reason … [but] race … is discrimination for 
its own sake” and the Constitution forbids it.354  
Similarly, in the case of Richmond, the court recognised that the rights created by 
section one of the Fourteenth Amendment are guaranteed to the individual.355 The 
fixed quota in the Richmond Plan denied certain individuals the opportunity to exercise 
their rights and the court stated that regardless of citizens’ racial groups, “their 
‘personal rights’ to be treated with equal dignity and respect are implicated by a rigid 
rule erecting race as the sole criterion in an aspect of public decision making”.356 
Therefore, strict quotas may not be permissible because the interests of innocent 
individuals may be harmed.  
Apart from quotas violating the Fourteenth Amendment rights, some judges have 
held that quotas are not permitted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. O Connor J 
stated that in the case of Sheet Metal Workers, the majority tacitly conceded that racial 
quotas are improper and they are improper by virtue of section 703(j).357 Burger J, in 
a dissenting opinion in the case of Steelworkers v Weber,358 stated that a “racially 
discriminatory admission quota is flatly prohibited by the plain language of Title VII”.359 
 
353 438 US 265, 317-318 (1978). 
354 438 US 265, 307 (1978); in Fullilove v Klutznick 448 U.S 448, 497 (1980), the court stated 
that the admission program in Bakke was not appropriate because it made use of a fixed quota 
which “eliminated some nonminority applicants from all consideration for a specified number 
of seats in the entering class, although it allowed minority applicants to compete for all 
available seats”.   
355 488 US 469, 493 (1989). 
356 488 US 469, 493 (1989). 
357 Title VII section 703(j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states:  
“Nothing contained in this title shall be interpreted to require any employer … subject to this 
title to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, 
colo[u]r, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of an 
imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of 
any race, colo[u]r, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer”. 
358 443 US 193 (1979). 





With the decision in Adarand to implement strict scrutiny as the judicial standard of 
review for all racial classifications, it has been more challenging for racial quotas to 
pass constitutional muster. Strict scrutiny requires not only for there to be a compelling 
state interest, but the means chosen to achieve the purpose must be narrowly tailored 
to achieve the stated purpose. It is at this point where quotas fall short of the mark, as 
was stated in Grutter: “to be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admission program 
cannot use a quota system”.360 Therefore, to be narrowly tailored, a programme should 
not unduly burden individuals who are not members of a favoured race. As mentioned 
above, quota systems have the potential to limit individuals’ personal rights which are 
guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore cannot be narrowly tailored.  
 
4 3 3 Racial balancing 
There are cases where provisions are implemented to achieve racial balance. 
Racial balancing in reference to district schools is described by Shane as:  
 
“[T]he reassignment of students throughout a public school district to prevent, to whatever 
degree possible, the concentration of minority students residing within the district in racially 
identifiable schools. Thus, if a district is seventy percent white and thirty percent black, the 
goal of racial balance would be the rough approximation of that ratio in as many schools as 
possible.”361 
 
Furthermore, racial balancing provisions can be described as aiming to limit or 
eliminate “racial isolation” or “racial imbalance”.362 Nevertheless, this does not make 
racial balancing constitutional, as the courts have in fact declared that racial balancing 
is unconstitutional. Bakke stated that: 
 
“If petitioner’s purpose is to assure within its student body some specified percentage of a 
particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose 
must be rejected not as insubstantial but as facially invalid. Preferring members of any one 
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group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake. This 
the Constitution forbids.”363 
 
In reference to the above, the court in Grutter stated that this “would amount to 
outright racial balancing, which is patently unconstitutional”.364 The admission 
programme in Grutter focused on each applicant as an individual instead of as a 
member of a particular racial group, and they did not pursue racial balance for “its own 
sake”.365 Therefore, the programme did not disguise racial balancing as “diversity”, as 
was found to be the case in Parents Involved v Seattle School District (“Parents 
Involved”).366 The court declared a school district’s consideration of race in assigning 
children to schools within a district as invalid. The court referred to previous case law 
which dealt with diversity as a compelling interest and found that Grutter proved that 
diversity may be a compelling governmental interest. However, Bakke stated that “it is 
not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of the student 
body is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups that can justify 
the use of race”.367 The court found that the “plans are tied to each district’s specific 
racial demographics”,368 and therefore the racial demographic in each district drives 
the required “diversity” numbers. The goal was therefore to achieve a level of diversity 
which approximates the district’s overall demographics. Furthermore, the court 
identified that: 
 
“The districts offer no evidence that the level of racial diversity necessary to achieve the 
asserted educational benefits happens to coincide with the racial demographics of the 
respective school districts--or rather the white/nonwhite or black/’other’ balance of the 
districts, since that is the only diversity addressed by the plans.”369 
 
 In Grutter, the number of minority students “pursued”, was an undefined 
“meaningful number”, necessary to achieve a genuinely diverse student body. As 
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opposed to Parents Involved who was “seek[ing] a defined range set solely by 
reference to the demographics of the respective school districts”.370 The court found 
that “in design and operation, the plans are directed only to racial balance, pure and 
simple, an objective this Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate”.371 Parents 
Involved outlined what accepting racial balancing as a compelling interest would entail 
and stated that: 
 
“[It] would justify the imposition of racial proportionality throughout American society, 
contrary to our repeated recognition that ‘[a]t the heart of the Constitution’s guarantee of 
equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat citizens as 
individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class’... 
Allowing racial balancing as a compelling end in itself would ‘effectively assur[e] that race 
will always be relevant in American life, and that the ‘ultimate goal’ of ‘eliminating entirely 
from governmental decision making such irrelevant factors as a human being’s race’ will 
never be achieved." (Citations omitted)372 
 
Furthermore, Kennedy J stated that racial balancing causes social division and 
individuals will be denied opportunities based on race.373 As a result, race would 
always be relevant in the USA. Therefore, not only will some races lose out in the 
numbers game because of their race, and as mentioned above, the “‘ultimate goal’ of 
‘eliminating entirely from governmental decision making such irrelevant factors as a 
human being’s race’ will never be achieved".374 Roberts CJ stated that “the principle 
that racial balancing is not permitted, is one of substance, not semantics”.375 Therefore 
racial balancing will not be transformed from being “patently unconstitutional” to a 
compelling state interest by relabelling it “racial diversity”.376 Racial balancing can 
never be a compelling state interest as it is contrary to the heart of the Constitution’s 
guarantee of equal protection that states that government must treat citizens as 
individuals and not as components of racial or ethnic classes.377 
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Furthermore, Title VII does not permit racial balancing. Section 703(j) states that: 
 
“Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer … 
subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group 
because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on 
account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of 
persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer…in 
comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin in any community[.]” 
 
In the case of Ricci v Destafano (“Destafano”),378 the court found that a fire 
department’s race-conscious actions to avoid a racially disparate impact in promotions 
violated Title VII. One of the flaws of the fire department’s actions was that it appeared 
to be acting with the intent of pursuing its “preferred racial balance”.379 The court 
cautioned against adopting “a de facto quota system, in which a ‘focus on statistics’ 
… could put undue pressure on employers to adopt inappropriate prophylactic 
measures”.380 
 
4 3 3 1 Racial Balancing equivalent to demographic representivity  
Racial balancing is equivalent to demographic representivity, as this latter concept 
appears to be applied in terms of the EEA in South Africa. They both aim to transform 
the racial composition of the workforce to reflect the regional or national demographics 
of the country or region. Therefore, racial balancing in South Africa would require 17.6 
of the 22 players to be African blacks.The USA clearly finds racial balancing to be 
unconstitutional, but in South Africa, demographic representivity has not been 
declared unconstitutional by the courts. This may be due to the fact that it is the 
express aim of the EEA to achieve demographic representivity in the workplace 
through the application of affirmative action. It is submitted that these two concepts 
are one and the same and the court in Destafano warns against adopting a “de facto 
quota system” to reach these targets. The US identifies racial balancing as resulting 
in a quota system, and it is therefore strange that South Africa cannot do the same in 
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respect of demographic representivity. If an employer in the USA applied measures to 
achieve demographic representivity it would certainly be struck down. 
The USA finds racial balancing to be unconstitutional because it goes against the 
aim of the US equality guarantee which is to treat citizens as individuals and not as 
components of racial classes. This is the sole reason as to why the programme in 
Grutter was allowed because they treated each applicant as an individual instead of 
as a member of a particular racial group. Thus, being in line with the USA’s notion of 
equality. South Africa however, follows a group-based approach when implementing 
affirmative action measures and therefore does not focus on the individual but the 
“designated group” to which that individual belongs. Individuals do not need to show 
that past unfair discrimination personally or individually harmed them. This is clear by 
referring to the Van Heerden test,381 which refers to targeting and advancing not only 
persons but “categories of persons” who have been disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination. Similarly in the case of Stoman v Minister of Safety and Security, 
(“Stoman”)382 the court held that the emphasis is not on the individual but on the group 
or category of individuals of which the individual happened to be a member.383 The 
court further states that the “aim is not to reward the…individual but to advance the 
category of persons to which he belongs to achieve substantive equality”.384 In the 
more recent case of Barnard, Van der Westhuizen J reinforces South Africa’s group-
based approach. Van der Westhuizen J believes that you cannot compare the dignity 
of one person against the collective dignity of previously disadvantaged people.385 Van 
der Westhuizen J further states that this was ensured by our transformative 
Constitution as “[t]he calculation required to restore the dignity of many after decades 
of unfair discrimination and the possible cost to the interests of individuals…was done 
when the Constitution was agreed on”.386   
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the aim of affirmative action under the EEA in 
South Africa is the achievement of “equitable representation”, which we have now 
established is used interchangeably with representivity. For South Africa, pursuing 
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racial demographics for its own sake may, therefore, be permitted according to the 
EEA. But that would result in a “de facto quota system” or just an outright quota 
system. Would this be justified when considering the infringement of rights of non-
beneficiaries? In the case of Stoman, Van der Westhuizen J stated that “the aim is not 
to punish or otherwise prejudice the [non-beneficiary] as an individual, but to diminish 
the over-representation which his group has been enjoying as a result of previous 
unfair discrimination”.387 In the more recent case of Barnard, Van der Westhuizen J 
again raised the point that as a result of over-representation in the workplace, a 
limitation of dignity was justifiably outweighed by the goal of the affirmative action 
measure, provided that the measure did not create an “absolute barrier to the 
prospective or continued employment or advancement of people”.388 However, this 
brings one back to the opinion of McGregor, who stated that: 
 
“Affirmative action was not intended to elevate demographics into ‘dogma’ or to eclipse ‘Ms 
Barnard]’s rights by putting in place ‘preordained’ demographic targets: this could suffice 
only if it were accepted that the proper implementation of affirmative action entailed 
disregarding ‘entirely’ the rights of members of certain groups to apply and compete for 
vacant posts until demographic targets were reached and if the national commissioner 
possessed an ‘unfettered’ authority to decide whether and when exceptions should be 
allowed.”389 
 
The EEA explicitly prohibits quotas, and we cannot ignore the fact that the rigid 
pursuit of demographic representivity can turn legitimate targets into illegitimate 
quotas. If quotas were justified, we would not have judges speaking out against the 
use of quotas. Judges have stated that rigid quotas unduly infringe the dignity of non-
beneficiaries and they are not allowed, and have highlighted the fact that quotas are 
inherently and irrationally discriminatory.390 Katz J and Tlhotlhalemaje J warned that 
quotas are measures which elevate race as an absolute category without regard for 
an individual’s characteristics or individual worth.391 Further, Tlhotlhalemaje stated that 
measures based on quotas are inherently “arbitrary, capricious and displays naked 
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preference” and would consequently not pass constitutional muster based on Barnard 
and Van Heerden. Again, this shows the inconsistency of the interpretation of 
affirmative action under the EEA as discussed in chapter 3.  
Strict scrutiny smokes out the use of quotas no matter how they are disguised and 
that is exactly what would happen under the USA law. One must bear in mind that 
demographic representivity is a relatively new concept in comparison to racial 
balancing and the concept is yet to be challenged pertinently before a South African 
court. If a challenge were to be brought forward against the achievement of 
demographic representivity it would be interesting to see whether the court would 
identify it as a form of a quota system as the USA jurisprudence has done in respect 
of racial balancing. This is yet another reason why the uncertainty of the appropriate 
standard of review of affirmative action measures under the EEA is of concern. An 
appropriate standard of review would assist the courts in “smoking out” disguised 
quotas. For now, what is accepted is that demographic representivity has the look and 
feel of a quota system. 
 
4 4 Conclusion 
The US Constitution is founded on the ideal of freedom, and the maximisation of 
freedom of the individual, as opposed to equality, which is the primary guarantee of 
the Constitution.392 It further protects individuals’ rights from state interference as 
opposed to promoting positive rights.393 In the USA, the equal protection clause is 
deemed to operate as an anti-discrimination provision against all use of race. 
Affirmative action measures, therefore, appear to violate the constitutional guarantee 
of equal protection.  
The USA’s approach regarding affirmative action is both similar but also 
fundamentally different to that of South Africa. One of the main reasons for this is the 
fact that the USA follows a formal notion of equality as opposed to substantive equality. 
The right to and the achievement of equality is one of the core and foundational values 
of the South African Constitution. As Moseneke J stated, when the Constitution “took 
root a decade ago our society was deeply divided, vastly unequal and uncaring of 
 






human worth”394 and as a result there is a positive duty by the organs of state to protect 
and promote the achievement of equality.395 Therefore, this conception of equality 
goes beyond formal equality of identical treatment which leads to entrenching existing 
inequalities.396 Through the Constitution and section 9 thereof, the notion of 
substantive equality aims to redress existing inequality. This positive commitment to 
eradicate socially construced barriers to achieve substantive equality is achieved 
through restitutionary or affirmative action measures. Moseneke J affirmed that their 
purpose is to “protect and develop those persons who suffered unfair discrimination 
because of past injustices”.397 This cannot be achieved by simply treating everyone 
“equally” as the inequality of the past needs to be addressed and not merely 
“removed”. 
In the USA, the equal protection clause, along with the strict scrutiny test, deem 
most affirmative action programmes to violate the equality provision, when 
differentiation based on race is present (because of formal equality). Therefore, racial 
quota systems would not pass constitutional muster. The reasons for this include the 
fact that the standard of strict scrutiny is applied to all cases concerning racial 
classification. Strict scrutiny is required because of the potential for racial preference 
to violate the equality guarantee. It is the most exacting judicial examination and 
Powell J stated that it is necessary because “[t]he guarantee of equal protection cannot 
mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a 
person of another colo[u]r”.398 The two-pronged analysis of strict scrutiny requires 
proportionality between means and an end. Therefore, not only do quotas violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but the courts in the USA have recognised the rigidity of racial 
quotas. This may impact significantly on “personal rights” to equality which clashes 
with the US jurisprudence which prioritises the freedom of the individual. Lastly, quotas 
result in discrimination for its own sake and will therefore never be narrowly tailored to 
meet a legitimate governmental objective. This deems racial quotas as 
unconstitutional. The last reason resonates most with the South African equality 
guarantee. 
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In South Africa, the EEA prohibits quotas and emphasises the importance of the 
right to dignity by insisting on affirmative action measures “based on equal dignity and 
respect of all people”.399 Moseneke ACJ has stated that remedial measures must be 
implemented in a manner which must not unduly invade the human dignity of non-
beneficiaries.400 Racial quotas not only have the ability to demean an individual’s self-
worth, but also prevent them from exercising their right to occupation and trade, but 
these measures are yet to be definitively declared unconstitutional. 
Furthermore, it was found that programmes that are geared towards the 
achievement of racial balance are unconstitutional in the USA. Case law has reiterated 
the fact that racial balancing cannot be pursued for its “own sake” and it is 
unambiguously unconstitutional.401 It further creates a “de facto quota system” which 
is unconstitutional. It was argued that racial balancing resembles demographic 
representivity, which is an objective that has been advanced by the South African 
government in a number of spheres. It was discussed whether South Africa’s group-
based approach justifies more aggressive affirmative active measures and therefore 
may justify the use of quotas. Despite South Africa’s ideals of substantive equality 
calling for a group-based approach, it cannot be said that quotas fall under the ideal 
of substantive equality. Even though substantive equality creates room for more 
progressive affirmative action measures than ones applied in the USA. Achieving 
demographic representivity remains a contentious point in the context of the EEA, but 
what is certain is that demographic representivity, like racial balancing, denies 
opportunities based on race and may, therefore, potentially amount to unfair 
discrimination. South Africa, with its use of demographic representivity to achieve 
“equality”, should heed this warning. 
The US Supreme Court, having dealt with racial quotas for several years, has raised 
several key factors that South African courts can take into consideration, although one 
must always remain vigilant of the fact that the US Constitution and the South African 
constitutional aims remain different. That is one of the main reasons that South Africa 
would never apply the standard of strict scrutiny as it would be contrary to the 
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achievement of substantive equality. However, both countries have a history of 
inequality and therefore it makes an appealing comparison.  
The second comparison which is necessary is to evaluate the South African sports 
transformation policies against the rules and regulations of international sporting 
federations. All the national sports bodies are members of international federations 
and are therefore bound by their rules and regulations. South Africa does not only 
have a history of discrimination in sport (during the apartheid era), but we now have 
transformation policies which are unique in the world of sport, in respect of their use 
of race for purposes of access to sporting opportunities. This will be examined in the 







CHAPTER 5: INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW: RULES AND REGULATIONS 
5 1  Introduction  
There has been a clear transformation agenda pursued by the South African 
government, with the primary aim of achieving “demographic representivity” of 
participants in professional team sports. It is also well-documented that the South 
African government is moreover pressurising South African sports bodies to 
implement these measures. These policies and measures may constitute nothing 
more than “racial balancing” which was found to be unlawful in other jurisdictions, such 
as the United States of America.402 Having compared South African affirmative action 
law to that of the United States of America, the next comparison that is relevant is that 
of the South African national sports bodies’ practises against the applicable rules of 
various international sporting federations. Therefore, to fully determine whether the 
South African transformation targets are unlawful, one would need to place the 
implementation of these targets against the international principles to which the South 
African sports bodies are bound. 
It is well known that sport is played in an international context, and national domestic 
sports bodies are members of international sports bodies.403 As such, a national 
governing body will usually mirror the rules of the international body.404 For one to, 
therefore, determine why race-based quotas may be unlawful, it is necessary to place 
it in the context of both domestic constitutional norms as well as international sporting 
principles, to which domestic federations are bound. National bodies such as 
SASCOC adopted unique sports policies, ostensibly to dismantle the legacy of 
apartheid.405  
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The task at hand for SASCOC is not an easy one. They have taken on the task of 
deconstructing systematic inequality and aim to put everyone on an equal footing. 
Equal footing in respect of sport should be when every person/athlete has had the 
same opportunity to develop and be exposed to sports in order to grow their skill set 
and therefore compete with one another on an ‘equal footing’. If they then decide to 
pursue a career in a given sport, sporting merit (performances) will be the determining 
factor. Sometimes they get it right and sometimes they get it wrong and we need 
structures in place to ensure that they get it right more often than not. One of these 
structures is, of course, the fact that they are bound by international bodies. While 
these policies may seem morally laudable in light of our past, occasionally these 
policies may be contrary to the fundamental principles of international sport and the 
rules of the international sports federations, which “unambiguously and unequivocally” 
prohibit any form of discrimination based on race.406 Various international federations’ 
rules and regulations will be considered below. This comparison will aid in establishing 
the mandate of these international bodies concerning the universal promotion of 
equality and the prohibition of discrimination, as opposed to South Africa’s domestic 
racial transformation agenda. 
 
5 2 International sports governance  
(Sports) governance can be described as: 
 
“[T]he structure and process used by an organisation to develop its strategic goals and 
direction, monitor its performance against these goals and ensure that its board acts in the 
best interest of its members.”407 
 
Therefore, sports governance is concerned with issues of “policy and direction for 
the performance of sports organisations”.408 The governance of sport (in terms of the 
European model of sports governance) follows a hierarchical structure, and may be 
described as being pyramidal shaped, with international federations being at the apex 
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of a “vertical chain of command, running from continental, to national, to local 
organisations”.409 Examples of international federations include the ICC, Fédération 
Internationale de Football Associations (“FIFA”), the IOC, and World Athletics. These 
are the supreme bodies in their respective sports fields, who not only have global 
authority but also have the authority to “impose a variety of governance and 
administrative practises” on its members.410 Therefore, the stance taken by the 
“supreme” international body will not only influence decisions made by a national body 
under their umbrella, but national bodies will moreover be bound by the rules set out 
by these international bodies.411  
A fitting example of the governance structure is that of the IOC. The IOC adopted 
not only the rules of the Olympic Games but also the organisational and procedural 
rules of the Olympic Movement. Chapter One of the Olympic Charter412 states that 
“[a]ny person or organisation belonging in any capacity whatsoever to the Olympic 
Movement is bound by the provisions of the Olympic Charter and shall abide by the 
decisions of the IOC”.413 This is emphasised once more, as Principle Seven of the 
Olympic Charter states that belonging to the Olympic Movement requires compliance 
with the Olympic Charter. Failure to do so may be met with sanctions imposed by the 
IOC.414 Furthermore, the mission and roles of National Olympic Committees (“NOCs”) 
are likewise set out in Chapter Four of the Olympic Charter, which includes “promoting 
and developing the Olympic Movement … in accordance with the Olympic Charter”.415 
Therefore, for any national body to be a part of the Olympic Movement and be 
recognised by the IOC, they would have to adhere to the Olympic Charter. 
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If one considers the position in respect of cricket, the cricket network is made up of 
a set of autonomous, interrelated federations with the ICC at the top of the pyramid, 
and numerous national associations beneath the ICC.416 The national federation which 
is responsible for the governance of cricket in South Africa is CSA. Beneath CSA are 
the provincial associations, for instance, the Western Province Cricket Association, 
and below that exists professional franchise teams such as The Six Gun Grill Cape 
Cobras and various other amateur cricket clubs in the region. All these organisations 
are responsible for the governance and management of cricket in their region, but they 
have to “report to” and “comply with” the rules of the organisation that stands above 
them in the network. A good example of this is the objective laid out in article 5(B) of 
the Memorandum of Association of the ICC, which states that the ICC must: 
 
“[G]overn and regulate Cricket at the international level, including by promulgating 
appropriate playing conditions for each format of the game of cricket, and to recognise the 
rights and responsibilities of its Members to govern and regulate Cricket in their respective 
Cricket Playing Countries.”417 
 
Therefore, members of the ICC, that is, the national federations, have been 
authorised to regulate cricket in their respective countries. However, despite this 
authority, as members of the ICC, they are obliged to comply with the rules of the 
ICC.418 Similarly, CSA’s Memorandum of Incorporation states that its members’ rules 
and regulations need not only comply with CSA’s rules and regulations but also the 
ICC’s rules and regulations.419  
 
416 These are: CA (Cricket Australia), ECB (England and Wales Cricket Board), BCCI (Board 
of Control for Cricket in India), NZC (New Zealand Cricket), CSA (Cricket South Africa), AFC 
(Afghanistan Cricket Board), BCB (Bangladesh Cricket Board), PCB (Pakistan Cricket Board), 
SLC (Sri Lanka Cricket), CI (Cricket Ireland), WIC (West Indies Cricket) and ZI (Zimbabwe 
Cricket). 
417 5(B) of the Amended and Restated Memorandum of Association and Articles of the 
Association of the International Cricket Council 2017. 
418 Article 2.4 (f):  
“adopt, implement and enforce within its Cricket Playing Country a set of regulations 
(including anti-doping and anti-corruption regulations) that are consistent with the 
Memorandum of Association, these Articles of Association, each Members’ Resolution that 
is passed, and the Regulations”. 





South African national bodies evidently not only have a duty to regulate their 
respective sport in South Africa, but they also have international obligations that need 
to be adhered to. These are contractual obligations incurred under the law of 
associations. Therefore, any action taken by these national bodies needs to be in line 
with the relevant rules and regulations of their “supreme” international body.  
 
5 3 Rules and regulations of international sport federations 
In the context of this dissertation, it is critical to look at key rules and regulations 
applied by these “supreme” international federations and the obligations that they set 
forth for their members, in terms of both discrimination and political interference in 
sport. The common themes that will be illustrated are that not only do all of the 
international federations prohibit all forms of discrimination, whether it be based on 
race, gender or religion, but also the fact that national federations need to act 
independently from political or governmental interference in the governance of their 
sport.  
 
5 3 1 The IOC’s Olympic Charter 
The IOC adopted the Olympic Charter, which may rightly be viewed as akin to a 
Constitution which codifies principles of international customary law of sport in respect 
of the sporting codes that make up the Olympic Movement. It further contains the rules 
and by-laws adopted by the IOC. There are several provisions which forbid 
discrimination and external interference: 
 
• Principle 4: “The practice of sport is a human right. Every individual must have the 
possibility of practising sport, without discrimination of any kind and in the Olympic 
 
“Affiliate Members’, Associate Members' and Ancillary Members’ constitutions and any 
rules or regulations formulated there under shall not be in conflict with this MOI or the 
International Cricket Council.”: 
see also the Constitution of the Western Province Cricket Association article 18.2.1 which 
states that:  
“Affiliate Members’, Associate Members' and Ancillary Members’ constitutions and any 
rules or regulations formulated there under shall not be in conflict with this Constitution, the 





spirit, which requires mutual understanding with a spirit of friendship, solidarity and 
fair play.”420 
• Principle 6: “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Olympic 
Charter shall be secured without discrimination of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status.”421 
• Principle 5: “Recognising that sport occurs within the framework of society, sports 
organisations within the Olympic Movement shall have the rights and obligations of 
autonomy, which include freely establishing and controlling the rules of sport, 
determining the structure and governance of their organisations, enjoying the right of 
elections free from any outside influence and the responsibility for ensuring that 
principles of good governance be applied.”422 
 
The mission and role of the IOC and NOC’s include: 
 
• Rule 2.5: “to take action to strengthen the unity of the Olympic Movement, to protect 
its independence, to maintain and promote its political neutrality and to preserve the 
autonomy of the sport;” 
• Rule 2.6: “to act against any form of discrimination affecting the Olympic Movement;” 
and 
• Rule 2.10: “to oppose any political or commercial abuse of sport and athletes.” 
• Rule 27.5: “In order to fulfil their mission, the NOCs may cooperate with governmental 
bodies, with which they shall achieve harmonious relations. However, they shall not 
associate themselves with any activity, which would be in contradiction with the 
Olympic Charter. The NOCs may also cooperate with non-governmental bodies.” 
• Rule 27.6: “The NOCs must preserve their autonomy and resist all pressures of any 
kind, including but not limited to political, legal, religious or economic pressures which 
may prevent them from complying with the Olympic Charter.” 
• Article 44.4: “An NOC shall only enter competitors upon the recommendations for 
entries given by national federations. If the NOC approves thereof, it shall transmit 
such entries to the [Organising Committee of the Olympic Games, or OCOG]. The 
OCOG must acknowledge their receipt. NOCs must investigate the validity of the 
entries proposed by the national federations and ensure that no one has been 
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Furthermore, the IOC strengthened its stance against discrimination by partnering 
with the United Nations to fight racism and racial prejudice.424 The president of the 
IOC stated that “[p]ractising sport, without discrimination of any kind, is a human right 
and a fundamental principle of the Olympic Movement”.425  
 
5 3 2 World Rugby Board’s rules and regulations 
World Rugby is defined under its by-laws as the association of unions and/or 
associations in membership with World Rugby in accordance with its by-laws. The 
objectives, functions and by-laws of the World Rugby Handbook include the following: 
 
• “To prevent discrimination of any kind against a country, private person or groups of 
people on account of ethnic origin, gender, language, religion, politics or any other 
reason.”426 
• “Membership of World Rugby by a Union or Association shall be effective as an 
agreement binding such Union or Association (which agreement requires such Union 
or Association to similarly by agreement bind its affiliated membership which such 
Union or Association undertakes to do) to abide by the Bye-Laws, Regulations and 
Laws of the Game and to accept and enforce all the decisions of World Rugby, 
Council and the Executive Committee (as the case may be) in respect of the playing 
and/or administration of the Game throughout the country or countries within the 
jurisdiction of such Union or Association. Any breach of this agreement or any 
conduct which may be prejudicial to the interests of World Rugby or of the Game shall 
render such Union or Association liable to disciplinary action in accordance with 
Regulation 18 of the Regulations Relating to the Game.”427 
• “A Union may be suspended or expelled from World Rugby membership pursuant to 
World Rugby Bye-Laws and/or Regulations if state authorities interfere in its affairs 
in such a manner that: it may no longer be considered as fully responsible for the 
organisation of rugby related matters in its territory; in the opinion of Council or the 
Executive Committee it is no longer in a position to perform its constitutional and 
regulatory tasks in an appropriate manner.”428 
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• “Provided that the same are not in conflict with these Regulations and subject to 
conformity with the relevant legal systems a Union may make and adopt other more 
restrictive regulations. Such domestic regulations shall have effect only within the 
jurisdiction of that Union.”429 
• “All Unions, Associations, Rugby Bodies, Clubs and Persons: shall not do anything 
which is likely to intimidate, offend, insult, humiliate or discriminate against any other 
Person on the ground of their religion, race, sex, sexual orientation, colour or national 
or ethnic origin.”430 
 
World Rugby has recently stated that it is taking a “firm” stand against 
discrimination. World Rugby proclaimed that rugby is a sport for all (which includes 
diversity and inclusion) and that one must be conscious of the fact that discrimination 
can be built into “policies, procedures and attitudes”.431 World Rugby further states 
that “everyone should have the opportunity to play the game or be a part of rugby 
regardless of their national, racial or ethnic origin, sex, gender identity, sexual 
orientation, disability, language, religion, politics or any other reason”.432  
 
5 3 1 Rules and regulations under the ICC and World Athletics 
The ICC and World Athletics both have constitutions as well as rules and 
regulations prohibiting discrimination in any form. The ICC is responsible for the global 
governance of cricket and it was established to ensure, amongst other obligations, the 
promotion and development of cricket worldwide and to protect the autonomy of the 
ICC and its members to govern and regulate cricket. These rules and regulations 
include the following:  
 
• Article 2.3(I): “Each member shall enjoy the rights and benefits conferred on Members 
by the Memorandum of Association and these Articles of Association, which shall 
include (subject to the terms of the Memorandum of Association and these Articles 
of Association): each Member being recognised by the ICC and its fellow Members 
as having the sole and exclusive right and responsibility (subject to the Memorandum 
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of Association, the Articles of Association and the Regulations) to govern, regulate 
and administer Cricket in its Cricket Playing Country.”433 
• Article 2.4(D): “Each Member must at all times: manage its affairs autonomously and 
ensure that there is no government (or other public or quasi-public body) interference 
in its governance, regulation and/or administration of Cricket in its Cricket Playing 
Country (including in operational matters, in the selection and management of teams, 
and in the appointment of coaches or support personnel).” 
• Article 2.4(F): “Each Member must at all times: each Member being recognised by 
the ICC and its fellow Members as having the sole and exclusive right and 
responsibility (subject to the Memorandum of Association, the Articles of Association 
and the Regulations) to govern, regulate and administer Cricket in its Cricket Playing 
Country.” 
• Article 12: “Neither the ICC nor any of its Members shall at any time offend, insult, 
humiliate, threaten, disparage, vilify or unlawfully discriminate against persons based 
on their race, religion, culture, colour, descent, gender, and/or national or ethnic 
origin”. 
 
Furthermore, in 2012 the ICC adopted an anti-racism policy, which echoes the 
words above, and the policy further states that:  
 
• “[T]he ICC strives to ensure that all such participants can enjoy the sport without 
being the subject of conduct that is (for example) offensive, insulting, humiliating or 
intimidating on the basis of race, religion, culture, colour, descent, and/or national or 
ethnic origin.”434 
• “The ICC and all of its Members should: not at any time offend, insult, humiliate, 
intimidate, threaten, disparage, vilify or unlawfully discriminate between persons 
based on their race, religion, culture, colour, descent, and/or national or ethnic origin 
(‘Inappropriate Racist Conduct’);435 
• “The ICC and all its Members should: adopt appropriate policies, protocols, mission 
statements and similar so that it is clear to all employees, officials, commercial 
partners and other participants and stakeholders that Inappropriate Racist Conduct 
(including in any public statements) will not be tolerated by the ICC or by the Member, 
whether at International Matches played within its jurisdiction or those played as part 




433 Article 2.3(I) of the ICC Amended and Restated Memorandum of Association and Articles 
of Association. 
434 Article 1 of the ICC Anti-Racism Policy for International Cricket. 
435 Article 6(a). 





World Athletics is the world governing body for athletics and the purposes of World 
Athletics, which are found in Part 1 of the World Athletics Constitution,437 set out the 
organisation’s position on discrimination and autonomy. This includes the fact that 
World Athletics must: 
 
• Article 4.1(e): “[P]rotect the integrity of Athletics and World Athletics by developing 
and enforcing standards of conduct and ethical behaviour and implementing good 
governance” 
• Article 4.1(j)“[P]reserve the right of every individual to participate in Athletics as a 
sport, without unlawful discrimination of any kind undertaken in the spirit of friendship, 
solidarity and fair play.” 
 
Furthermore, members of World Athletics need to abide by the Constitution and the 
rules and regulations of World Athletics. Members’ obligations include: 
 
• Article 9.1(b): “[To] comply with this Constitution and all Rules and Regulations;” 
• Article 9.1(f): “[To] adopt a constitution, rules and regulations which comply with, and 
are not inconsistent with, this Constitution, the Rules and the Regulations”. 
  
Article 13 of the Constitution provides for suspensions and sanctions if members do 
not comply with the rules and regulations of World Athletics. This may accrue if a 
member federation: 
 
• Article 13.1(a): “is in breach of any one or more of its obligations under Article 9 
(Obligations of Members) including its failure to pay the Membership Fee or any other 
fees or payments due and owing by the date specified in Article 10.2;” 
• Article 13.1(b): “is otherwise in breach of any other Article in this Constitution or any 
Rule, Regulation or a decision of Congress or Council;” 
• Article 13.1(c): “acts in a manner which is contrary to any of the Purposes of World 
Athletics, or the government of the Country or Territory that the Member represents, 
acts in a manner contrary to any of the Purposes;” 
 
The World Athletics Integrity Code of Conduct further requires applicable persons 
to uphold the principle of equality:  
 
 





“[N]ot to unlawfully discriminate on the basis of race, sex, ethnic origin, colour, culture, 
religion, political opinion, marital status, sexual orientation or other differences and in 
particular to encourage and actively support equality of gender in Athletics.”438 
 
5 4 Understanding the rules 
Taking the above-mentioned rules and regulations of the various international 
federations into account, it is clear that the autonomy of their sport is codified in their 
relevant constitutions. National bodies are required to implement the rules and 
regulations adopted by the international body free from external interference. Pierre 
de Coubertin, the founder of the IOC, believed that politicians could only violate sports 
integrity and stated that “the beam formed by the goodwill of all its members of an 
autonomous sport, relaxes when the giant figure of this dangerous and imprecise 
figure called the state appears”.439 Therefore, NOCs are encouraged to maintain their 
autonomy and resist pressures, including but not limited to political interference.440 
Again, the idea of autonomy and being free from political interference is a rule that 
World Rugby, the ICC, World Athletics and FIFA441 have adopted. The ICC specifically 
speaks about government interference in team selection and management, and it is a 
point that will be elaborated upon below. The South African national federations that 
are members of these international federations would need to abide by these rules 
and regulations, but on the face of it, it appears that they often fall short of these 
obligations.  
What is also evident in the various rules and regulations is the universal 
condemnation of discrimination. The Olympic Charter states that practising sport is a 
human right and that every individual should enjoy playing sport without discrimination. 
This coincides with the views regarding discrimination by World Rugby, the ICC and 
World Athletics. More specifically they mention that individuals should not be 
discriminated against based on national, racial or ethnic origin, sex, or religion. The 
 
438 Article 3.3.9 of the World Athletics Integrity Code of Conduct 2019. 
439 Mrkonjic & Geeraert “Sports organisations, autonomy and good governance” in Action for 
Good Governance in International Sports Organisations 134. 
440 Article 27.6 of the IOC Olympic Charter:  
“The NOCs must preserve their autonomy and resist all pressures of any kind, including 
but not limited to political, legal, religious or economic pressures which may prevent them 
from complying with the Olympic Charter”. 





ICC and World Athletics emphasise these rules as it is found in separate documents 
to the general rules and regulations found in a Constitution or a Memorandum of 
Association.442 Discriminating based on race would, for example, be allowing a black 
individual to compete in the sport at the expense of allowing a white individual the 
opportunity to compete, or vice versa, based on race as opposed to sporting merit. 
Therefore, as the Olympic Charter describes it, one would be prohibiting one of those 
individuals from exercising the freedom to enjoy their human right of practising sport.  
A leading example of a South African sports body that is inconsistent with the above 
international laws is the actions of SASCOC in their support of government’s pursuit 
of race-based sports transformation. The team manager, Mr Khaya Majeka stated that 
“[re]presentivity would be part of the selection criteria” and for sports teams to be sent 
to the 2008 Olympic Games, they would have to at least show a 50/50 black-white 
ratio of participants.443 Furthermore, SASCOC and other sporting codes entered into 
an agreement with the Minister of Sport and Recreation, whereby failure to meet the 
transformation targets that were agreed upon would result in the Minister punishing 
federations by withdrawing their ability to award national colours.444 This seems quite 
inconsistent with rule 27.5 and 27.6 of the Olympic Charter, set out above.445  
 
5 5 The South African transformation agenda 
The National Sports and Recreation Amendment Act 18 of 2007 (“NSRAA”) is the 
official legislation regulating and governing sport in South Africa. The purpose of the 
NSRAA is to, inter alia, provide for measures to correct imbalances in sport and 
recreation and to empower the Minister to make regulations.446 Section 2(5) instructs 
all national federations to develop its sports or recreation at club level in accordance 
 
442 The ICC introduced the Anti-racism policy, while World Athletics has the Integrity code of 
conduct. 
443 Sports, Arts and Culture “Beijing Olympics Team Preparation: Input by SASCOC and 
SRSA; SABC Siyanqoba Campaign; SA Football Supporters Association” (19-06-2007) PMG 
<https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/9997/> (accessed 23-04-2020). 
444 Minister Fikile Mbalula: Aftermath of Springbok Campaign in the IRB 2015 World Cup 
Championships (05-11-2015) South African Government 
<https://www.gov.za/speeches/minister-sport-and-recreation-south-africa-mr-fikile-mbalula-
mp-statement-aftermaths-senior> (accessed 23-04-2020). 
445 See the text to chapter 5.3. 





with the service level agreement referred to in section 3A, the development 
programmes in section 10(3) and the guidelines issued by the Minister in terms of 
section 13(A). Section 3A states that the “sports confederation [SASCOC] and national 
federations must, in the prescribed manner, enter into a service level agreement with 
Sports and Recreation South Africa in respect of any function assigned to them by this 
Act”.  
Furthermore, the Minister is empowered to make regulations. In this regard, section 
4(1) of the NSRAA provides that the Minister may, “after consultation with or 
consideration of proposals made by the SASCOC in so far as high-performance sport 
is concerned, from time to time, determine the general policy to be pursued with regard 
to sport and recreation”. The Minister may amongst other things, determine policy 
concerning the institution of affirmative action measures. Section 4(2)(g) and (h) state 
that the policy to be determined may relate to “helping in cementing the sports 
unification process; and instituting necessary affirmative action controls which will 
ensure that national teams reflect all parties involved in the process”. Coupled with 
that, section 13A provides that the Minister must issue guidelines or policies to 
promote equity, representivity and redress in sports and recreation. Section 13(5)(a)(ii) 
of the Act empowers the Minister to intervene “in any non-compliance with guidelines 
or policies issued in terms of section 13A or any measure taken to protect or advance 
persons or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination as 
contemplated by section 9(2) of the Constitution”. Louw rightly states that it is “unclear 
what ‘instituting necessary affirmative action controls which will ensure that national 
teams reflect all parties involved in the process’ entails, exactly.”447 He remarks further 
that the NSRAA does not provide guidance on the meaning of affirmative action in the 
context of sport and it, therefore, does not seem to provide legislative authority for a 
special form of affirmative action in sport.448 If affirmative action in sport includes 
quotas, the conflict section in the EEA states that “any conflict relating to a matter dealt 
with in this Act arises between this Act and the provisions of any other law other than 
the Constitution or an Act of Parliament expressly amending this Act, the provisions of 
 
447 Louw (2019) De Jure Law Journal 395. 
448 396; what is very interesting is that section 13(5)(a)(ii) refers to unfair discrimination as 
contemplated by section 9(2) of the Constitution and not necessarily reference to the EEA and 





this Act will prevail”.449 As a result, Louw states that because the EEA applies to 
professional sportspersons and quotas are prohibited by the Act, “and the fact that the 
EEA supersedes all other legislation concerning matters dealt with in the Act, the use 
of quotas in team selection must be seen to be unlawful”.450 However, like all 
affirmative action measures, it must comply with the Constitution and its “parameters 
for constitutionally legitimate affirmative action measures”.451 
South African national federations may not always enjoy their autonomy, as is clear 
from the actions of former Minister of Sport, Fikile Mbalula, who sought a rapid 
increase in black representation in national sports teams and warned of harsh 
punishment for those who failed to meet the set criteria.452  As previously mentioned, 
the punishment included: withdrawal of government funding to bodies, withdrawal of 
national colours and not allowing bodies to bid to host international events.453 
However, intending to keep national federations free of external interference and to 
preserve their autonomy, section 13(5)(b)(ii) prohibits the Minister from performing 
certain actions, which includes that the Minister may not “[i]nterfere in matters relating 
to the selection of teams, administration of sport and appointment of, or termination of 
the services of, the executive members of the sport and recreation body.” Setting a 
target for national federations of 50% black representation may be adding constraints 
on the selection of teams and may be viewed as a rather blatant contravention of the 
above provisions of the Act.  
 
5 5 1 Government’s strategy   
It is no secret that government has, for some time, played an active role in 
determining the transformation plans formulated and implemented by the national 
sports bodies in South Africa, as illustrated above. However, implementing racial 
 
449 Section 63.  
450 Louw (2004) Stell LR 243. 
451 396. 
452 S Mnyanda “Imposing racial quotas is a vital step forward for South African sport” (29-04-
2019) The Guardian <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/29/south-africa-racial-
quotas-sport-rugby-springboks-cricket> (accessed 02-11-2020) 
453 EPG: Sport Transformation Status Report Overview 2017/2018 5; see also Sport24 “SARU 
to get quota clarity” (14-04-2014) Sport24 <https://www.sport24.co.za/Rugby/SARU-to-get-





quotas simply to meet government criteria is not one of the methods that these national 
bodies should be forced to use. In 2012, the South African government adopted the 
Transformation Charter (the “Charter”) to aid in the broad-based transformation of 
sport in South Africa. Article 1.5 of the Charter provides that the transformation 
strategy should be: 
 
“[M]ulti-dimensional and focused on changing demographic profiles on and off the field of 
play, ensuring equitable access and resource availability, skill and capability development 
on and off the field of play; extensive community involvement with a view to provide 
participation opportunities and to identify potential talent; and building and shaping 
relationships with its future support and spectator base, future leaders and decision-makers 
on the basis of broad-based community engagement. This approach will drive and shape 
sport’s future demographic profile.”  
 
The Charter recognises that one-dimensional transformation models have to be 
changed to multi-dimensional models. Thus, it appears that the objective is to ensure 
that transformation is not only about demographic representation but similarly about 
having a broader impact on South African society. Part 3 of the Charter identifies the 
six dimensions of the multi-dimensional strategy, which includes access to 
infrastructure and participation opportunities, human resource skill and capability 
development, demographic profile, performance, contribution to government priorities 
and good governance. These dimensions are composed into a scorecard and the 
scorecard serves as a “framework designing a set of indicators for activities selected 
as the key drivers for transformation”.454 Each of the six dimensions will have pre-set 
and agreed performance goals (targets) and along with the respective indicator sets, 
will contribute to the achievement of the objectives set out in the Charter.455  
The demographic profile dimension aims to change sports’ demographic profile on 
and off the field so that it ultimately reflects a more equitable demographic profile at 
local, provincial and national level. The Charter states that it is not only about replacing 
“white faces with black faces”.456 The Charter provides that in setting “representation” 
targets, it is important to take cognisance of the fact that certain geographical regions 
 







differ substantially from others in terms of population demographics and therefore it 
may require different representation targets in different sports in different regions. 
Through the Charter, the South African government is ostensibly committed to 
correcting what is viewed as a “skewed picture of sporting facilities and opportunities” 
and to ensure that our national teams are representative of the total South African 
population.457 Two key issues on the government directive stand out, and that is the 
fact that “it is not the policy of the Government to advocate the racial composition of 
national teams, nor to prescribe to National Federations on how they should select 
their teams”, and that “transformation of teams should be from the bottom up”.458 As a 
result, it is portrayed that transformation is a conscious process of eliminating 
inequality, and not furthering the interests of one particular group. Government speaks 
about transformation from the “bottom up”, which should essentially mean from 
grassroots levels, but that begs the question as to why there remains a need to burden 
our national sports teams with transformation “targets”.  
 
5 5 2 National federations’ targets 
In 2012, the Sport Transformation Commission called the Eminent Persons’ Group 
(or “EPG”), was appointed to guide transformation and to advise the Minister on ways 
to progress in respect of transformation. The EPG has as its main objective monitoring 
and evaluating the implementation of the Charter. The EPG is further mandated to 
provide leadership and direction in developing a targeted transformation measurement 
and progress monitoring system; advise on the Charter dimension targets; compile, 
distribute, collect and analyse data sheets and make recommendations and generate 
transformation audit reports; advise on the design of a process of monitoring 
transformation status and a reporting system to assess the success or failure of the 
implementation of transformation targets; monitor and advise the Minister on punitive 
measures concerning sporting bodies not driving transformation; offer a long-term 








and long-term transformation strategy.459 After the EPG pilot report,460 weaknesses 
were identified which hindered the progress of transformation since its inception, and 
these weaknesses were that it was: 
 
• “generic (‘one size fits all’) i.e. not sport-specific enough  
• retrospectively focused (rear-windowed) not forward looking and 
• restricted with respect to federation leadership accountability.”461 
 
The Charter sets out “generic” targets to be achieved by all the national federations 
for the representation of “Generic Blacks” in the various sports teams, and this is found 
in the Transformation Status Report of 2013, which states that:  
 
“Demographic profiles are evaluated in terms of the % achievement of the 50% target set 
for the percentage generic black (black African, Coloured and Indian) and black African 
representation profile of the structure under review.”462 
 
No statistics were gathered to determine the amount of people that are actively 
playing a given sport at a professional or semi-professional level. This could assist in 
setting specific targets for various individual sports and as opposed to the “one size 
fits all” approach which was already recognised as a weakness. Running 
simultaneously with the Charter, a select group of national federations entered into 
agreements with the SRSA and SASCOC463 to give effect to the EPG’s 
recommendations:  
 
459 Briefing to Select Committee Education and Recreation - PowerPoint PPT Presentation 
(17-09-2014) SlideServe <https://www.slideserve.com/freya-hardy/briefing-to-select-
committee-education-and-recreation> (accessed 01-09-2020). 
460 Sport and Recreation South Africa Pilot Evaluation Rugby | Cricket | Netball | Athletics | 
Football: A Transformation Status Report (2013) 26. 
461 PMG “EPG outcomes and strategies” (undated) PMG 
<https://pmg.org.za/files/170530EPG.pptx> (accessed 02-11-2020). 
462 Sport and Recreation South Africa Pilot Evaluation 26. 
463 EPG: Sport Transformation Status Report 2016/2017 15:  
“‘Barometer’ project involving the original 5 pilot codes, athletics, cricket, football, netball, 
and rugby entering into MoU’s with SRSA and SASCOC in which they undertook to set and 






“In 2014/15 the EPG also introduced the notion of a Transformation Barometer. This was 
a more proactive approach – with each code – based on its particular circumstances – 
setting targets for itself. Actual achievement against these self-set targets is monitored and 
subjected to penalties for non-achievement of at least 50% of these targets.”464 
 
Therefore, national federations have to meet the transformation targets set out 
according to the Charter, as well as their own “self-set” targets, and this is referred to 
as the new transformation barometer.465 This is indicative of governments’ level of 
interference in the team selection of South African national teams. SARU has gone as 
far as to stipulate that, in its Strategic Transformation Plan, the Department of Sport 
and Recreation has set targets for SARU: 
 
“The Department of Sport and Recreation has in place a target of at least 50% generic 
black representation for a team or dimension to be regarded as having been transformed. 
Within that 50% representation, the expectation is that half of those will be black African. It 
has been anecdotally suggested by the Eminent Persons’ Group that that requirement for 
black African representation should be raised to 60%”.466 
 
For the past five years, national federations have had to act on these agreements 
and, as a result, we have our ‘flagship’ national federations implementing what 
arguably amounts to racial “quotas” in sports such as rugby, cricket and netball. 
However, the Department of Sport and Recreation refrains from referring to it directly 
as quotas but instead refers to it as “targets”.  
The targets set out in SARU’s Strategic Transformation Plan, are as follows: 
 
 
performance against these targets is annually measured and a penalty imposed on those 
federations failing to achieve 50 % or more of their self-set targets.” 
464 5. 
465 EPG: Individual Federation Barometer and Charter, Transformation status scorecard 
2017/2018 19: 
”Self-set targets are influenced by federation specific circumstances including views on its 
current position and the perceived impact of internal and external forces on its future. 
Prevailing federation culture and value sets linked to leadership commitment to and 
understanding of the transformation process, are key actors in repositioning a federation.” 





“Increase black participation in Super Rugby competition to 50% by 2019 … [By] engag[ing] 
Super Rugby franchises to increase black player representation to 30% (7 black players in 
squad of 23). From the 7 generic black players 2 must be black Africans. By the end of the 
competition all black players should at least have played 1 full match.”467 
 
“Increase black participation in the Springbok team to 50% by 2019... [By] engag[ing] 
national coach to increase black player representation to 30% (7 players in squad of 23). 
From the 7 generic black players 2 must be black Africans.”468 
 
In CSA’s Transformation Philosophy and Plan, it sets out their targets which run 
from 2017 to the year 2020. In the Transformation Philosophy and Plan, CSA has 
implemented racial quotas for senior provincial and franchise cricket teams and the 
minimum number of black players per team (per match) is set at six black players in 
the match-day squad.469 Of those six, three need to be black Africans. CSA has stated 
that they would not implement racial quotas for their national teams,470 but 
unfortunately, the Transformation Charter has done that for them. The 2017/2018 EPG 
states that 54% of the cricket team has to be generic black throughout the season, 
and 20% needs to be Black African.471 In 2013, the EPG found that CSA did so well in 
meeting their targets, that they further considered setting the target for generic black 
representation in the national cricket teams to 60%, “to further progress the game 
towards the goal of representative team demographics reflecting the demographics of 
the country”.472 
According to the 2017/2018 EPG Transformation scorecard,473 ASA set a target for 
the amount of Generic Blacks to compete for Team South Africa. The targets indicated 
that 60% of male individuals had to be Generic Blacks, of which 30% had to be Black 




469 Cricket South Africa Transformation Philosophy and Plans 8. 
470 4. 
471 EPG: Individual Federation Barometer and Charter Transformation status scorecard 
2017/2018 65. 
472 Sport and Recreation South Africa Pilot Evaluation 28. 






to be Black Africans.474 In the same report, NSA set targets for a certain amount of 
Black representatives in the team throughout the season. The target for Generic 
Blacks was set at 58% and 38% for Black Africans.475 
Furthermore, the trade union, Solidarity, obtained the forecasted and actual 
performance transformation targets agreed upon by the above federations. SARU’s 
forecast for senior national rugby players include:476  
• An increase in generic black representation from 21% in 2014 to 49% in 
2018. 
• An increase in African black representation from 9% in 2014 to 30% in 2018. 
 
CSA’s forecast for senior national cricketers include:477 
• An increase in generic black representation from 54% in 2016 to 60% in 
2020. 
• An increase in African black representation from 18% in 2016 to 27% in 
2020. 
 
ASA’s forecast for senior athletic participants include:478 
• An increase in male generic black participants from 40% in 2014 to 84% in 
2018 (the forecast is exactly the same for African black participants). 
• An increase in female generic black participants from 20% in 2014 to 40% in 
2018. (the forecast is exactly the same for African black participants). 
 




476 Staff Writer “New race quotas for SA rugby, cricket and netball revealed” (02-03-2017) 
Business Tech <https://businesstech.co.za/news/lifestyle/161391/new-race-quotas-for-sa-
rugby-cricket-and-netball-revealed/> (accessed 20-10-2020). 
477 Staff Writer “New race quotas for SA rugby, cricket and netball revealed” (02-03-2017) 
Business Tech. 
478 Staff Writer “New race quotas for SA rugby, cricket and netball revealed” (02-03-2017) 
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• An increase in generic black team members in the season from 21.29% in 
2014 to 25% in 2018. 
• An increase in African black team members in the season from 55.46% in 
2014 to 71% in 2018. 
 
It is important to recall that there is no basis outlined in the EEA for the selection of 
a national demographic profile to determine the composition of a sports team. Further, 
the EEA does not make mention of classing coloureds, Indians and Africans in 
separate categories but classes them all under a single category, black people, as a 
designated group. It is quite evident that sporting merit (experience and ability) is not 
the most important factor, but an athlete’s selection may lie in the category that they 
fall in (Coloured, Indian or African). Therefore, taking the above into account, it is 
abundantly clear that the Minister along with the national federations imposed a quota 
system in their selection of athletes and national teams.  
What happens if these federations do not meet these “targets”? The former Minister 
of Sport has informed us that they will be punished. If they are punished for not meeting 
“targets” then it can strongly be argued that these are not targets at all but rather 
mandatory quotas. These federations are under clear pressure from government to 
meet these strict and now rigid quotas to avoid government sanctions. As mentioned 
before, quotas can be defined as being externally imposed as well as sanctions being 
imposed if these quotas are not attained. World Rugby uniformly warns that 
discrimination can be built into policies.480 The South African transformation agenda 
may be an example of one of those policies and a significant one at that. Therefore, 
given the rules and regulations we have seen, can racial quotas (or even racial targets) 
pass scrutiny under these international sports laws? It is submitted that they cannot. 
 
5 6 Potential consequences 
Not very long ago, South Africa was trapped in international sports isolation due to 
racist practices which ultimately filtered into sport. Under the appalling regime of 
apartheid, the government institutionalised and legislated racial segregation. The 
implementation of these racist policies meant that black athletes could not be part of 
 





a representative South African team competing in international competitions or the 
Olympic Games.481 Furthermore, the government prevented mixed sports teams to 
represent South Africa and correspondingly attempted to prevent mixed sports teams 
from other nations from competing in South Africa.482 A great example of this is the 
notorious case of Basil D’Oliveira, a non-white South African émigré, who played 
cricket for England. The England tour of South Africa was cancelled since the South 
African government would not allow D’Oliveira to play, and as a result, the international 
community viewed South Africa’s racial segregation as a violation of the principles of 
sport and duly expelled the country.483 The national federations in South Africa, which 
were members of international federations, did not allow non-white membership and 
therefore prevented non-white athletes from competing on the international stage.484  
 
5 6 1 South African sport in isolation 
International sports federations, however, were not always quick to expel South 
Africa. In 1964, South Africa instructed each group to represent their racial affiliation 
for the Olympic Games. This discriminatory stance was against the principles of the 
IOC, and due to not sending a mixed team, the IOC forbade participation.485 In 1968, 
the IOC initially invited South Africa to participate in the Mexico Games.486 However, 
only through a threatened boycott by 50 nations, did an under-pressure IOC eventually 
suspend South Africa from the Mexico Games.487 The IOC may have never suspended 
South Africa had it not been for the threatened boycott of numerous nations.  McClean 
explains it as follows: 
 
 
481 P Nongogo, A Goslin & J van Wyk “An argument for the struggles to de-racialise South 
African sport: The Olympic Movement’s response, 1896-1946” (2014) 20 AJPHERD 1637 
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483  D Booth “The South African Council on Sport and the Political Antinomies of the Sports 
Boycott” (1997) 23 Journal of South African Studies 51 54. 
484 Nongogo, Goslin & Van Wyk (2014) AJPHERD 1650. 
485 P Labuschagne “Sport, Politics and Black Athletics in South Africa During the Apartheid 
Era: A Political-Sociological Perspective” (2016) 41 Journal for Contemporary History 82 93. 
486 D Booth “Hitting Apartheid for Six? The Politics of the South African Sports Boycott” (2003) 






“Although South Africa had not been invited to the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, the IOC had 
sidelined demands to explore claims that the South African National Olympic Committee 
(SANOC) violated the Olympic Charter by practi[c]ing racial discrimination – an allegation 
made to the IOC by the South African Sports Association in 1960. Debates in Mexico City 
forced the IOC to act. The IOC’s fact-finding mission to South Africa in 1967 had been 
instructed to address only whether SANOC complied with Olympic regulations, not to judge 
apartheid; this instruction to limit the focus came after repeated accommodation of and 
adaptation to the structure of apartheid sport alongside denunciation of but no action 
against government interference in sport.”488 
 
The IOC was reluctant to get involved with any political regimes and it was evident 
that it was only through the influence of other nations that the IOC was forced to act. 
However, in 1970, the IOC voted to expel South Africa due to the South African 
government’s insistence that the “international world should accept the discrimination 
on the basis of race”.489 The other international federations followed suit, with World 
Athletics (previously known as the IAAF) terminating South Africa’s membership due 
to racial policies, but World Rugby was the exception.490 Eventually, the 
Commonwealth leaders came together to effectively boycott sporting relations with 
South Africa, through what became known as the Gleneagles Agreement.491 The 
agreement had a profound effect on a racist South Africa, as it effectively curtailed 
South Africa’s ability to compete internationally in sports such as cricket and rugby, 
which the Commonwealth countries dominated.492 
While it was the blatant racial segregation that enforced the sporting isolation of 
South Africa during apartheid, one could likewise question the legitimacy of current 
 
488 M MacLean “Revisiting (and Revising?) Sports Boycotts: From Rugby against South Africa 
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racial policies which are being implemented in South African sport today. It has been 
mentioned that, according to the South African Transformation Charter, all sports 
codes have been set targets of having 50% black representation in their teams. In 
addition, our national federations have set their own targets – under pressure from 
government to do so – and if those are not met, sanctions will be imposed on them. 
Government is again controlling the mandate of sport participation in South Africa, 
albeit in a way that purports to rectify past injustices. 
 
5 6 2  Current “targets” are against international federations’ rules 
Analysing the South African national federations’ above-mentioned transformation 
policies will shed some light on their legitimacy concerning the rules and regulations 
of international federations.  
 
5 6 2 1 Discrimination  
The South African rugby team requires seven of the 23 players to be black, while 
at least two have to be black Africans. The same measures are implemented at Super 
Rugby level. Therefore, seven white players who may be good enough to make the 
team will not be allowed to be selected due to the quota system that has been 
enforced. World Rugby clearly states as an objective and function that they aim to 
prevent discrimination of any kind and that members should not do anything which will 
discriminate against any person on grounds of their race.493 Furthermore, as a 
member of World Rugby, the South African domestic governing body is bound by all 
by-laws and regulations of World Rugby,494 and as a result, any breach of these rules 
may result in disciplinary action. This may be an example of discrimination against 
players who fall outside the categories of coloured, Indian and African and therefore 
breach by-law 3(f) as well as a breach of the objectives and functions of World Rugby. 
That is because there is a strong case that these targets constitute racial quotas and, 
as previously mentioned, it is not only contrary to the EEA (therefore not a legitimate 
affirmative action measure) but judges have also stated that quotas cannot pass 
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constitutional muster under section 9(2) of the Constitution. Quotas were also referred 
to as “inherently” and “irrationally” discriminatory by Thlothlalemaje J.495 
CSA has implemented quotas in domestic competitions, which required six of the 
eleven players to be black whereas the EPG has mandated that 60% of the national 
cricket team needs to be black during the course of the season. Again we see a 
scenario where there are only eleven positions on the cricket field and six of those are 
reserved for black players. That means only five white players will be able to be 
selected. The ICC has explicitly stated that the ICC or its members shall not at any 
time unlawfully discriminate against persons based on their race. Furthermore, the 
ICC’s anti-racism policy insists that its members adopt policies and protocols that 
indicate that all inappropriate racist conduct is not tolerated.496 The reservation of six 
places for black players in the cricket team cannot be deemed lawful under the rules 
of the ICC’s articles of association. CSA would certainly defend their stance by 
referring to this as affirmative action. However, regardless of whether it is affirmative 
action or discrimination, nowhere in the ICC’s rules and regulations does it refer to 
affirmative action measures or make an exception for it (in fact none of the international 
federations makes mention of affirmative action). This may be because the application 
of affirmative action (or, what purports to be affirmative action) in South African sport 
is so unusual in the world. At least on the face of it, these racial targets appear to be 
clear discrimination by the CSA, and if the ICC takes action, the CSA may be 
suspended for not adhering to the objectives and functions of the ICC.497  
Cricket is a specialist sport which is based largely on player statistics. A cricket team 
generally consists of five batsmen with two openers, which are considered specialists 
positions, a wicketkeeper and four to five bowlers. To be selected as a batsman, one 
would need to have a good batting average, which is calculated using the total amount 
of runs scored to innings played (similar for bowlers but one uses wickets taken to 
innings played). Therefore, it would be clear for the public if someone is selected and 
they are not up to “standard” or has a less favourable average than another batsman. 
It follows that if a non-white player does not perform and his statistics are not 
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favourable compared to a fellow white player, it is hard to justify the selection. 
However, this may be the current situation if selection is based purely on race. A 
notable incident is the one between Vernon Philander and Kyle Abbot. The South 
African cricket team’s former high-performance coach reported that for the semi-final 
of the 2015 World Cup, South Africa was mandated by CSA to include another player 
of colour in the starting eleven following their quarter-final win.498 Abbot, a white South 
African bowler is the player who was allegedly sacrificed for the selection of a player 
of colour in the form of Philander. Philander left the field injured after an unfavourable 
bowling display and much was made of the fact that Philander had to replace an in-
form Abbot. If these reports are accurate, it can be regarded as a clear example of not 
only government interference but also discrimination against Abbot, who was not 
allowed to play due to his race. A more comical example transpired in a franchise 
match between the Highveld Lions and the Titans. The Lions were in a pickle when 
African black spinner, Eddie Leie, got injured during the warm-up and the Lions had 
to get permission from CSA to field a white player, as the quota system at the time 
required all franchise teams to field a minimum of six players of colour in their starting 
team with three having to be black African. With Leie being injured, they did not meet 
the quota requirement, but CSA nevertheless granted the permission. Another Lions 
player got injured in the third over of the game and the coach Geoffery Toyana (a 
Black African coach) was forced to do some fielding before they managed to get a 
young white spectator to do some fielding for the rest of the match.499 
The quota system implemented by ASA states that Team South Africa’s male 
athletes have to comprise of 84% Generic Blacks and 40% of the female athletes have 
to be Generic Blacks. The principles of the IOC, as well as those of World Athletics, 
state that every individual has the right to practise and participate in athletics without 
discrimination. Furthermore, the IOC explicitly states that the NOCs need to ensure 
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that athletes are not excluded based on racial reasons or other forms of 
discrimination.500  
The IOC, one of the oldest sporting associations in the world, is extremely 
unambiguous about athletes not being selected based on race, and this is clearly 
something South Africa may be guilty of. The IOC is the only international federation 
which explicitly states that athletes may not be excluded based on race. It is a 
federation which in the past has suspended and expelled South Africa because it has 
been guilty of racist practices.  
It is well known that under South African jurisprudence, neither the Constitution nor 
the EEA prohibits discrimination per se; it is unfair discrimination that is explicitly 
prohibited. It is important to note that under the rules and regulations of the 
international bodies, discrimination is prohibited and it makes no difference whether it 
is “unfair” or just “ordinary” discrimination; it is prohibited, plain and simple. Therefore, 
it would appear that it would not matter if South Africa finds discrimination to be lawful 
(as constituting affirmative action), as these domestic federations are still bound by 
the rules and regulations of these bodies, and these sports transformation policies 
may therefore violate the given provisions. However, the fact that these targets may 
constitute racial quotas and therefore cannot be legitimate affirmative action 
measures, aids the case of these targets being recognised as (unfair) discrimination 
under the international federations’ rules. 
It is easy to point out the remarkable similarities that exist between sport under 
apartheid and the current racial quota system implemented in South African sport. Due 
to apartheid policies, black sportspersons were prohibited from not only competing in 
sports in South Africa but also internationally. Currently, white deserving players are 
left out of South African teams because a specific number of positions are reserved 
for black players. It is not my intention to compare the current racial quota system in 
sport with apartheid, as that would be outrageous. Apartheid did not only affect sports 
participation, but it also crippled racial groups from being on equal footing with one 
another in all spheres of life and it is a burden we all carry to this day. But that is not 
an excuse to say that what is currently happening under our law is necessarily lawful 
or constitutional, simply because it may occur in the name of redress. 
 
 





5 6 2 2 Political interference  
A further potential breach of international sporting rules relates to the principle of 
autonomy. The IOC, ICC and World Rugby state as rules that the respective sports 
must be governed domestically free from political interference. Despite this, we have 
seen on more than one occasion in recent years that the relevant national bodies in 
South Africa have acted under pressure from the government. A perfect example is 
the punitive measures with which the Minister threatened the poor performing sports 
federations to ensure race-based transformation, as referred to earlier. One cannot be 
autonomous if the composition of your team is governed by rules that are implemented 
by the Minister or the government.  
Louw states that one could argue that “the transformation of South African sport is 
a legitimate governmental objective”.501 However, as mentioned previously, Barnard 
stated that not only must an affirmative action measure be lawful, but it must also be 
lawfully implemented, and coupled with that is the fact that rigid quotas are prohibited 
according to the EEA.502 It is at least arguable that the measures driven by 
governmental pressure on domestic federations are illegitimate. If one considers the 
similarities between race-based measures currently employed and the racist policies 
of the apartheid governments, one may question why, from a purely sporting 
perspective, international federations have not once again stepped in as they did 
during the apartheid years in South Africa. Is it, therefore, a case of two wrongs making 
a right? The evidence clearly shows that a number of South African domestic 
federations are in apparent direct and blatant contravention of various rules and 
regulations of the international federations. More recently, the Institute for Race 
Relations has reported CSA to the ICC for “blatant racist” policies and political 
interference. After being under pressure from government, CSA has committed to 
exclusively hiring black coaching consultants.503 The deputy head of policy research, 
Herman Pretorius stated that over the last decade there have been issues of “political 
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interference, of malfeasance, mismanagement and of course…just blatant racism.”504 
The outcome of this case will most probably give a clear directive as to how South 
African sports bodies should deal with political interference.  
If one takes a closer look at the history of South African sport, it is clear that the 
international federations did not make the first move in terms of apartheid South 
Africa’s suspension from international participation. International federations 
expressed reluctance to interfere in what appeared to be domestic political matters. 
This is clear when one considers that in 1968, South Africa was again invited to the 
Olympic Games even though it was stated that the IOC was completely opposed to 
any political interference in sport.505 In this regard, Nongogo et al state that the IOC 
and its president were well aware at the time of the fact that the SANOC had 
“voluntarily chosen to exclude black sportspersons, in direct response and alignment 
to its government’s racist policy of apartheid”.506 It was only due to boycotts by other 
nations as well as the Gleneagles Agreement that South Africa was eventually placed 
in sporting isolation. Therefore, in the current climate, it may take much of the same 
doing before international federations would act on potential racial discrimination in 
South African sport. History shows that South Africa has a unique past and therefore 
international federations may be hesitant in acting on any potential discrimination. 
However, that is not to say that international federations are afraid of implementing 
their rules and regulations.  
 
5 6 3 International federations laying down the law 
There have been instances where international federations have banned national 
sports federations for not complying with their constitutions or their rules and 
regulations. To name but a few of these instances: Kuwait faced a ban by the IOC for 
sports legislation which permitted governmental interference in the internal functioning 
of its NOC and other sporting federations, which runs contrary to the Olympic 
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Charter.507 Furthermore, legislation was enacted to confer upon the Kuwaiti Sports 
Ministry the power to assume control of national sporting bodies, and this again was 
contrary to the policy of sports governance autonomy. FIFA similarly banned Kuwait 
for failing to comply with similar obligations in the FIFA statutes.508 In July 2019, the 
ICC banned Zimbabwe over a failure to keep the sport free from political interference. 
Zimbabwe breached the ICC Constitution when the Zimbabwean government 
suspended the Zimbabwe Cricket Board and replaced it with an interim committee.509 
Pretorius claims that CSA has followed the route of Zimbabwe by allowing political 
interference and should face the same consequences.510 
 
5 7 Conclusion  
South African national sports bodies have been authorised to govern their respective 
sports codes in the country. However, the national bodies will have to comply with the 
constitutions of their respective international federations as well as their rules and 
regulations. South Africa, with its unique circumstances and history, has introduced 
affirmative action into the world of sport, from the side of government policy as well as 
through the rules and policies of national federations. It has not been indicated that 
some sort of special affirmative action exists for sports employment. Therefore, in the 
case of professional sportspersons, these affirmative action measures are regulated 
by the EEA. The same rules that apply to so-called “normal” employees, apply to 
professional athletes. Furthermore, the applicable governmental charter makes it clear 
that it is neither the policy of government to advocate for the racial composition of 
national teams, nor how these teams should be selected and, further, that 
transformation should be from the bottom up. Considering the South African national 
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federations’ transformation plans, which have been discussed above, this raises the 
question of whether government is indeed adhering to the key principle raised in its 
own Charter? By setting a target of 50% black representation it is clear that 
government is interfering with the racial composition of the teams and squads and, at 
least indirectly, in the selection of teams. The NSRAA explicitly prohibits this. 
 Furthermore, South African national federations may not be adhering to the rules 
and regulations inherent to their international obligations. These are international 
federations which have not shied away from suspending sports teams and federations 
for non-compliance with their rules and regulations, as was illustrated above with 
nations such as Kuwait and Zimbabwe. International federations’ prohibitions against 
discrimination as well as political interference are common amongst all their 
constitutions. While we have seen examples of suspension due to political 
interference, nothing stops international federations from imposing sanctions for 
discrimination against individuals, especially where such instances of discrimination 
are, in fact, as a direct result of governmental interference.  
South African national sports federations are clearly implementing a government-
directed transformation agenda. National bodies implementing race-based policies for 
participation in sport is something that remains unusual in the world of sport. However, 
one thing is certain and that is that these national sports bodies have obligations 
towards the international federations. Moreover whether South Africa’s transformation 
agenda and the measures implemented comply with those rules of international 
federations is yet to be ascertained, and only time will tell whether this might have 















CHAPTER 6: POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATION FOR RACE-BASED QUOTAS? 
6 1 Introduction  
It has been argued that racial quotas in professional sports teams are unlawful, both 
under South African domestic law as well as in terms of international sports law. It 
must accordingly be emphasised again that this type of affirmative action measure in 
this context is highly anomalous. In terms of South African employment legislation (and 
the courts) quotas are prohibited in all other industries and contexts for purposes of 
transformation. We find these racial quotas in sport as measures that designated 
employers impose under direct pressure from government, and it is unusual in the 
world of sport. Considering this anomaly, it may be of significance to consider whether 
there exists some special justification for the use of these highly contentious measures 
in this very specific context.  
South Africa is a proud sporting nation, and one cannot underestimate the role sport 
has played in the reconciliation of the country after apartheid. One merely has to reflect 
on the 1995 Rugby World Cup, when then newly-elected president, Nelson Mandela, 
clad in a Springbok rugby jersey, handed the William Web-Ellis trophy to Francois 
Pienaar, in a symbolic event of reconciliation that is unlikely to be matched.511 Many 
commentators agree that sport has a special role to play in nation-building, and it is 
definitely more than just a form of physical or recreational activity: 
 
“In addition, as a universal language, sport can be a powerful medium for social and 
economic change. It can be utilized to bridge cultural gaps, resolve conflict and educate 
people in ways that very few non-physical activities can. Sport is the only forum that can 
bring people together for a common goal.”512 
 
Therefore, despite the mental and physical benefits of sport which include building 
self-confidence and developing social skills, it has a greater impact on society as a 
whole. One would be remiss not to investigate whether sport, as a tool for nation-
building, justifies the use of such a controversial and problematic type of affirmative 
action measure as the racial quota.  
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6 2 Sport and nation-building 
An important part of nation-building is creating a sense of nationalism. Sport is one 
of the few tools that can do this, as it is one of the best fora apart from religion that can 
bring people together for a common goal.513 Citizens in a nation need to feel that they 
are a part of the nation and sport provides a platform for that type of unity to grow. The 
value of sport can be described as a “means of exchange and understanding among 
people of various backgrounds, nationalities or beliefs, and it promotes expression 
beyond traditional barriers”.514 It results in “rivals” under one flag competing for the 
honour of one country,515 and it consequently creates an “us” versus “them” mentality 
which can bind national supporters in the context of international competition.516 
Therefore, sport has the potential to unite diverse groups in a divided country.  
The United Nations (“UN”) has recognised the role and impact that sport can have 
on nations and, as a result, the UN Office for Sport, Development and Peace was 
established.517 The objective was to “raise awareness about the use of physical 
activity, sport and play as powerful development tools in the advancement of 
development and peace objectives”.518 The areas identified where sport can help drive 
positive change include health, gender equality, education, economic growth and 
sustainable communities.519 But these are not the only areas of influence, as 
mentioned above, sport benefits self-confidence, socialisation and mutual 
understanding across divisions of race, culture and gender and therefore its 
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importance to nation-building and reconciliation initiatives should never be 
underestimated.520 In a report by the UN Secretary-General on the progress of sport 
development,521 it was found that many sports initiatives focused on skills which would 
foster social integration, inclusion and cohesion.522 It was further stated that “[s]ports 
supports the process of peacebuilding by bridging relationships across groups and 
communities that might otherwise tend towards distrust and hostility”.523 
Sport has played a significant role in many nations prior to the UN identifying sport 
as a peacebuilding and development mechanism. As early as 1956, sport played a 
role in unification, as was seen with West and East Germany appearing under one flag 
at the Olympic Games, despite their political differences. West Germany set up its own 
National Olympic Committee after the Cold War, but East Germany was refused this 
for fear of the potential of provoking political tensions, and as a result, to compete in 
the games, they had to compete as one nation despite taking nearly four more 
decades to become one Germany again.524 After unification, sport was again used as 
a tool to “enhance national unity and solidarity in a reunited country”.525 An example 
of this includes hosting the 2006 FIFA World Cup, and in the same breath, all the 
marketing campaigns were aimed at promoting a new self-image of Germany.526 
Moreover, Angola used the hosting of the 2010 African Cup of Nations to show the 
world that the civil war which had plagued the country for decades was officially 
over.527 The focus was used to showcase Angola to the world and to enhance 
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development. As a result, according to Freeman, Angola is now one of Africa’s 
emerging nations “with the arrival of relative political stability and growth in both the 
petroleum and diamond industries therein”.528 As Freeman stated: “sport, politics, and 
nationalism are all intimately intertwined, both at the national and international 
levels”.529 This is echoed by Labuschagne who stated that: 
 
“Sport is an important vehicle that evokes and strengthens this emotional attachment, and 
is regularly used by politicians and other leaders for nation-building purposes. It is a very 
important instrument to guide or even manipulate a divided society towards the attainment 
of emotional attachment and the sharing of values, a common bond, and loyalty in a 
society.”530 
 
One country that certainly resonates with this statement is South Africa. In South 
Africa’s unique history, sport has had a pioneering role in the unification and 
reconciliation of the nation. 
 
6 2 1 The impact of sport in South Africa 
Segregation was established under apartheid through various Acts of Parliament, 
such as the Group Areas Act, which allocated areas of habitation and business 
according to race.531 While nothing in the Act specifically related to the outlawing of 
races participating in sport together, the Act had a profound effect on sport and 
recreation which included reserved sporting facilities such as public swimming pools, 
arenas, courts and athletic tracks according to one’s race and exclusively for the use 
of white persons.532 Under the apartheid government sportspersons of colour could 
not compete with their white counterparts and the playing fields were extremely 
uneven in terms of opportunities to participate. In 1967, the Prime Minister, John 
Vorster, announced that no mixed sports would be played in South Africa irrespective 
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was marred by racial separateness and boycotts. However, the abolishment of 
apartheid meant the end of segregated sport534 as well as the international isolation 
and boycotts experienced. Then arrived the popular triumph of the 1995 Rugby World 
Cup. Hosting and winning the 1995 Rugby World Cup was highly symbolic. Nelson 
Mandela used the Rugby World Cup to unite a divided South Africa. He ingeniously 
used the “Springboks” (a symbol of white supremacy) as a means to address 
divisiveness and as a result, African blacks, coloureds and Indians all believed that 
the Springboks not only belonged to “the white man” but to them as well. The victory 
promoted a new-found nationalism and improved social bonds of a multi-racial 
democracy.535 These sorts of symbols can promote reconciliation by representing 
multiculturalism and unity despite diversity.536  
The ruling party recognised that sport can be a powerful weapon in the 
reconciliation of the nation post-apartheid, and the sports establishment blithely 
accepted this idea.537 As a result, there was now a greater focus on changing the 
dynamic of South African sport. Government linked sports to development, and riding 
on the success of the historic triumphs in 1995 and the 1996 soccer African Cup of 
Nations, government saw an opportunity to transform the sports sector through 
national development programmes. 538 In democratic South Africa’s short history of 
competing on the world stage, there have been some great achievements in the 
sporting world. South Africa won the Rugby World Cup for a record-equalling third time 
in 2019 to go along with the 1995 and 2007 victories, the country hosted the 2010 
FIFA Soccer World Cup, and it boasts Olympic Gold medallists in Caster Semenya 
and Wayde van Niekerk.  
Sport is one domain where South Africans have constantly found success on the 
international stage and, therefore, in this passionate and determined nation, we 
associate our sports teams with success. We look to them as a beacon of hope and 
possibility. Young kids from the township want to be the next Bongiwe Msomi (current 
Proteas Netball captain), Kagiso Rabada (current Proteas cricketer) or Siya Kolisi 
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(current Springboks captain). They see these stars on television and in the media 
representing their country and immediately realise that the possibilities are endless. 
The South African government has previously used symbolism as a key tool to 
reunite the nation. Achieving international success is one of the major contributors to 
nation-building. However, more recently the implementation of sports transformation 
policies has become increasingly apparent in the government’s quest to achieve 
reconciliation. These extreme policies have often experienced mixed reviews; 
however, symbolism and transformation policies have played a crucial role as tools for 
nation-building and will, therefore, be discussed further. 
 
6 2 1 1 The power of symbolism 
As mentioned above, winning, hosting, and competing in international sports events 
can be highly symbolic as it can portray unity within a divided nation. According to 
Höglund and Sundberg, South Africa utilised symbolism to great effect:  
 
“The new South Africa and its focus on multiculturalism and unity were encapsulated in the 
reference to South Africa as a Rainbow Nation. Significantly, sport provided opportunities 
for portraying new symbols of this unity, and for creating new national myths regarding the 
transformation. For instance, in the 1992 Barcelona Olympics the South African team, 
consisting of both white athletes and athletes of colour, flew in an aeroplane completely 
covered by the new national flag, and also saw Nelson Mandela attending the games. This 
took place before the first democratic elections, and at a time when the negotiations 
between the ANC and the National Party were experiencing a crisis.”539 
 
Since the inception of a democratic government, sport clearly had a prominent role 
to play in South Africa. De Beer and Radley state that “unless South Africa recognises 
diverse values and manages the role of diversity and change accordingly it will miss a 
major opportunity for the successful integration that is necessary for the country to 




540 A Goslin, G van Wyk & N Welman “Diversity Management in South African Sport 





6 2 1 1 1 International success 
We need not look further than the class of 2019 Rugby World Cup-winning 
Springboks, a perfect example of sport uniting a nation. The victory was referred to as 
an “inspiration” to a nation suffering from racial tensions, unemployment and 
violence”.541 The Springboks’ first black captain, Kolisi stated that: 
 
“We have so many problems in our country and this team comes from different 
backgrounds, different races, but we came together with one goal and we wanted to 
achieve it … I really hope we’ve done that for South Africa. (It) just shows that we can pull 
together if we want to achieve something … we can achieve anything if we work together 
as one.”542 
 
Rassie Erasmus, the Springboks’ winning coach, stated that the win could act as a 
“catalyst to help resolve some of the country’s complex problems”.543 One media 
article further reported that: 
 
“The upwelling of hope and national unity that the Springbok fountain appears uniquely 
equipped to deliver was almost tangible across the country yesterday, just as it was in 1995 
and again in 2007. But it was also apparent that this time might be a little different.”544 
 
The message was clear, if South Africans look past race and class and move on 
from the past and work together for the good of the country, we can achieve 
remarkable things as a nation. The 2019 triumph encapsulated the meaning of national 
symbolism. A team not defined by colour but by their unity to achieve a common goal. 
The 1995 triumph was described as an “orchestration of national identity”, an outward 
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reconciliation of which the harsh realities of South African life were sanitised and 
commodified for both internal audiences and an international market.545 However, the 
2019 triumph seemed to create so much more than just symbolism, there is a real 
feeling that hope has been created by a multicultural team filled with whites and blacks. 
How South Africa uses this as a springboard to tackle the many challenges remains 
to be seen, but there is no doubt that on the day of the historic triumph, Siya Kolisi and 
his troops united South Africa. 
 
6 2 1 1 2 Transformation policies 
Former Minister of Sport and Recreation, Makhenkesi Stofile stated that:  
 
“Sport must be a catalyst for the building of a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic, prosperous 
and free South Africa. It must build social cohesion and build a proudly South African nation 
of all South Africans”.546  
 
The ANC, therefore, started implementing policies to transform sport in South 
Africa, as according to the Minister, “sport is an important barometer of how a particular 
society is organised.”547 The ANC wanted to make sport more inclusive and, within 
this charged climate, the South African government instituted various instruments in 
order to address the imbalances of sport in South Africa, which include the White 
Paper on Sports and Recreation of 1998, the NSRA as well as the Transformation 
Charter. The reason why transformation policies fall under symbolism is that selecting 
and fielding a multi-racial sports team can be very symbolic of the achievement of 
transformation on a broader level. However, South Africa as a nation grapples with the 
real and apparent tension between the ideal of being a truly successful sporting nation 
but at the same time potentially sacrificing that success to implement the above 
measures to redress social injustices of the past. Concerning this ideological tension 
(and at the same time highlighting the role of sporting merit, which was touched on in 
an earlier chapter), O’Leary and Khoo state that: 
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“Few would argue that modern international sport serves a greater function than providing 
a convenient structure for global competition. To some nations it is an important factor in 
defining the status and prowess of a nation. It is inextricably linked with national identity 
and wellbeing. For other nations, however, international sporting success requires a 
political compromise. An important internal function of a nation’s sport is to provide means 
of health and social cohesion. The objective is to be inclusive: to bestow sporting 
opportunity on all citizens and provide a means of redressing disadvantage in all its forms. 
This worthy objective causes tension, however, when juxtaposed with international sports 
competition, because competitive sport at all levels is inherently elitist. If international 
sporting competition is to provide consequential benefits for a nation, then international 
selection is likely to require a ruthless filtering of the strong from the weak. If sporting 
opportunity within a nation is such that reasonable equality of opportunity can be assured, 
then such a selection process is unlikely to cause tension. If a significant proportion of the 
population is disadvantaged, however, a nation, through its laws, needs to find a 
compromise that is politically acceptable. That may be achieved by policies that promote 
equality at the cost of international sporting success, or that, effectively, promote sports 
inequality to achieve what the nation might believe to be the net benefit of a high 
international sporting profile. It is most likely to be a compromise between the two.”548 
 
This succinctly encapsulates South Africa’s sports transformation mission. The 
sacrifice that O’Leary et al refer to is not new to South Africans. Former Minister Stofile 
had, in the past, called for sports administrators to “sacrifice a little bit in terms of 
winning in the interest of transformation”.549 South Africa’s rich sporting history coupled 
with government’s progressive transformation policies (racial quotas) have created 
serious tension in respect of the implementation of the governmental agenda to 
redress social injustice. But few will argue against the fact that transformation policies 
are exactly what might be required in South Africa. 
In 1995, the Rugby World Cup team had one player of colour and in 2007 there 
were only two players of colour on the field. These types of inequalities needed to be 
addressed as the national sports teams were not demographically representative 
enough. A political tool used to achieve representivity was the introduction of 
affirmative action to amateur and professional sport which in some cases led to the 
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implementation of racial quota systems.550 Racial quotas were implemented in all 
sports codes at all levels. It can be described as being “necessary for redress”.551 As 
stated previously quotas are used to reserve places in sports teams for previously 
disadvantaged groups in order for the team to be demographically representative of 
the nation. People of colour were so marginalised that the only way to fast track them 
into teams was to potentially use racial quotas. The fact that only two players of colour 
could make the starting fifteen of the 2007 Rugby World Cup-winning team should 
speak volumes, and as a result, more was needed to ensure that more players of 
colour received opportunities. Even though it could be argued that racial quotas may 
paint over the cracks, it could nevertheless be a powerful tool to aid symbolism. Why 
not fill the team with more black players to have the black population represented on 
the international stage? This would give young kids in disadvantaged areas hope that 
they can one day be a Protea or a Springbok and that it is not just for the lucky few.  
 
6 2 1 2 The problem with symbolism  
Hosting and/or winning major sporting events are fleeting events, often with a long 
period of time between them.552 Merret, Tatz and Adair state that the error made by 
South Africa “was and is to believe that these transient games on sports fields are an 
enduring contribution to nation-building and a tangible ‘solution’ to gross poverty, 
unemployment, lack of shelter, elementary utilities, reasonable health and schooling 
standards”.553 Boit referred to the saying, the strength of the rope lies in the weakest 
point and said that “similarly the strength of national development lies in the weakest 
point”.554 Therefore, international events do little for those in the poor and rural areas. 
It brings a “kumbaya” moment, but without meaningful development in those areas, 
there will not be growth.  
We further must wonder what implementing racial quotas does for the 
disadvantaged individuals in rural areas. We are placing players of colour into teams 
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and it is to symbolise a transformed team. Resorting to such an extreme form of 
transformation shows that either we are not implementing the correct measures at the 
grassroots level or, as Merret et al stated, that they are “arguably a consequence of 
the failure to think more deeply about the history of South Africa; they also reflect an 
ignorance and arrogance about past and present”.555 Gardiner described sport as a 
useful measure to determine “how far we have come and how far there is to go in 
terms of race relations and racial integration”. Racial quotas may not give a clear 
indication of how far we have come because it is not only a highly artificial measure, it 
also comes at an expense of non-beneficiaries, and one needs to ask whether that 
would really aid race relations or racial integration or cause more social division. Thus 
bearing in mind that South Africa has in the past had white athletes leave to represent 
foreign nations because of quota systems. By implementing racial quotas, we have 
not closed the proverbial gap between white and black athletes. After 25 years of 
democracy, should there be equal opportunity for all our athletes? This is certainly 
what government believes if they are aiming to speed up transformation.  
The much renowned Siya Kolisi has risen to the forefront of international rugby by 
overcoming incredible odds. This is clear by the media frenzy surrounding the fact that 
Kolisi watched the Springboks’ 2007 triumph in a tavern, and 12 years later lifted the 
trophy himself. The message around Kolisi’s achievements was presented in a 
manner that indicates that anyone can achieve and excel regardless of their early 
childhood circumstances, but this was described by one journalist as a “seductive 
lie”.556 McKaiser stated that: 
 
“The media parade these poor achievers with an uncomplicated narrative that has a clear 
subtext and often an explicit moral: sheer hard work and a positive attitude can guarantee 
you success in life regardless of the structural conditions under which you live…Being 
inspired by the overcoming narrative isn’t something we should feel bad about. But if we 
only feel moved and do not also think critically about these stories, then we will miss some 
important insights about the limits of these stories.”557 
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McKaiser further stated that no one should be a statistical outlier and that the people 
should be mindful not to imply that hard work ensures success. He described Kolisi 
and other successful African blacks as lucky and stated that society and in particular 
the state, “must eliminate the structural injustices”.558 While it is by no means to imply 
that Kolisi or all players of colour in our sports teams are quota players, it is necessary 
to be conscious of how the media can use these athletes of colour to paint a certain 
picture. That picture portraying that we are transformed, as our national teams are 
littered with players of colour. In the cases where quotas are implemented, it indicates 
that we still have a long way to go in terms of transformation. McKaiser rightly states 
that it remains the few, or the “statistical outliers” who make it. The fact that we still 
implement racial quotas may indicate that he is correct in that analysis. It may look 
good for the nation to have sports teams that are demographically representative of 
the nation, but it hides major problems,559 like the lack of facilities and the lack of 
opportunities afforded to those from previously disadvantaged groups. That may be 
exactly the problem with symbolism - without tangible work, it merely papers over the 
cracks.  
The remark by the former Minister of Sport should, however, be given due regard. 
Apartheid was an abnormal system; does anyone have an idea of how to normalise 
an otherwise abnormal society?560 The current government believes that quotas are 
the method that produces the “best” results. We are dealing with a unique system and 
perhaps unique measures are required. South Africa does not have the luxury of 
referring to examples from elsewhere and therefore every step of the sports 
transformation journey is highly scrutinised. 
The legal principle, however, is that despite governments best efforts to transform 
sport, under the EEA, quotas are explicitly prohibited and therefore cannot be rational 
(let alone fair). These transformation policies cannot be said to be aimed at protecting 
and advancing people who are previously disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. The 
measures are introduced with the apparent objective of simply achieving demographic 
representivity, and as previously highlighted, there does not appear to be a link 
between the notion of substantive equality and demographic representivity. As stated 
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by Penrose, we cannot say that the previously disadvantaged are now compensated 
for by reserving seats in national teams.561 The Constitution makes no mention of 
representivity, and it remains highly questionable why government should use 
representivity as a yardstick or indicator for the achievement of equality. In the sporting 
context, merit would, therefore, be irrelevant and race would be the deciding factor. 
This must surely be in conflict with section 9(2) of the Constitution. 
 
6 3 The reality of sports transformation 
Widely recognised names in various sporting codes have spoken out against 
implementing racial quotas in sport in order to speed up transformation. Former SARU 
president, Oregon Hoskins, spoke out against the government’s transformation plan 
and stated that “players of colour will continue to be thrown in at the deep end”. 
Hoskins further stated that:  
 
“Rugby is part and parcel of South African society [but] there isn’t a commitment on the part 
of government to genuinely tackle the development of the sport and it’s all well and good 
saying that you should transform the national team and transform the franchise teams but 
that’s not going to work, it’s never going to work.”562 
 
Former Proteas cricketer, Darryl Cullinan, in an interview, voiced concerns over the 
transformation in cricket in South Africa. Cullinan stated that for African blacks, the 
progress of cricket is hindered because soccer remains the most popular sport 
amongst the black community, and that cricket is an expensive sport to play, which 
puts it out of reach of most aspiring, disadvantaged black sportspersons.563 He further 
questioned why it took 25 years for the first African black top-order batsman (Temba 
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Bavuma) to represent the Proteas, and that it similarly took ‘Afrikaners’ a long time to 
be successful at cricket.564 
A report by Brink and Nortjѐ highlight the lack of development of grassroots level 
through statistics: 
 
“According to the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) only 57,8% of public 
schools in the country have sporting facilities. The quality of the existing facilities is often 
substandard and facilities are very unevenly distributed. For instance, whilst 77,5% of 
public schools in Gauteng and 75,1% of schools in the Western Cape have sporting 
facilities, only 40,6% of public schools in the Eastern Cape possess such facilities. If the 
figures are broken down further, an even more dismal situation emerges. 3 245 out of 5 
461 public schools in the Eastern Cape had no sporting facilities in 2015. For the rest, only 
1 412 schools had soccer facilities, 164 had cricket facilities, and only 333 had rugby 
facilities. In KwaZulu-Natal, 3 207 out of 5 861 schools had no sporting facilities. Only 1 
591 had soccer facilities and 258 had cricketing facilities; and a mere 111 could boast rugby 
fields.”565 
 
On the face of it, it appears that the government is not pulling their weight when 
they speak about a transformation from the “bottom up” and investing more resources 
at “grassroots” level. As a result of the lack of development, quotas are an easy fix 
and will remain an easy fix if the development at the grassroots level is not improved. 
 
6 4 Conclusion 
Sport is a powerful transformative tool and it has been illustrated that there are 
many examples of it contributing to nation-building and reconciliation. Its impact 
cannot be underestimated, as an organisation like the UN has also used sport as a 
tool for development and peace. South Africa is a prime example of sport uniting a 
divided nation, albeit only for fleeting moments. A country that was torn apart by 
apartheid, demonstrated how sport transcends differences and inequality. The entire 
country supported the Springboks at the 1995 Rugby World Cup despite it previously 
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being a symbol of white supremacy. South Africa is not unique; it is one of a few 
countries that, in the past, has employed legal separation of different races.566 
However, the question remains whether the use of race-based quotas can be justified 
due to the importance of sport in South Africa. The many examples above illustrate 
the important impact that great sporting moments and sports teams have had on South 
Africa’s pathway to reconciliation as a nation. 
The two processes identified through which reconciliation and nation-building can 
take place include the utilisation of symbolism through hosting and/or winning 
international events and the implementation of transformation policies (more 
specifically, racial quotas). South Africa has used symbolism to great effect over the 
years and the country is referred to as the “Rainbow nation” to show that it is one 
country with diverse races and cultures. However, we have seen that hosting major 
sporting events is fleeting and there are large time gaps between these events. While 
it may bring unity to the nation and provide a sense of national identity, one must 
question whether it is really reconciliatory in the South African climate. In between 
these events and major triumphs, not much has materialised in terms of the country 
transforming. Furthermore, symbolism is highly dependent on success, and therefore 
cannot be deemed viable for long- term reconciliation in the absence of accompanying 
sporting success on the international stage.  
Racial quotas were implemented because of the inequalities that persisted in sport 
after apartheid. According to government, the national teams had to represent the 
demographics of the nation. The implementation of quotas has caused numerous 
controversial debates. However, having a team filled with players of colour does not 
only give opportunities for those players but it also denotes a more demographically 
representative team, albeit in a controversial manner. Young kids from rural areas get 
to have heroes that they can more readily identify with and it allows them to believe 
that sport can save them from their current circumstances. Implementing extreme 
measures due to the persistence of structural inequalities in South African sport does 
however circumvent selection based on merit. Perhaps with continuous opportunities, 
players will improve and eventually their true potential will be displayed, and they 
would “deserve” to be selected. The fear, however, is that quotas merely paper over 
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the cracks. The question that needs to be asked is why at the highest level of 
competition does South Africa need to implement quotas? The answer may lie in the 
fact that there is a lack of development at the grassroots level. Quotas portray the 
“seductive lie” that anyone can represent their country despite their circumstances. 
However, people do not look further than that because the media does not necessarily 
focus on it. Without a quota system, the players of colour who do get selected on merit 
may still only be the “outliers” or the “lucky few”. Further, one cannot overlook the 
impact that implementing a quota system has on those individuals from non-
designated groups and the potential infringement of their rights. But it is noted that 
South Africa is still suffering from the effects of apartheid. Consequently, some may 
argue that quotas are a temporary tool that is required to rectify the abnormal system 
and that it can be justified in light of the current plight of government’s transformation 
agenda. This dissertation has previously questioned whether two wrongs can make a 
right, but considering the past, is this temporary tool really a “wrong” if we think about 
what the nation faces? It cannot be easy for government to deconstruct a system that 
they had no hand in building.  
Sport is an integral part of being a South African, and due to the unification role of 
sport, it has helped to lay a foundation for a democratic country. This is something that 
has never been overlooked and that is why sport is viewed as a harbinger of peace 
and reconciliation. While symbolism is evidently important for nation-building, South 
Africa needs so much more for sport to have the desired impact of true reconciliation. 
As Labuschagne said, sport is a prominent tool for nation-building due to its relative 
innocence outside the parameters of politics.567 But we have witnessed that in South 
Africa, sport and politics are intertwined and this may be due to the unique history of 
South Africa. This may mean that the unique sports transformation policies may be 
what is required on a short-term basis to give hope and to paint a representative 
picture, but the positive long-term effects – in the absence of the government assisting 
in a more tangible way to strengthen the “weakest point of the rope” - remain unclear.  
 
 





CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION  
7 1 Introduction 
South Africa has a uniquely dark history and a potentially bright future. For some, it 
was a country that offered very little in terms of prospects. These people were mainly 
those affected by the apartheid regime’s segregationist and repressive policies: black 
Africans, coloureds and Indians. It was a time when whites were deemed superior to 
their counterparts and enjoyed and benefited from most of the resources provided. 
The generation growing up in what is now labelled the “new South Africa” often cannot 
fathom the extent of the struggle and fight for equality, while the scars of the past 
remain.  
From a sporting perspective, how do we determine whether affirmative action and 
in effect transformation has been successful? Is success measured by the racial 
composition of our national sports teams or the number of players from every race that 
is currently a professional in their respective sports code? Or further, is it the level of 
access that is afforded to those that have been previously disadvantaged to ensure 
that everyone starts on equal-footing? I believe it should be the level of opportunity or 
access afforded to the previously disadvantaged in order to start competing on equal-
footing. Affirmative action involves treating people differently by favouring one group 
over another. But the main aim of affirmative action remains to achieve a just and 
“equal” society in light of past injustices suffered. When it comes to affirmative action 
in professional sport in South Africa, the conversation surrounding racial quotas 
frequently dominates. Quotas are often disguised as either targets or numerical goals 
and sometimes not disguised at all and blatantly referred to as quotas, all to achieve 
demographic “representivity”. Absolute demographic representivity causes a number 
of grievances as it not only affects non-beneficiaries’ right to trade and occupation but 
also their right to human dignity. These are apprehensions that have not been raised 
enough when talking about professional athletes in sports teams. From the 
aforementioned examination, it is suggested that government’s standard for 
successful affirmative action is almost exclusively based on the racial composition of 
South Africa’s national and other high-level sports teams. But is that a legitimate aim 
for affirmative action under the Constitution and the EEA? It is against this standard 





There are many avenues to analyse race-based quotas in professional sport, but 
this study aimed to focus on the legal aspect of the implementation of affirmative action 
as opposed to the more political, often anecdotal debate which frequently surrounds 
sports transformation in South Africa. In this study of a complex phenomenon, many 
questions remain unanswered. These include the questions surrounding the 
appropriate standard of review of constitutionally-compliant affirmative action, and the 
question of whether the EEA is inconsistent both in terms of its own regulations and 
the Constitution, as well as the question why judges have apparently unquestioningly 
accepted representivity as a legitimate, and constitutionally-compliant objective of 
affirmative action in terms of the EEA. All these aspects play a role in consideration of 
the lawfulness of the implementation of racial quotas. However, a more in-depth study 
of each of these topics may need to be done, individually, to sift through the complex 
questions that the EEA raises. While acknowledging those questions, the research set 
out to critically analyse the legality of race-based quotas in professional sports teams 
in South Africa. 
 
7 2 Research findings  
It has been shown that affirmative action measures under the EEA differ 
significantly to affirmative action as set out in the Constitution. In addition to eliminating 
unfair discrimination, the EEA aims to ensure equitable representation of designated 
groups in the workplace. Equitable representation is not defined in the Act and the 
term is not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution. Commentators have questioned 
whether this renders the EEA inconsistent with the Constitution. While this question 
was not explored further, it is to take note of it. This influences affirmative action 
measures under the EEA, especially since equitable representation has been used 
interchangeably with, and even implied to mean, “representivity”. Representivity 
means to reach a level of representation in a workforce which equates to the national 
or regional demographic profile, but in this context, to the racial demographic profile 
of the entire population. This is vastly different from the constitutional aim of affirmative 
action which is to redress past disadvantage, as expressly recorded in section 9(2) of 
the Bill of Rights. 
Neither the EEA nor the NSRAA state that professional sports teams must be 





through section 20(3) warns against promoting race above merit. However, 
government spokespersons, as well as the President, are calling for demographic 
representivity in various sectors of the workforce despite the potential negative 
implications of such a form of affirmative action for non-beneficiaries. It is submitted 
that one cannot set legitimate numerical goals or targets when striving for absolute 
demographic representivity, especially when the Minister of Sport has enforced 
punitive measures for not meeting these “targets”, without facing the real risk of such 
“targets” turning into illegitimate racial quotas. Therefore, race has now become a 
stand-alone/determinative factor when implementing affirmative action in professional 
sport. There are more than enough examples of sports bodies having to meet set 
targets or face punishment. Positions in teams are clearly reserved based on race and 
would appear to equate to discrimination for its own sake, as the USA courts have 
ruled in the past.  
It is now clear that the South African government has in effect defined equitable 
representation to mean demographic representivity. Therefore, Malan’s words may 
ring true that the EEA may now simply be aimed towards the achievement and 
maintenance of quotas in the workforce. Why then are racial quotas debated in sport? 
Because despite the government’s interpretation and implementation of the Act, the 
Act expressly prohibits quotas. Professional athletes are protected by this very Act, 
and as mentioned above, the EEA and the NSRAA do not make any assertion that 
sports teams should reflect the national demographic profile of the nation. At the very 
least there might be significant tension between these two pieces of legislation in their 
application in this context. Furthermore, the courts have not only explicitly stated that 
quotas are inherently and irrationally discriminatory, but they are also rigid and lack 
flexibility and therefore may place undue, and an unconstitutional burden on non-
beneficiaries. That burden equates to an infringement of non-beneficiaries’ right to 
dignity, as well as their right to freedom of trade and occupation.  
Racial quotas are discriminatory in nature; however, the Constitution and the EEA 
prohibits unfair discrimination, not merely discrimination. Is the implementation of 
racial quotas therefore unfair discrimination? Section 6(2) of the EEA states that 
affirmative action measures consistent with the purposes of the Act are not unfair 
discrimination. Du Toit is of the view that affirmative action can never result in unfair 





“affirmative action measures from the scope of ‘unfair discrimination’’,568 but the 
Constitution also views it as its own category outside of the “ambit of 
‘discrimination’”569 It had seemed as if Moseneke J had given plausibility to this point 
of view when, in the case of Van Heerden, he stated that even if measures are based 
on any of the listed grounds in section 9(3) of the Constitution, but pass constitutional 
muster under section 9(2), it cannot be presumed to be unfair discrimination.570 
However, this refers to the presumption of unfair discrimination and not necessarily 
the fact that affirmative action could never be unfair discrimination. Furthermore, if the 
government equates equitable representation to the rigid pursuit of demographic 
representivity, then according to their interpretation implementing racial quotas are 
consistent with the purposes of the Act. However, the Act says quotas are prohibited, 
and this will result in government’s interpretation of equitable representation leading 
to the Act being internally inconsistent.  
It is further true that the EEA must be interpreted to be in line with the Constitution, 
and according to the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of section 9(2), affirmative 
action measures must be rational. The Constitution states that there must be a rational 
link between the proposed affirmative action measure and its objective. While this 
allows for a clear intention to achieve a certain goal, it does not require that success 
of achieving that goal is guaranteed or mandatory, like the ‘targets’ advanced by the 
government in agreement with various sports bodies.571 Furthermore, if quotas are 
explicitly prohibited under the Act, it cannot pass any standard of review which has 
been proposed as the Act would be inconsistent with itself (A point that cannot be 
stressed enough). This should be the norm even when quotas are not blatantly used 
but disguised in measures aiming to achieve demographic representivity.  
The USA used the highest standard of review, strict scrutiny, to “smoke out” 
illegitimate quotas even when they were disguised as racial balancing. However, the 
USA follows a formal approach to equality and as a result, the implementation of 
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affirmative action measures are applied with scepticism. The standard of strict scrutiny 
ensures that quotas will never pass constitutional muster because it prefers one 
person over another for no reason other than race. This, in the view of the US Supreme 
Court, is discrimination for its own sake. Where the USA gets affirmative action “right” 
is when they acknowledge race as a plus factor and not the determinative/stand-alone 
factor in selection or admission. Therefore, the measure must be flexible enough to 
ensure that each athlete is evaluated as an individual and not in a manner that makes 
the athlete’s race the defining factor. This is where racial quotas fall short of the mark. 
It seems that in South Africa equitable representation equates to elevating race as the 
sole criterion for selection. Unfortunately for South Africa, in the context of professional 
sport, there remains a lack of case law to build up legal precedent on the matter. 
This lack of case law against discrimination in professional sports may further be a 
reason why international sports bodies have not been proactive against the 
implementation of racial quotas in South African sport. We have seen that these racial 
quotas are discriminatory and therefore breach countless international sports bodies’ 
rules and regulations. Even though South Africa prohibits unfair discrimination and not 
discrimination per se, South Africa remains bound by the rules and regulations of the 
international bodies. Furthermore, there are countless examples of political 
interference in South African sport. Government’s influence over the sports sector in 
South Africa should, however, come as no surprise, as sport was identified as one of 
the most essential tools to lead the country into a non-racial society. However, this 
should not give the government the license to interfere as they please as we have 
seen international bodies punish federations for breaching these rules and regulations.  
With that said, one needs to look no further than the National Sports and Recreation 
Amendment Bill, 2020 (which is still before Parliament) for a sign of things to come. 
The Bill aims to give the Minister even more power and this is made clear when one 
looks at the proposed amendments. These include giving the Minister the power to 
review the recognition of SASCOC for failing to perform their functions as 
contemplated in the amendment Bill. The Minister may either withdraw funding, 
withdraw its recognition of national colours or suspend its recognition wholly or 
partially. Furthermore, the Minister would be given full control in approving all 
applications for the bidding and hosting of major events. In respect of section 13A 
(issuing of policies and guidelines by the Minister to promote equity, representivity and 





undertaken to ensure compliance with the above provision as well as the 
Transformation Charter. Without the above amendments appearing in any existing 
legislation, it is apparent that the Minister is already attempting to exert this sort of 
power. The main purpose is clearly to grant the Minister more power to be able to 
influence transformation in sport to a greater degree. The power being removed from 
SASCOC and being granted to the Minister is an example where there would probably 
be more blatant examples of political interference in sport in the future.  
However, South Africa has in the democratic era avoided sanctions or punishment 
from these international bodies. A reason for the lack of sanctions and punishment 
may be due to the terrible sports system endured by black athletes under the apartheid 
regime, which was fundamentally built on a system of blatant discrimination. Would 
the role that sport has played in the South African unification process then justify the 
use of racial quotas? It is no secret to the world what black athletes went through and 
in some cases are still going through to enjoy the same opportunities as their white 
counterparts. This means that quotas are considered an appealing mechanism to 
enforce change with immediate effect. The government often uses the past as a 
reason for supporting the implementation of racial quotas in sport. It raises the 
question of whether the abnormal system of apartheid and its lingering effects requires 
an abnormal tool like racial quotas to dismantle the legacy of apartheid. Over the 
years, quotas have been a quick-fix tool for federations to select representative teams. 
But the fact that quotas still raise many questions and we remain far off the mark of 
“equality” in sport, shows that perhaps we need to critically rethink how to level the 
playing fields. 
However, we are focusing on the legality of the measure and not merely what 
seems morally right or wrong. Yes, sport was used to dismantle an oppressive system 
and introduce a new-found unity to South Africa, but does and should this override the 
basis of fundamental constitutional values in respect of human dignity and equality? It 
is submitted that, for the reasons advanced in this dissertation, racial quotas simply 
cannot be deemed lawful. Sport is no longer enjoyed or participated in simply for 
leisure and has become the livelihood of many professional athletes who enjoy (or 
should enjoy) the same rights as any other working citizen. Sport should, therefore, 
not be allowed to be used as a political tool. Quotas are unfairly discriminatory. 





of the potentially “special” nature and value of sport, measures and policies that 
appear to flout constitutional principles can ever be justified. 
 
7 3 Recommendations  
Taking the above into consideration, there are four specific recommendations to be 
considered. Firstly, Affirmative action is discrimination, yet is viewed as part and parcel 
of the right to substantive equality and the prohibition against unfair discrimination, 
due to its constitutional and legislative mandate. However, measures still need to pass 
constitutional muster. The fact that the EEA differs so much from the Constitution may 
result in many challenges and debates. This stems from the fact that equitable 
representation is the main aim of the EEA. It is therefore of vital necessity to define 
the concept ‘equitable representation’ either in the Act and/or by the courts. We have 
clearly seen the results of the lack of definition. Equitable representation has been 
equated to ‘representivity’ and when enforced by government, amounts to a racial 
quota system. Therefore, the role of representivity (which is not mentioned anywhere 
in the Constitution) in respect of the fundamental objectives of the affirmative action 
chapter of the EEA should also be defined and explained. This will go a long way in 
ensuring that the aim of the EEA is set out clearly and does not leave scope for 
confusion or manipulation.  
Secondly, there is clarity regarding quotas being prohibited by means of legislation 
(the EEA), but not whether they are unconstitutional, and more cases need to be 
brought before our courts to adjudicate on matters relating to the constitutionality of 
quotas, specifically in the sports context in order to establish clarity and precedent on 
the matter. The USA could identify racial balancing resulting in a quota system 
because the US Supreme Court had adjudicated on quotas over a number of years 
and therefore had managed to create legal precedent. 
Thirdly, to make a real impact, sustainable sports transformation should be driven 
from the bottom up. The “grassroots” levels need to be targeted as this results in 
sustainable and long-term results. This would ensure that sporting merit will also 
eventually feature more strongly. In this respect, the evidence is that government has 
not done what it could and should, and that quotas in that context specifically is smoke 
and mirrors at the expense of substance. The EEA’s protection extends to professional 





cannot be taken advantage of because professional sport is a “special” type of 
occupation. It is exactly because of this “special” nature of sport in South Africa, that 
a decision needs to be made whether sport’s special nature means that one should 
allow a limitation of fundamental constitutional principles and rights.  
Lastly, it is important to note yet again that quotas are prohibited for a reason. That 
reason being that it creates unfair discrimination against non-beneficiaries of 
affirmative action in sports teams. Transformation is necessary considering the harm 
suffered by people of colour. That should never be debated, but it is a sensitive topic 
that needs to be approached as such and addressed correctly, legally and 
constitutionally. It might be advisable for government and/or the major sports 
federations to obtain a proper and high-level legal opinion on the lawfulness of the 
current transformation measures (particularly quotas/racial targets) in light of the 
applicable international legal framework, in order to facilitate a due diligence exercise 
to determine potential liability for federations and to plan in order to avert future 
sanctions from international bodies. The progress that South Africa has made in terms 
of transformation would mean very little if, for example, South African cricket is 
suspended from international competition. It would then matter very little what the 
racial composition of the Proteas team is.  
No one has a memorandum on how to best recover from apartheid, but what we do 
have is a Constitution which is transformative in nature. I believe that if all else fails, 
one should always base one’s actions on the Constitution, and it is highly questionable 
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